1.       This revision petition has been filed in challenge to the Order dated 23.02.2023 in Appeal No. 464 of 2007 of the State Commission Uttar Pradesh arising out of Order dated 23.01.2007 of the District Commission in Complaint no. 215 of 2004.

2.       The present petition has been filed with reported and admitted delay of 243 days.

3.       Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and have perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 23.01.2007 of the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 23.02.2023 of the State Commission, the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition and the memo. of petition.

4.       As the delay does not appear to be insignificant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is being heard first on the delay condonation application in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not. 

5.       The submissions made by the learned counsel are no different from the grounds taken in the delay condonation application and they have been virtually repeated once again.  Submission is that even though the Order was passed by the State Commission on 23.02.2023 but its knowledge could be acquired only when the summons dated 17.06.2023 issued by the executing court was received.  The copy was obtained thereafter.  The afore-said information was received by the head office on 23.06.2023 and by the regional officer on 04.07.2023 which caused the delay.  It has also been submitted that a number of mergers had taken place in the bank which also contributed to the delay.  Another submission is that the erstwhile counsel did not inform about the impugned Order and it was his fault. It has also been submitted that because of the mergers the record also got misplaced.  Some time also got consumed in the translation work.  After collecting necessary information about the instant matter instructions, approvals and opinions were sought and it was decided to challenge the impugned Order before this Commission.  After approval of the draft the petition has been filed with delay.  Submission is that as the delay is neither deliberate nor intentional the same may be condoned.

6.       It may be observed that in the ordinary course the advisable approach to be adopted in such matters by a judicial or quasi-judicial Forum as the case may be, is to lean favourably towards the defaulting petitioner who fails to file the petition within the limitation period.  It is ordinarily preferred not to adopt a pedantic approach but to proceed with a pragmatic view and to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation.  But while saying so Commission should not be understood to mean or to imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided by the Act can either be blissfully ignored or be soft paddled at will.  Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment of the law of limitation.  The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with.  In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period.  It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the given Fora looking into the matter that there were actually justifiable reasons which go to explain as to why the petition was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Forum cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which even this Commission exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously.  The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioner who seeks judicial indulgence in this regard.  It is true that while evaluating the sufficiency of cause with regard to the circumstances, which resulted in the delay in filing the present petition, the Bench does adopt a pragmatic approach and not a pedantic one and it does keep in perspective the practical side of the working of a particular institution or sector, Public or Private as it may be, while evaluating the circumstances to determine the sufficiency of cause.  The Commission does make due allowance in that regard.  But such liberal disposition should not be construed to imply that such a long rope may ever be granted to any institution, company or sector which may go to result in shelving the law of limitation completely or which may go to render the same nugatory and reduce it to a naught.

7.       When this Bench proceeds to evaluate the genuineness of the grounds that have been pleaded in the delay condonation application in order to see whether they maybe held genuine grounds constituting sufficient cause to earn condonation of delay, it is found that the grounds pleaded may scarcely be called good grounds to deserve condonation for the delayed filing of petition.  The said amalgamation of the bank and the merges which took place are said to have been affected in the year 2019.  The impugned Order was passed on 23.02.2023.  It is difficult to comprehend that when the merger is said to have taken place in the year 2019 and the matter remained pending in the State Commission even after merger for almost four years and then the  impugned Order was passed, how can that process be logically connected with the delayed filing of the petition which has been filed on 22.01.2024.  The matter was duly represented by the bank’s counsel.  If after the merger the panel of lawyers changed it is a regular course that the subsequent lawyers step into the shoes of the erstwhile counsels and they start pursuing the pending matters and take care of them.  Such kind of explanation putting the blame on the erstwhile counsel also appears to be just an attempt to pass the buck and make the earlier counsel an escape goat only.  If the record got misplaced what else can it be termed except an act of gross negligence and how can the lack of due diligence in maintaining the record can qualify to be called a valid explanation to exonerate the delay is difficult to appreciate.  The translation work is also a routine exercise which is undertaken in most of the case as the petitions filed in the National Commission come from all nooks and corners of the nation having  different vernacular lawyers but it does not imply that the petitions should not be file within the prescribed period of time for that reason.  It is not a case which involves the delay of days or weeks.  It is a case where petition has been filed with a reported delay of 243 days.  The hiatus which separates the date of the passing of the Order and the date of filing of the petition is too yawning a gap to be either overlooked or be ignored.         

     The Bench does not see even a semblance of an explanation which may constitute a good ground to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is without worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. As such the  Bench  has no hesitation in dismissing the application.

8.       Resultantly the petition stands dismissed on limitation.

9.       The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.