Chandigarh

StateCommission

RA/19/2024

M L SHARMA - Complainant(s)

Versus

KREINTO CONSTRUCTIONS - Opp.Party(s)

05 Dec 2024

ORDER

 STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, U.T. CHANDIGARH

[Addl. Bench]

==========

Review Application No. in Exe.App.No.83 of 2023	:	RA/19/2024
Date  of  Institution	:	11/11/2024
Date   of   Decision	:	05/12/2024

 

 

 

 

 

M.L. Sharma                

…. Applicant/Decree Holder

 

 

V E R S U S

 

 

M/s Kreinto Construction

 

 

…… Non-Applicant/Judgment Debtor

 

BEFORE: MRS. PADMA PANDEY   PRESIDING MEMBER

                PREETINDER SINGH      MEMBER

 

 

PRESENT

:

Sh. M.L. Sharma, Applicant/Decree Holder in person.

 

 

PER PADMA PANDEY, PRESIDING MEMBER

 

1.         The Applicant/Decree Holder has filed a misc. application bearing no. MA/957/2024 for condoning the delay of 112 days in filing the review application.

 

2.         In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, Civil Appeal No.8183-8184 of 2013 decided 13.09.2013, it has been held that there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. Further in another judgment in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd.,  Civil Appeal No. 3883 of 2007 decided on 07.04.2017, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held in Para 18 of the judgment, inter alia, that “…. The provision of limitation in the Act cannot be strictly construed to disadvantage a consumer in a case where a supplier of goods or services itself is instrumental in causing a delay in the settlement of the consumer's claim. That being so, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the National Commission was quite right in rejecting the contention of National Insurance in this regard.”

 

3.         For the reasons stated in the application and in view of law settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we are of the considered view that the Applicant/ Decree Holder has been able to satisfy that there had been a sufficient cause for not preferring the review application within the stipulated period. 

 

4.         In this view of the matter, the misc. application aforesaid stands allowed and the delay in filing the review application is condoned.

 

5.         Accordingly, misc. application bearing no. MA/957/2024 stands disposed of.

 

6.         The instant review application has been filed by the Applicant/Decree Holder – Sh. M.L. Sharma under the provisions of Section 50 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (in short ‘the Act’) seeking review of orders dated 22.07.2024 whereby this Commission had directed the Judgment Debtors to pay delayed compensation by way of interest @9% p.a. on the entire amount deposited by the complainant from 01.01.2022 (one day after the commitment date of possession being 31.12.2021) till 11.11.2022 the date the Complainant/ Decree Holder obtained occupancy certificate from the HSVP, apart from making compliance of the directions as at Sr. No.(iii) and (iv) contained in the decreetal order qua payment of compensation and litigation costs, in its letter and spirit, within a period of 30 days, from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order, failing which their properties shall be put under attachment, in accordance with law.

 

7.         We have heard the Applicant/Decree Holder and have also gone through the record of the case with utmost care and circumspection with his able assistance.

 

8.         After giving our thoughtful consideration, to the contentions raised and material on record, we are of the considered opinion, that the instant review application is liable to be dismissed for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter.

 

9.         The Applicant/Decree Holder argued with vehemence that Para No.5 of the order under review is factually incorrect and modifies the relief in the original decree as such the order is harsh and liable to be reviewed by restoring the original relief granted in the decreetal order. However, per material available on record, the grounds taken by the Applicant/Decree Holder for   reviewing the order lacks merit in as much as the grounds now taken by means of instant review application have already been dealt with in detail by this Commission in orders under review. It needs to be emphasized here that such an error should be an error apparent on the face of the record and should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

 

10.         We are not oblivious of the fact that review would be permissible only if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason is made out. We are equally aware of the fact that the review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. The review of the order would be permissible only if a material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

 

11.         It may be stated here that each Consumer Commission has been empowered to review its own order under the provisions of Sections 40, 50 and 60 of the Act. The power under the Statute is highly limited as compared to the powers of civil court to review its own orders under the provisions of Section 114 read with order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is beneficial to refer following provisions of law: -

 

Section 50 of the Act:- "The State Commission shall have the power to review any of the order passed by it if there is an error apparent on the face of the record, either of its own motion or on an application made by any of the parties within thirty days of such order."

 

12.         In the light of aforesaid provision, the prayer of the Applicant/Decree Holder to review order dated 22.07.2024 is misconstrued and misapplied inasmuch as Section 50 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 empowers this Commission to review its order only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record and we do not find any such apparent error on record. Therefore, this review application does not merit consideration.

 

13.         It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by a Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.  In Lilly Thomas v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1650, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of mistake and not to substitute views.    

 

14.         From the above observation of Hon'ble Apex Courts, it is crystal clear that the power of review cannot be equated with the power of appeal as the scope of review is very limited.  Besides this, the scope of review under the provisions of Section 50 of the Act is highly limited and only to the extent of “an error apparent on the face of record”.

 

15.         Whatever observed by this Commission in the orders dated 22.07.2024 is based upon the factual position on record. There is no any apparent error on record and there is no need to review same.

 

16.         For the reasons recorded above, this review application stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

 

17.         Certified copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

 

18.         The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced

05^th Dec. 2024                                                           

Sd/-

                                                        (PADMA PANDEY)

PRESIDING MEMBER

 

Sd/-

                                                        (PREETINDER SINGH)

MEMBER

“Dutt”