Haryana

StateCommission

A/139/2016

RANGOLI PROJECTS PVT.LTD. - Complainant(s)

Versus

MANJU GARG - Opp.Party(s)

ANKUR BALI

17 Mar 2016

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION HARYANA, PANCHKULA

 

First Appeal No.139 of 2016

Date of Institution:11.02.2016

Date of decision:17.03.2016

 

Rangoli Projects Pvt. Ltd. through its Managing Director, DD House, F-1/9, Okhla Industrial Area Phase I, New Delhi-20 or 8B, Rajendra Park, Pusa Road, New Delhi.

…Appellant

Versus

 

Manju Garg W/o Ajay Garg, R/o H.No.34, Old Housing Company Sonepat.

…Respondent

CORAM:   Mr. R.K.Bishnoi, Judicial Member.
                   Mrs. Urvashi Agnihotri, Member.

 

Present:-    Mr.Ankur Bali, Advocate counsel for the appellant.

 

                                      O R D E R

 

R.K.BISHNOI, JUDICIAL MEMBER:

 

            Alongwith the appeal, appellant has filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act (in short “Act”) for condonation of delay of  1199 days wherein, it is alleged that  appellant did not receive any notice, although one Sh.Bijender Singh, Advocate appeared on behalf of the appellant, who was not authorized by the appellant. Counsel did not appear on further dates and learned District Forum passed ex parte order.  Again Mr. Dharamvir Nain, Advocate appeared on behalf of the appellant on 06.03.2012, who was also not authorized by the appellant. The appellant came to know about the order when execution petition was filed by the complainant and bailable warrants issued. It immediately appointed Sh.Vinay Chhikara, Advocate to represent it’s case.  In this process 1199 days were consumed (as in application). Thus, delay of 1199 days in filing of the present appeal be condoned.

2.         Arguments Heard. File perused.

3.         Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the appellant did not ask Sh.Bijender Singh, Advocate and Sh.Dharamvir Nain, Advocate  to appear on it’s behalf before District Forum.  An application was moved before the District forum to set aside the ex parte orders, but, the same was dismissed vide order dated 20.11.2014 on the ground that it cannot review it’s own order.  Fact of execution petition came to it’s notice on 27.09.2015 when warrants were received. Thereafter documents etc. were collected and this appeal was filed. The delay is not intentional and the same may be condoned.

4.         This argument is of no avail.  The appellant has appeared before the District Forum in the year 2014 in execution petition, whereas this appeal has been filed in the year 2016.  It is no where alleged that a complaint has been filed against the advocates who had put in appearance without any instructions. So it cannot be presumed that they were not directed by the complainant to put in appearance  during the main proceedings.  Even after dismissal of their application vide order dated 20.11.2014 they preferred this appeal on 11.02.2016.  Why it did not rush to the Commission is not properly explained by them. It  shows  that O.P. intentionally  avoided  to  file  the  appeal.   A period  of  30  days  has  been  provided  for  filing  an  appeal  against  the  order  of  the  District  Forum. The proviso therein permits the State Commission to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there is “Sufficient cause” for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The expression of sufficient cause has not been defined in the Act rightly so, because it would vary from facts and circumstances of each case.

5.                   The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR, 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held that;

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay.”

          The Hon’ble National Commission in case Government of U.T. Electricity Department & Others versus Ram Lubhai, II(2006) CPJ 104 has held that:-

“Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 15 –Appeal –Maintainability – Limitation –Condonation of delay– Resjudicata –Appeal filed after a delay of 44 days –Plea of procedural delay in getting approval for filing appeal – Appeal filed by complainant against order of District Forum decided and copy of order dispatched to parties prior to filing of appeal by opposite party –Appeal and application for condonation of delay dismissed –Matter once finally concluded by any Court cannot be reopened by same Court.”

          In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has   been observed:

         “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.”

      In Ram Lal and Ors.  Vs.  Rewa Coalfields  Ltd., AIR  1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

         

    Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 held as under;

“We have considered   the respective    submissions.  The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The   legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that   they    do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same   time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.”       

    In 2012 (2) CPC 3 (SC) – Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:-

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”.

6.      Taking into consideration the pleas raised by the appellant and all the facts it is clear that it is not a fit case to condone the delay of 1199 days in filing of the appeal. Hence, the application of the appellant is dismissed.

7       Resultantly, this appeal is also hereby dismissed as time barred in limine.

 

March 17, , 2016	Urvashi Agnihotri Member		R.K.Bishnoi, Judicial Member
S.K