For the Applicant /Petitioner          : Ms. Priyadarshini Dewan, Advocate (in PH)           

1.       IA Nos. 14981,14942,  14957-68, 14956, 14959, 14971-80/2024 (For Condonation Of Delay)

The present applications have been moved seeking condonation of delay in filing the MA/743, 718, 720-31, 719, 732-42 of 2024. (for restoration).

For the reasons stated in the delay condonation application and in order to decide the application on merits rather than scuttle it at the threshold on the point of limitation, the delay in filing the above MAs is condoned.

2.                 MA/743, 718, 720-31, 719, 732-42 of 2024 (For restoration)

The present application has been moved seeking recall of Order dated 20.12.2023 vide which the present revision petitions were dismissed in non-prosecution.

Heard.

Learned counsel for the applicant / petitioner has tried to explain the circumstances which resulted in the dismissal of the petition in non-prosecution.  It also appears that the Order dated 28.08.2019  appears to have been complied with.  Grounds  shown are sufficient.  

In the interest of justice the Order dated 20.12.2023 is being recalled and the present petitions are restored to their original number.

REVISION PETITION NO. 796  to 821 OF 2019

3.       Learned counsel for the petitioner has been heard on the revision petitions.

4.       All these petitions involve identical facts and are against the concurrent findings of the fora below and have been filed with almost similar delays. Thus they are being decided by this Common Order.

5.        It may be apt to mention that the complainants / respondents in the petitions are peasants and the matters relate to the insurance of their respective crops.  The relief granted to them is very miniscule having the range of Rs. 10,512/- to Rs. 1,39,318/- only.  The relief granted by the District Commission was upheld by the State Commission and thus these petitions have been filed against concurrent findings of the fora below. Though the stage to evaluate the merits of the impugned orders can arrive only if the petitioners succeed to show sufficient cause for the much belated filing of petitions, but still learned counsel has tried to make some submissions regarding the merits.  We are constrained to observe that prima facie we do not see any jurisdictional error or material irregularity or illegality that may go to vitiate the impugned Orders or on the basis of which the same may be castigated.  However, we refrain to delve into the details of merits for the obvious reasons that the petitions have been filed with a reported delay of 233 days (except RP No. 806 of 2019 where the reported delay is of 234 days) and admitted delay is 225 days in all the petitions (except RP No. 796 of 2019 where the admitted delay is of 224 days). The said delay being neither  insignificant nor small, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is being heard first on the delay condonation applications in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not.   

6.       Perused the record including inter alia the delay condonation application.

7.       Learned counsel has reiterated the submissions made in the delay condonation application and has not added anything further to it.  Submission is that the impugned Order was passed on 24.05.2018.  The certified copy was obtained on 30.05.2018.  According to learned counsel, time was primarily spent in taking necessary permission from the authorities to file the revision petition and in obtaining approval on the Memo of Appeal.  Some time also got spent in obtaining copies of the records.  It has been submitted that the petitioner is a nationalized bank and there is an institutional working mechanism involved in the process which takes time resulting the delay.  Submission is that the delay being neither deliberate nor intentional, the same deserves to be condoned.  

8.       First of all it may be observed that in the ordinary course whenever the aspect of evaluating the sufficiency of cause behind the delayed filing of a given petition or appeal, as the case may be, is involved, it is advisable to adopt a liberal approach and not a pedantic one.  A pragmatic view needs to be adopted as it is found preferable to decide a case on its merits rather than to thwart the same at the threshold on the point of limitation.  But while saying so, it must not be misconstrued to mean that the approach to be adopted can ever be such which may reduce the law on the point of limitation, wherever it is provided, into insignificance as if it is inconsequential and does not signify anything.  The law of limitation wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve which cannot be looked down with irreverence or with indifference.  The Courts, judicial or quasi-judicial as they may be, can never afford to ride roughshod over the solemn provisions of limitation wherever they have been laid down by the Legislature in its wisdom.  It is also to be kept in perspective that the failure to file a petition against a particular order and the failure to challenge the same within the prescribed period of time, often gives rise simultaneously to a right to the other side.  This is true that if valid reasons come forth and sufficient cause is shown which may go to vindicate the delayed filing of a petition, the same may be accepted and the delay may be condoned by the given Forum.   But this discretion conferred upon any Forum judicial or quasi-judicial as it may be, has to be exercised judiciously and in keeping with the norms.  The exercise of discretion in such matters is not the exercise of any prerogative or privilege.  It is essentially the exercise of a statutory power, granted by the Act, which has to be exercised judiciously and legally both.  The delay of larger periods may be condoned in a given case if sufficient cause may be shown which resulted in the delay.  On the other hand, a lesser period of delay may not be condoned if valid reasons furnishing or showing sufficient cause are not brought forth by the defaulting party.  The onus to show and furnish the necessary factual or circumstantial basis which contributed to the delay, must be shown in order to earn the condonation and this onus is of the defaulting party who seeks such condonation.

