ORAL ORDER

PER JUSTICE MR. V.R. KINGAONKAR

We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

2.          There is delay of 66 days in filing of the present revision petition.  The petitioner had filed appeal no. 332/2007 being aggrieved by judgment and order of the District Consumer Forum in complaint case no. 269/2006.  That appeal was dismissed by the State Commission on the ground that delay of more than 160 days was caused in filing of the appeal had not at all been sufficiently explained.

3.      Not only that there was substantial delay in filing of the appeal before the State Commission, which was not duly explained as per the impugned order, but that there is further delay in filing of the present revision petition.

4.      The delay is of 66 days and it is alleged that time of 156 days was consumed in obtaining the certified copy.  The application for copy was filed by the petitioner in the State Commission at a belated stage. The petitioner alleges that copy of the oral order was received on 04-02-2011. The oral order was rendered by the State Commission on 19-11-2010 in presence of counsel for the parties.  Obviously, the knowledge of the oral order can be attributed to the petitioner as on the day the impugned order was dictated in the open court/commission.  There was no reason for the petitioner to wait further.  The petitioner could have immediately filed an application for certified copy at least in the third week of November, 2010.  The allegation that the copy was received later on is not worth the name and moreover the further delay tried to be explained is regarding the time consumed in obtaining the approval from the higher authority.  The delay is said to have occurred because the APFC, Delhi sought translated copy of the order of CDRF and later on an advocate was engaged to provide the translated copy.  The time consumed in obtaining translated copy of the order of the CDRF cannot be a sufficient cause to condone the delay.

5.      Even for sake of argument it is assumed that there was delay in filing of the petition due to the reasons stated in the application, the justification for the delay in filing of the appeal before the State Commission is found to be totally inadequate, insufficient and inexplicable.  The State Commission noted that the judgment of the District Forum was delivered on 05-09-2006.  The petitioner   alleged   that    copy of that judgment was received on 28-09-2006.  Still,   however,   FA No. 332/2007 was filed on 11-04-2007.  The contention of the petitioner was that time was consumed in obtaining approval from the competent authority to prefer the appeal.  The learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to case of State of Nagaland vs Lipok AO & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752.   In the given case, the Supreme Court held that certain amount of latitude is permissible having regard to considerable delay in procedural red tapism in the decision making process of the Government.  The Supreme Court held that the individual and the State cannot be put on the same footing.  It appears that liberal approach is required to be taken in such a matter when the delay is duly explained and is of marginal nature.   In the case of “State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO & Ors.” (Supra), the delay was of 57 days in filing of the application for grant of leave was made in terms of Section 378 (3) of the CRPC. 

6.      The State Commission has referred to case of M/s National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Narmadabai Prahlad Mote & Anr. II(2000) ACC 279 (DB).  The Supreme Court in the subsequent case in Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon, Medium Project & Anr.  (2008) 17 SCC 448 held that the Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the government in filing an appeal.  The relevant observations may be reproduced as below:--

“It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities.  The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such.  It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it.  In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict.  In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis.  We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being proper foundation in the pleadings.

7.          Similarly, in case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) by LRs Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 363, the Supreme Court succinctly illustrated concept of “sufficient cause” and the liberal approach.          The Supreme Court referred to Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 in the context.  In Balwant Singh (Supra), the Supreme Court held that even if the term “sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned.  It has been observed that the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation.  It is held that justice must be done to both the parties equally.  Considering the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot claim any special privilege under the garb that certain procedural steps were required to be taken during the relevant period.

8.      In any case when the appeal was dismissed by the State Commission on the ground that the delay was not properly explained by the petitioner, it was more necessary that further delay should not have been caused in filing of the revision petition.  We find that the petitioner did not learn any lesson inspite of the order of the State Commission, which declined to condone delay and thereafter also continued to commit the same mistake of filing this revision petition after a considerable delay.   Under the circumstances, we find no justification to condone the delay.  The revision petition is accordingly dismissed.