This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner Assistant Executive Engineer/SDO Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. against the order dated 02.03.2017 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab, (in short ‘the State Commission’) passed in First Appeal No.527 of 2016. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 11.12.2015, electricity connection bearing account no.GC51/0002 installed at the school premises of the complainant was checked by the checking party of the petitioner headed by Engineer of Shakti Sadan Jalandhar and Additional Superintending Engineer enforcement No.1 Jalandhar. Electricity account of the complainant was overhauled and it was found that the amount of Rs.12,47,193/- was payable by the complainant by application of multiplying factor as 2. Therefore a notice bearing memo no.577 was issued to the complainant for deposit of the said amount. On 19.12.2015, a representation from the complainant was received. Thereafter the electricity account of the complainant was again scrutinized and overhauled. It was found that during the said period, the complainant has been paying MMC (minimum monthly charges) bills and the amount of that bills, which were paid by the complainant was liable to be adjusted and after adjusting that amount, the complainant was found liable to pay an amount of Rs.7,49,448/-. On 01.01.2016, therefore notice bearing memo no.7 was issued to the complainant for deposit of the said amount of Rs.7,49,448/- along with the calculation sheet and copy of relevant provision/regulation, by relying upon which the account of electricity was overhauled. 3. Aggrieved by this action of the petitioner/opposite party, the respondent/complainant filed a consumer complaint bearing No.26 of 2016 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal, Forum, Ferozepur, (in short ‘the District Forum’). The complaint was resisted by the opposite party/petitioner on the ground that as per conversion factor of (2) Rs.7,49,448/- is required to be paid by the complainant. However, the District Forum vide its order dated 30.05.2016 allowed the complaint and passed the following order:- “18. In view of what has been discussed above, the present complaint is allowed against opposite party and the demand of the opposite party raised vide demand notice bearing memo No.07 dated 01/01/2016 for an amount of Rs.7,49,448/- is hereby quashed and the opposite party is directed to refund to the complainant as sum of Rs.1,12,420/- deposited as a conditional amount of stay with immediate effect. The complainant is further held entitled to a sum of Rs.20,000/- for mental harassment and sufferings and a sum of Rs.10,000/- as litigation expenses from the opposite party. This order is directed to be complied with within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order failing which, the opposite parties shall be liable for penal action under Section 27 of Consumer Protection Act.” 4. Aggrieved by the order of the District Forum, the petitioner/opposite party preferred an appeal bearing No.527 of 2016 and the same has been dismissed vide its order dated 02.03.2017. 5. Hence the present revision petition. 6. Heard the learned AAG for the State of Punjab on behalf of the petitioner at the admission stage. The learned counsel stated that the meter was installed in the year 2010. However, the checking was made in the year 2015 and the consumed units were corrected on the basis of multiplying factor, which was actually (2), though the bills were being raised at a multiplying factor of only (1) and the complainant was paying bills on the basis of the minimum monthly charges. The main objection of the learned counsel was that the fora below have not considered the issue of consumer, which was alleged by the opposite party. It was stated by the learned counsel that the respondent/complainant is not a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as he had taken electricity connection for commercial use. It was argued that though it has been stated in the complaint that the complainant is a school run by the charitable trust and therefore, there is no question of running the school for commercial purpose, but no evidence has been filed by the complainant in the shape of their profit and loss account or their balance sheet. Without any evidence, the State Commission has treated respondent/complainant as a consumer and has decided the appeal filed by the petitioner. 7. It was also stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the revision petition has been filed with delay of 120 days. It was explained that the delay has been caused by time taken in obtaining legal advice and getting the petition prepared. It was requested to condone the delay. 8. I have given a thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and have examined the material on record. 9. First of all, it is seen that the revision petition has been filed with delay of 120 days and the petitioner has not given any cogent reasons for condoning such delay. The following reasons are mentioned in the application for condonation of delay:- “4. Thereafter the petitioner had collected the papers from the Lawyer and through its department got approval for engaging a counsel at New Delhi and entrusted the case to him for drafting and filing. The counsel found that the papers forwarded were incomplete and requested the petitioner to forward the missing papers which the petitioner had to collect from their lawyer in Chandigarh and forward to the lawyer in Delhi. Only upon receipt of the entire papers the counsel could draft the petition and forward to the petitioner for his signature and attestation which took further timer and the petition is filed thereafter without any delay.” 10. From the above, it is clear that no specific reasons and circumstances supported by documents have been given by the petitioner to justify the condonation of the delay. These are only administrative lapses on the part of the petitioner and such delays are not accepted as sufficient cause for condoning of delay as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General &Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. &Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:- “29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay”. 11. Moreover, special periods of limitation have been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, Rules and Regulations for speedy disposal of consumer disputes. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC)has laid down that; “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras.” 12. Decision of Anshul Aggarwal (Supra) has been reiterated in CicilyKallarackalVs. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) 1, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court observed; “4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special Courts/ Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute (s). 5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay. 6. Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay.” 13. Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that:- “There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence”. 14. In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, Supreme Court observed:- “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition”. 