9.   When we proceed to make an estimate and assessment regarding the sufficiency of cause which according to the learned counsel contributed to the belated filing of the revision petition, we feel constrained to observe that the grounds that have been pleaded barely contain any such explanation which may go very far to explain the enormous delay involved in filing the petitions.  The submissions that have been made are no different from the grounds that have been pleaded in the delay condonation application and to facilitate better appreciation the relevant paragraphs may be quoted hereinbelow which read as under:-

          3. That the certified copy of the Judgment and Order dated 24.05.2018 delivered by Hon'ble State Commission Consumer Protection Forum, Circuit Bench, Bikaner in Appeal No. 381/2017 was applied for on 29.05.2018 and certified copy of thereof was delivered to the Advocate for the Petitioner on 30.05.2018. Hence, the present Revision Application preferred today is barred by limitation by ay days and a separate application is being filed herewith separately for condonation of the same. 

4. That the delay occurred because of time spent in taking necessary permission from the concerned authorities to file the present revision and in obtaining approval of Memorandum of Appeal by the Competent Authority. Moreover this matter pertains to Churu Branch of the Petitioner Bank. Some time was also spent in obtaining copies of records pertaining to the matter from the Churu Branch. Further, as there are 30 bunch matter therefore, some time was also taken by th counsel in drafting and filling the petitions. 

5. That the Petitioner is a Nationalized Bank and case involves public money. 

6. That the delay in filing the present petition is neither deliberate nor intentional but due to the above said reason. The above reason is a sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the prescribed period. 

10.     As is obviously demonstrable that it is not a case in which any significant time got lost in getting the copies of the impugned Order.  The impugned Order was passed on 24.05.2018 while the certified copy was made available to the advocate on 30.05.2018 itself.  Shockingly enough, the petitions have been filed on 18.04.2019, almost a year thereafter.  So far as the permission to file the petition and getting the draft of the appeal approved is concerned this process is neither unprecedented nor there is anything new about this process.  In various departments this process is adopted.  It is also true that while making an evaluation about the validity of reasons which caused the delay we refrain from adopting a pedantic approach in the matters and do not insist on day-to-day explanation of the delay.  We do keep in perspective the pragmatic side of the working of the institutions which are involved in the matter but while saying so we certainly do not imply to suggest that in the name of institutional functioning any such long leash should be expected, much less than be granted, which may completely reduce the sanctity of the law of limitation into complete insignificance as if it is nugatory and has no purpose to serve.  In the matters like these which are at hand and which involved huge admitted delays, it is a long hiatus which separates the date of the impugned Order and the date when the petitions have been filed. In order to bridge up such procrastinated delay it would need far more convincing and far more credible explanations than what have been proffered in delay condonation application.  It appears that things were taken for granted and the petitioner bank felt content to move with its own slow pace bothering little about the period of limitation which has been prescribed by the Consumer Protection Act in this regard.  What gleans out from the state of affairs as are apparent and which have been shown is nothing but administrative indifference and managerial inefficiency alone and not any convincing genuine or legitimate grounds on the basis of which the delay may be ignored or condoned.        

When a petition is filed beyond the period of limitation the onus to bring forth such factual and circumstantial basis is on the defaulting petitioner on the basis of which the delay may be condoned.  In the matter at hand the Bench feels constrained to observe that the petitioner has woefully failed to discharge that onus.  The delay condonation applications do not contain even a semblance of good explanation to vindicate the delayed filing.  The applications do not contain much worth and do not help the petitioner at all.  Being meritless the delay condonation applications stand disallowed.

11.     Concomitantly the petitions stand dismissed on limitation.

12.     The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to the learned counsel for the petitioner bank. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.