1.      Counsel for the petitioner heard.  Mani, the husband of Baby C.S., the complainant had availed financial assistance for purchasing a tractor as well as Mahindra Loan Suraksha Insurance cover.  The main attraction of this scheme was that if the borrower died during the pendency of the loan, the borrower’s family need not discharge the balance loan liability.  Unfortunately, the husband   of the complainant passed away on 14.04.2007 due to jaundice.  The claim was submitted.  The said claim was repudiated on the ground that the petitioner had wrongly declared that he was in good health.  He had signed the declaration of good health on 28.02.2007.  As is apparent from the death summary received from the Mother Hospital Limited,  Exhibit B-2, was produced in this context which reads that Mani died on 14.04.2007 and the cause of death was cirrhosis of liver, hepatorenal syndrome.

 2.      Ex-P-6 is a certificate issued issued from the Sain Nursing Home.  It shows that Mani was admitted in the hospital from 02.04.2007 to 10.04.2007.  In Ex-B-1, it is mentioned that Mani had seen doctor in 2004.  He had chronic liver disease then.  The State Commission was pleased to observe:-

“6.xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Ext. B1 is the death summary relied on to reject the claim of the complainant.  It is issued from the Mother Hospital based on the patent’s details kept in the Mother hospital.  It shows that Mani died on 14.4.2007 and the cause of death was cirrhosis of liver, hepatorenal syndrome. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx The doctor also gave the opinion that in 2004 when he saw the deceased he was not very ill.  The illness he had in 2007 was possibly the progression of the illness in 2004.  Ethanolic hepatitis is related to abuse of alcohol.  The doctor further gave the opinion that had the patient given up alcohol he would have carried on as he was in 2004.  He admitted in cross-examination that the death summary would not reveal the date of first admission in 2004.  The doctor further explained that generally a person with chronic liver disease would not go back to the original state of health.”

3.    It is very strange that few persons of this country who are medically threatened with impounding death, they rush to take the Insurance and then they have no qualms about telling lies.  The character of those persons comes down to the lowest ebb.

4.      In Satwant Kaur Sandhu Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in IV (2009) CPJ 8 (SC), the Hon’ble Apex Court  held as under :-

“12.. ……… Nonetheless, it is a contract of insurance falling in the category of contract ‘uberrimae fidei’, meaning, ‘a contract of utmost good faith, on the part of the assured’.  Thus, it needs little emphasis that when an information on a specific aspect is asked for in the proposal form, an assured is under a solemn obligation to make a true and full disclosure of the information on the subject which is within his knowledge.  It  is   not   for    the    proposer    to determine whether the information sought for is material for the purpose of the policy or not.  Of course, obligation to disclose extends only to facts which are known to the applicant and not to what he ought to have known.  The obligation to disclose necessarily depends upon the knowledge one possesses.  His opinion of the materiality of that knowledge is of no moment. (See: Joel Vs. Law Union & Crown Ins. Co. [1908] 2 K.B. 863).

13. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M.K.J. Corporation, III (1996) CPJ 8 (SC)=(1996) 6 SCC 428, this Court has observed that it is a fundamental principle of insurance law that utmost faith must be observed by the contracting parties.  Good faith forbids either party from non-disclosure of the facts which the

party privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact and his believing the contrary.  (Also see: Modern Insulators Ltd. Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., II (2000) SLT 323 = I (2000) CPJ 1 (SC) = (2000) 2 SCC 734).

17.  The  term “material fact”  is  not defined  in the Act and, therefore, it has been understood and explained by the courts in general terms to  mean as any fact which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he would like to accept the risk.  Any fact which goes to the root of the Contract of Insurance and has a bearing on the risk involved would be “material”.

18.  As stated in Pollock and Mulla’s Indian Contract  and Specific Relief Acts, any fact the knowledge or ignorance of which would materially influence an insurer in making the contract or in estimating the degree and  character of risks in fixing the rate of premium is a material fact”. 

5.    The revision petition is meritless, the same is dismissed.