Petitioner being aggrieved by the impugned order of the State Commission dated 23.12.2011 has preferred this revision petition.  The revision petition, however, has been filed with the delay of 98 days after the expiry of statutory period of limitation of 90 days in filing the revision petition.  The petitioner, therefore, alongwith revision petition has moved an application for condonation of delay.

2.           The explanation given for delay in filing of revision petition is that the petitioner is a private limited company having its office all over India.  There is a hierarchy of officers having financial powers and the considerable time is lost in taking approval of the highest authority to challenge the order in question.  Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that it is well settled that while considering the request for condonation of delay, the Courts and various forums should adopt a liberal approach especially in case of Government Bodies and Corporate Bodies. 

3.           Before adverting to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be useful to have a look on the scheme of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ( in short, ‘the Act’).  The statutory period for filing of revision petition is 90 days from the date of receipt of the order by the party.  Section 13 of the Act deals with the procedure to be adopted by the District Forum for disposal of complaint after admission.  Section 13 (3A) provides that complaint shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made to decide the complaint within three months from the date of receipt of notice by the opposite party where the complaint does not require analysis or testing of commodities and within five months, if it requires analysis or testing of commodities. From this as also other provisions of the Act, it is evident that object behind the Act is to provide expeditious relief to the consumer.  In the instant case, there is inordinate delay of 98 days  as per the report of the Registry whereas the petitioner claims that delay is of 50 days.  The petitioner has nowhere mentioned  on which date he received copy of the impugned order which was dispatched to him by the State Commission on 03.01.2013.  Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the version of the petitioner that delay is only of 50 days.  Only reason given for condonation of delay is the procedural delays by the hierarchy of the petitioner / company in taking decision to challenge the impugned order. No details of movement of file have been provided.  Day to day delay has not been explained.  Thus, we are not satisfied with the explanation.  Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if the appeals and revisions which are highly belated are entertained.  Relevant observations are as under:

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this  Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer fora”.

4.           Going by the above observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inordinate delay of 98 days or 50 days as claimed by the petitioner cannot be condoned.

5.           Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that petitioner has very strong case on merits and if his revision petition is dismissed on technical grounds of limitation, the petitioner shall suffer injustice.  In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that State Commission as well as District Forum have failed to appreciate that the fire took place because the petitioner was unauthorisedly trying to fill gas cylinder installed in the car with a cooking gas cylinder.  In support of this contention, he has referred to the report of the Surveyor.  The report of the Surveyor has not been placed on record.  Therefore, we are not in position to appreciate its contents.  We may however, note that State Commission in the impugned order has dealt with aforesaid plea of the case in para 11 & 12 of the impugned judgment, which observations are reproduced thus:

“For the reasons best known the Surveyors reports submitted to it by Mr.Sambasiva Rao and Mr.Jagannadha Sastry were not filed. The report of Mr.Ramesh Babu, Surveyor does not in any way convey that the complainant had used the domestic gas.  Obviously the insurance company had collected some newspaper clipping marked as Ex.B4 wherein there was a mention that the complainant was using the gas kit without any authorization or permission.  However, at the end of news item there was a categorical mention that the fire officer Mr.Simhachalam  has informed the reporter that he would enquire whether the complainant had permission to use gas kit for running the vehicle.  It looks as though a domestic gas cylinder was retrieved from the bushes from the scene of incident.  However, it was stated that the fire officer would enquire into the matter whether the cylinder retrieved from the bushes pertain to the cylinder used in the car.  These reports are contradictory.  In fact the complainant had purchased the Maruti Omni van running on gas / petrol. Even in the counter it is not mentioned that he had used the domestic gas cylinder.  What all stated was that the complainant got the domestic gas filled in the gas tank attached to the car.  Since the claim of the insurance company was that the complainant got the gas filled in the gas chamber attached to the car it could  not have been domestic gas.  Unless it is proved by evidence by enquiring  with the gas agency whether the complainant got it filled through domestic gas cylinder for running his vehicle.  The insurance company intends that a presumption to be drawn from the narration made in the newspaper item without confirming any of these facts.  Even their own surveyor did not confirm the same.  We suspect that the other surveyors might have given a positive repot and therefore the insurance company has suppressed the said reports.

 It may be stated herein that the Hon’ble Supreme Court deprecated the practise of appointing one surveyor after another till such time they get a favourable report. Even the report that was filed by the insurance company does not in any way suggest that the complainant had filled the domestic gas in the cylinder attached to the car. The claim of the insured cannot be rejected on suspicion. When the very car was burnt and was useless, even according to the report of the surveyor, the complainant would undoubtedly entitled to the entire amount covered under the policy. The very purpose of taking insurance policy over the vehicle will be defeated if compensation is not granted. Since the insurance company could not prove by leading any evidence that the complainant got the tank fixed to the car was filled with domestic gas, it cannot be said that there was violation of policy conditions. The car got insured evidently run with gas. Whether it is domestic gas or the gas meant for running the car was not established. The repudiation of claim was unjust.  It has become a practise for the insurance companies to take every small fact and turn it into a major issue to deny the just compensation. We are in agreement with the Dist. Forum finding that the fire accident was sudden due to combustion in the gas chamber”.

6.         On reading of the above, we find that State  Commission has dealt with the aforesaid factual aspect in a reasonable manner and given well reasoned finding.  Otherwise also, there is concurrent finding of fact by both the fora below which cannot be interfered in revisional jurisdiction by re-appreciating the facts. 

7.         It is well settled that under section 21 (b) of the Act, the scope of revisional jurisdiction is very limited.  The Hon’ble Supreme in the matter of Mrs. Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. M/s United Insurance Co. Ltd. 2011 (3) Scale 654 has observed thus:

“Also it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21(b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside.  In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two Forums.  The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the Courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts.  This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked.  In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act has been transgressed.  It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two fora.”

8.         Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show us any jurisdictional or factual error in the impugned order which may call for interference in exercise of powers under section 21 (b) of the Act.  Since two foras below have given detailed and reasoned orders, there is no justification for any interference particularly when orders do not suffer from any infirmity or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.

9.         In view of the discussion above, we do not find any merit in the application for condonation of delay. It is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, Revision Petition is dismissed as barred by limitation and also on merits.