1.       This appeal has been filed in challenge to the Order dated 19.01.2024  in CC No. 117 of 2022  of the State Commission,  Karnataka    

2.       The appeal has been filed with a reported delay of 119 days and admitted delay of 109 days as per the delay condonation application. The delay does not appear to be insignificant and as such learned counsel has been heard firstly on the delay condonation application.

3.       Heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the record including inter alia the delay condonation application.   

4.       It has been submitted by learned counsel that after obtaining the copy of the impugned Order the matter was examined internally by the Department and then it was referred to the central team dealing with the claims and their views were solicited. The central team thereafter referred the matter to medical team and then it was decided to file the appeal in the matter.  Panel counsel was approached and the matter was entrusted to him.  The necessary documents were then collected and the appeal was drafted and then finalized. This process resulted in the delay in filing of the appeal.  The submissions that have been made by the learned counsel is a reiteration of the grounds pleaded in the delay condonation application which may be quoted hereinbelow and which read as follows:-

That there is a delay of 109 days in filing the instant appeal, the reason being that after receiving the certified copy of the impugned order, in the first place, the appellant internally examined the impugned judgment by the dealing office. Keeping in view the seriousness of the matter which has the potential of having bearing on similar matters on PAN India basis, the matter was referred to the central claims team at Mumbai on 17, March, 2024 for their views. After examining the matter, the Central team referred the matter for examination by the medical team on 5 April, 2024. After consulting the medical team, the appellant decided to prefer the instant statutory appeal before this Hon'ble Commission and accordingly, the appellant entrusted the matter to the panel counsel on 3.7.2024 who upon examining the record, desired certain documents which were provided on 16.07.2024 after obtaining certified copy from the learned State Commission. The counsel shared the draft appeal on 24.07.2004 with the appellant for comments. Hence, this delay.          

          The learned counsel also submitted that in the normal course the delay should be condoned and attempt should be made to consider the matter on merits rather than to reject the same on the technical ground of limitation.

5.       First of all it may be observed that in the ordinary course whenever the aspect of evaluating the sufficiency of cause behind the delayed filing of a  petition or appeal, as the case may be, is involved, it is advisable to adopt a liberal approach and not a pedantic one.  A pragmatic view needs to be adopted as it is normally found preferable to decide a case on its merits rather than to thwart the same at the threshold on the point of limitation.  But while saying so, it must not be misconstrued to mean that the approach to be adopted can ever be such which may reduce the law on the point of limitation, wherever it is provided, into complete insignificance as if it is inconsequential and does not signify anything.  The law of limitation wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve which cannot be looked down with irreverence or with indifference.  The Courts, judicial or quasi-judicial as they may be, can never afford to ride roughshod over the solemn provisions of limitation wherever they have been laid down by the Legislature in its wisdom.  It is also to be kept in perspective that the failure to file an appeal against a particular order and the failure to challenge the same within the prescribed period of time, often gives rise simultaneously to a right to the other side which accrues.  This is true that if valid reasons come forth and sufficient cause is shown which may go to vindicate the delayed filing of an appeal the same may be accepted and the delay may be condoned by the given Forum.   But this discretion conferred upon any Forum judicial or quasi-judicial as it may be, has to be exercised judiciously and in keeping with the norms.  The exercise of discretion in such matters is not the exercise of any prerogative or privilege.  It is essentially the exercise of a statutory power, granted by the Act, which has to be exercised judiciously and legally both.  The delay of larger periods may be condoned in a given case if sufficient cause may be shown which resulted in the delay.  On the other hand, a lesser period of delay may not be condoned if valid reasons furnishing or showing sufficient cause are not brought forth by the defaulting party.  The onus to show and furnish the necessary factual or circumstantial basis which contributed to the delay, must be shown in order to earn the condonation and this onus is of the defaulting party who seeks such condonation.

6.       When we proceed to make an evaluation about the genuineness of the pleading in order to decide whether they can be said to constitute sufficient cause good enough to earn the condonation of delay, we feel constrained to observe that the grounds pleaded fall much shorter and do not at all qualify to be called valid reasons.  If the appellants felt aggrieved by an Order they have their own internal mechanism to scan through it and take appropriate steps to decide about the next steps to be taken in that regard.   If internally the matter is to pass through different tables and is to be referred to more than one team it is for the appellant to ensure the mechanism efficient enough to do all this exercise within the prescribed period of time.  It is true that while evaluating the sufficiency of cause  we do not tend to adopt a pedantic approach and always make an attempt to keep in perspective the pragmatic considerations relating to the nature of working of a department.  But while saying so we certainly do not mean to imply that in the name of being a public sector or private sector company any such long leash can ever be granted to it that it may ride roughshod over the statutory law of limitation and may act in such a manner which may result in reducing the law of limitation into complete insignificance as if it is nugatory. The impugned Order was passed on 19.01.2024 while the appeal has been filed on 01.08.2024. The admitted delay according to the learned counsel for the appellants is of 109 days.  The delay involved is not of days or weeks but is of months and in order to bridge up the hiatus which separates the date of the impugned Order and the date of the filing of the appeal cogent, reliable, genuine and convincing explanations have to come forth.  The grounds that have been pleaded perhaps speak of nothing more than an internal administrative indifference and a casual attitude towards the law of limitation.  No such impelling circumstances are reflected in the application which may be taken or treated to be a credible explanation for the delayed fling of the appeal.  It appears that the law of limitation was simply taken for granted and instead of moving with alacrity and dispatch the things were allowed to move with their own slow pace giving scant regard to the statutory period of limitation.  In fact when we see the things in perspective of the Consumer Protection Act, we also have to give due regard to its objects and the need to decide consumer disputes expeditiously.  An overly liberal approach may eventually prove incompatible with the concept of expeditious consumer justice and the avid object for which the Consumer Protection Act itself has been enacted. In order to earn the condonation of delay the defaulting appellants have to furnish the factual basis from which may emanate valid reasons and sufficient cause to vindicate the delayed filing of the appeal.  The explanations offered appear to be explanations given just for the sake of giving them and not much can be made out by it to the benefit of the defaulting appellants.       

7.       The onus to show such factual basis from which may have emanated valid reasons to vindicate the delay in filing an appeal was on the appellants.  But the appellants have obviously failed to discharge that onus to the satisfaction of this Bench.  The Bench does not see even a semblance of good explanation which may constitute sufficient ground to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is without much worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. As such the  Bench does not feel inclined to allow  the application seeking the condonation.

8.       Resultantly the appeal too stands dismissed on limitation concomitantly.

9.       The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the appeal and to the learned counsel for the appellant. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.