1.       This revision petition has been filed under Section 58 (1) (b) of the Act 2019 in challenge to the Order dated 20.10.2022 in Appeal No. 285 of 2019 of the State Commission Andhra Pradesh arising out of Order dated 08.07.2019 of the District Commission in Complaint no.10 of 2019.

2.       Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as counsel appearing for respondents no. 1 to 3 and have perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 08.07.2019 of the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 20.10.2022 of the State Commission, the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition and the memo. of petition.

3.       It appears that initially an adverse Order was passed by the District Commission against the petitioners which was appealed in the State Commission. The State Commission partly allowed the appeal and modified the District Commission’s Order to a certain extent.  But the petitioners still aggrieved have filed the present revision petition against the Order passed by the State Commission but the same has been filed with the self-admitted delay of 75 days. However, the reported delay by office is 93 days.  

4.       An application seeking condonation of delay has been filed.  As the delay does not appear insignificant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is being heard first on the delay condonation application in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not. 

5.       The submissions made by the learned counsel are no different from the grounds taken in the delay condonation application and they have been virtually repeated once again. Learned counsel has been fair enough to admit that the impugned Order was passed on 20.10.2022 and the certified copy of the impugned Order has been procured on 25.10.2022 itself but the revision has been filed with the reported delay of 93 days. Submission is that the period of delay has been inadvertently typed in the delay condonation application as 75 days.  The only defence pleaded to explain the delay is that the matter was sent for drafting to the legal representative of the conducting law firm but the associate of the law firm was indisposed and so he was working from home.  According to learned counsel there was lack of proper communication within the law firm and, therefore, the matter remained unattended and the revision could not be filed in time.  According to the ground taken in the delay condonation application there were other consumer cases also which were received by the said associate of the law firm but they were ‘stored cold’ without intimation to the other associates of the law firm.  The lack of proper communication in the law firm eventually resulted in the delay in filing of the revision petition.  No other explanation has been proffered on behalf of the petitioner with regard to delay.  

6.         Ordinarily the Bench tends to adopt a liberal approach on the aspect of considering the point of delay and lean to take an indulgent view towards the side who seeks its condonation. The Bench prefers that a matter be decided on merits rather than be closed at the threshold stage i.e. on the ground of delay, but that does not imply that the Bench may ever ride roughshod over the statutory requirement regarding the law of limitation wherever it has been provided by the legislature in its wisdom. That is why, whenever there is a delay, and whenever condonation on that aspect is sought, by either side, it has to discharge the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds relying upon which such delay may be condoned. It goes without saying that such explanation has to be genuine and not an explanation just for the sake of explanation. Anything and everything said to bridge up a considerable gap of delay is not to be termed as legitimate explanation, which has to be sincere, honest and persuasively adequate and worthy of credence.

7.     The powers which have been conferred to condone the delay have got to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily and certainly not at will either whimsically or capriciously. The discretion to be exercised in such matters is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is essentially a legal exercise and has to be lawfully harnessed with judicious discipline. The object and purpose behind the law of limitation cannot be either swung into oblivion or be ignored with apathy. A complete disregard of the law of limitation will eventually frustrate and defeat the salutary purpose which inspires the enactment in this regard wherever provided.

8.       Having gone through the grounds taken in the delay condonation application the Bench feels constrained to observe that they fall far short of qualifying as sufficient grounds to condone the delay. The law firm entrusted with the matter was supposed to take appropriate steps and file the revision within the period of limitation. The inefficiency of its employee or the mis-communication between law associates of the firm or the casual attitude of the law associates can scarcely be called valid grounds to vindicate the delay or to justify the non-compliance of law of limitation in breach. The managerial inefficiency or an indifferent attitude towards the law of limitation or towards the progress or status or the development relating to pending cases is hardly a good explanation. The lackadaisical approach on the part of the petitioners and being remiss in pursuing the matter or looking after them in right earnest does not serve as an acceptable excuse.  The Bench, therefore, does not feel inclined to accept the grounds taken in the delay condonation application as being good grounds for furnishing  ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay involved in filing the petition.

9.      In the present case however one does not see even a semblance of an explanation which may constitute a good ground to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is palpably without worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. As such we have no hesitation in dismissing the application.

10.     Resultantly the petition stands dismissed on limitation.

11.     The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to their learned counsel. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.