15. The above authoritative judgements are clearly applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. No details of any dates of correspondences etc. have been given in the application for condonation of delay. In fact, no portion of the delay has been explained. Clearly the negligence and inaction is attributable to the petitioner in filing the present revision petition. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. 16. Coming to the merits of the case, prima facie, it seems that petitioner department was sending bills and bills were being paid on the minimum monthly charge (MMC) basis by the complainant. After five years, some inspection was made and it was found that the meter was to be read with multiplying factor of (2). However, the bills were being sent with multiplying factor of one. Clearly, this was the fault of petitioner department that they were not sending the correct bills. It is not the case of the petitioner that the complainant has done some tempering in the meter. Thus, prima facie the petitioner department was deficient in not sending the correct bills and recovering the correct amount. Suddenly after 5 years, no consumer could be burdened with a large sum to be paid as arrears and that too without any negligence or deficiency on the part of the complainant. Both the fora below have examined the facts and have found that the bill in question was not payable by the complainant. The scope under the revision petition against the concurrent finding is very limited as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Rubi (Chandra) Dutta vs. United India Insurance Company, 2011 (3) Scale 654, wherein the following has been observed:- “Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21 (b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view that what was taken by the two Forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the Courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken, by setting aside the concurrent finding of two fora.” 17. From the above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court it is implied that the facts cannot be reassessed at the stage of revision petition by this Commission. The only legal point raised in the present revision petition is the assertion of the petitioner that the complainant is not a “consumer”. In this regard, I find that the State Commission has examined this issue in great detail as would be clear from the following observations and finding of the State Commission:- “13. The contention of the appellant/opposite party that the respondent/complainant does not fall under the definition of “consumer” under the Act as the same is involved in commercial activities, is not tenable in view of Memorandum of complainant society Ex.C-143. It is clearly mentioned in this document that the complainant-school is a charitable school, being run by a charitable society, namely “Lala Saran Dass Boota Ram Aggarwal Sarv Hitkari Vidya Mandir” for the welfare of the children and the aim and objects of the society are to provide education to the needy persons and students, so that illiteracy can be removed; to open sanskar kendras to provide free education in slum areas to promote education etc. The ratio of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the opposite parties is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The present case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble National Commission rendered in Delhi Public School Vs. The M.D. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors., 2015 (1) CLT 103 (NC) in which in Para Nos.6,8 and 9, it was observed as follows. “6. On this point, the State Commission returned the finding that the complainant had refuted the charge that fees was being charged for use of equipment. A commercial purpose envisaged profit making. The main purpose of the activity must be to generate profits by using the goods purchased. If an educational institution bought equipment for being used by the students and even if it charged certain amount of fees for allowing the equipment to be used for students, the main purpose of purchase could not be said to be commercial. It was one thing to purchase the property with the object of making profit by hiring it to others for use and it was entirely a different thing when the equipment was bought for the purpose of use of students for education and charging a certain amount to render the costs and maintenance charges for such an equipment. In the present case, the equipment was purchased for being attached to some other system purchased for the purpose of education and research, it could not be said to be a purchase for commercial purposes. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on judgment of Apex Court in (2009) 3 SCC 240 Karnatakas Power Transmission Corpn. & Anr. Vs. Ashok Iron Works Pvt. Ltd. in which it was held that supply of electricity by Electricity Board to a consumer is service. I agree to the principle of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex court, but in this case it has nowhere been held that use of electricity by educational institution falls within purview of commercial purpose. In the aforesaid case, Company was engaged in manufacturing iron products and for that purpose electric connection was taken whereas, in the case in hand, electric connection has not been taken for production of any article and in such circumstances, aforesaid judgment does not render any help to the respondent. 9. In the light of aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that electric connection obtained by petitioner does not fall within purview of electric connection for commercial purpose and complaint was maintainable before consumer fora.” 14. The ratio of the above judgment lays down that if education institution purchases equipment for use by the students, the same cannot be said to the commercial purpose. In view of the law laid down in the above authority, the complainant certainly falls under the definition of “consumer”. 18. Electricity connections are charged either on residential, industrial or commercial rates of electricity. The petitioner has not filed any proof that the complainant was being billed on commercial or industrial rates to justify his stand on use of electricity for commercial purposes. Moreover, the responsibility to prove that the service was obtained for commercial purpose lies with the opposite party/petitioner. If the complainant did not file any records like balance sheet or profit & loss account, the opposite party should have requested the District Forum or the State Commission to order for production of these documents. The opposite party could have also filed some document to disprove the assertion of the complainant that the complaint was a charitable institution and run by a charitable society. Thus, the petitioner has failed in producing any evidence to justify its claim that the complainant was not a ‘consumer’. Thus, I agree with the finding of the State Commission that the complainant is a consumer in the present case. 19. Apart from the legal issue of “consumer”, no other legal point has been raised in the present revision petition so as to invoke the jurisdiction of this Commission inspite of concurrent findings of facts by the fora below. 20. Based on the above discussion, the Revision Petition No.3087 of 2017 is dismissed on the ground of limitation as well as on merits at the admission stage. | 
