Heard Ms. Vandana Sehgal, Advocate, for the appellant. In spite of service of the notice, nobody appears for the respondents. 

2.       The opposite party has filed above appeal from the order State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra dated 20.09.2019 passed in CC/1247/2016, whereby the complaint has been allowed and the appellant has been directed either to deliver possession of the flat as allotted to the complainants or any alternative flat of same specification after receiving balance consideration or refund the amount deposited by the complainants with interest @12% per annum and pay cost of Rs.25000/-. In case refund is not made within two months from the receipt of the order, interest @15% per annum would be payable, for the period thereafter.

3.       The office has reported that the appeal has been filed with delay of 1308 days. The appellant has filed IA/8207/2023 for condoning 443 days delay in filing the appeal. In the IA, the appellant has stated that the appellant and his advocate appearing before State Commission did not have any intimation of passing the impugned order dated 20.09.2019. The appellant received ‘Free Certified Copy’ of the order dated 20.09.2019 on 26.12.2019. Then the appellant took advice and was advised to file appeal before National Commission. By the time, he could obtain advice, in March, 2020, Covid-19 spread in the country and Mumbai was severely hit by the lockdowns imposed by Central Government and State Government. Due to Covid-19, all the employees of the appellant left for the hometowns. The employees returned back in June, 2022. Then the appellant sought some time, in locating an advocate in Delhi to file the instant appeal. They then spent some time, in appointing an advocate in Delhi. Then they spent some time in giving instruction to the advocate of Delhi for preparing the appeal. After preparing, the appeal was filed on 22.06.2023.

4.       We have considered the cause for delay as given in the delay condonation application. As stated, the appellant received ‘Free Certified Copy’ of the order dated 20.09.2019 on 26.12.2019. Lockdown in the country was imposed by Central Government on 22.03.2020. Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition No.3 of 2020, waived the limitation from 15.03.2020 till 29.05.2022. The employees of the appellant returned back on their duty in June, 2022. The Affidavit filed in support of IA/8207/2023 was sworn on 24.04.2023 in Mumbai. The appeal was filed on 22.06.2023.

5.       Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) 14 SCC 578, held that it is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras. A three member Bench in Brahampal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 512, held as follows:

“16. At this juncture, we need to interpret the term “sufficient cause” as a condition precedent for the granting of the discretionary relief of allowing the appeal beyond the statutory limit of ninety days. Although this Court has held that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, but it is relevant to note that even while interpreting “sufficient cause” under the Limitation Act the courts have taken a liberal interpretation. This Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321, observed that

“13. … (i) The words ‘sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation’ should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.”

17. The aforesaid view was reiterated in  Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, wherein this Court held that:

“25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.”

18. The Court in the abovementioned cases highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause “sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party's inaction and negligence, the courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties.

19. The aforesaid view was taken by this Court in  Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, wherein the Court held that

“23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.”

6.       The counsel for the appellant submitted that while issuing notice, this commission has granted conditional interim order and the condition imposed in the interim order has been complied with. State Commission has awarded 12% interest, while now a days Supreme Court is awarding 9% interest in case of refund. To prevent miscarriage of justice, delay is liable to be condoned.

          We do not agree with arguments of the counsel for the appellant. So long as delay in filing the appeal is not condoned, this Commission has no jurisdiction to examine the merit of the appeal. If the merit is examined before condoning the delay, purpose of providing limitation by the legislature will be frustrated. As held by the Supreme Court that for conodnation of delay reasonableness of the explanation has to be examined. As per appellant there is total 443 days delay in filing the appeal. The explanations as given by the appellant are that after receiving certified copy of the order, they took some time in taking legal opinion, some time, in locating an advocate in Delhi to file the instant appeal, some time, in appointing an advocate in Delhi and some time in giving instruction to the advocate of Delhi for preparing the appeal. The appellant took unusual time in filing the appeal, although limitation for filing the appeal was 30 days under Section 19 of Consumer Protection Act, 1986. There appears no reason to take 443 days, ignoring limitation of 30 days. There is no reasonableness in the explanation given by the appellant, who has not exercised due diligence and committed gross negligence. IA/8207/2023 is rejected. The appeal is dismissed as time barred.