1.      These revision petition Nos.3040 of 2016, 3041 of 2016, 3042 of 2016, 3043 of 2016 & 3044 of 2016 have been filed by Dileep Kumar, Besant Kumar, RenuVerma, Sanjay Pandey & Trilok Chand Jain, petitioners against the order dated 19.07.2016 of the Rajasthan, State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, (in short ‘the State Commission’) passed in Appeal Nos.73 of 2011, 74 of 2016, 76 of 2016, 77 of 2016 & 78 of 2016 respectively. As facts and questions of law are same in all these revisions, they are being decided by a common order. The revision petition No.3040 shall be taken as the representative petition.

2.      Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner on 11.01.2003 purchased a plot of land measuring 252 Square Meter in Ram Nagariya residential Extension Scheme, Jaipur from respondents. On 11.01.2003, the petitioner deposited with the respondents the cost of it Rs.2,92,975/- through challan.  On 20.10.2010, in 158^th meeting, respondents took decision that for extra area of plot allotted to consumers more than area prescribed, cost of such extra area shall be charged more than double to reserve cost. It has been alleged by the petitioners/complainants that this is not proper.  In the year, 2013 the complainant filed complaint before the District Forum with prayer to direct respondents to charge cost for plot at reserve rate only from complainant. It was also prayed to hand over possession of plot to him forthwith and the respondents may be directed to pay interest @ 24% per annum on amount of Rs.2,92,275/- from date of deposit made by complainant towards cost of plot on 11.01.2003 till date of handing over actual possession of plot.  It was further prayed that for mental agony, physical pain and economic loss caused to him, each of the respondents be directed to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to complainant and for expenses of complaint Rs.31,000/- be ordered to be paid.  On 28.09.2015, the District Forum allowed complaint of petitioner awarding him compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- from respondents and towards expenses of complaint an amount of Rs.20,000/- was awarded. In the year, 2016, challenging order passed by District Forum, respondents filed First Appeal No.73/2016, before learned State Commission, Rajasthan, Jaipur and prayed for allowing their appeal and quashing the order of the leaned District Forum. The respondents JDA along with their appeals also filed an application U/s. 5, Limitation Act, 1963 praying therein for allowing it and condoning the delay caused in filing the appeals.  On 19.07.2016, the State Commission allowed application of respondents on payment of cost of Rs.2,000/-. 

3.      Hence, this revision petition.

4.      Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at admission stage and perused the record.

5.      Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that District Forum had allowed the complaint against the opposite parties, but they preferred appeals before the State Commission and the appeals were filed with a delay of 77 days.  The State Commission without going into the law laid down in this regard condoned the delay at a cost of Rs.2,000/- only whereas, the delay was only procedural delay and should not have been condoned by the State Commission.  The rights of the complainants/petitioners have been adversely affected by the impugned order of the State Commission.  The learned counsel also referred to the judgment in Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Auth., IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) and drew my attention to the head note of this case namely “Consumer Protection Act, 1986- Sections 23,24A- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5- Limitation-Condonation of delay- Insufficient cause for not filing SLT in this prescribed period of limitation- Delay of 233 days- Within a fortnight of passing impugned order, petitioner had become aware of the same- she instructed her Counsel to prepare draft of case to be filed in Court, but did not take necessary steps for filing the petition- Object of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against order of consumer Foras- Delay not condoned.”

6.      The learned counsel further referred to the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC). My attention was drawn towards the headnote of this case, which reads as under:-

“(ii)   Consumer Protection Act, 1986- Sections 24A, 23- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5- Condonation of inordinate delay of 1314 days and 851 days in filing petitions against orders dated 16.9.2008 and 17.12.2009 respectively- Cause shown for not approaching this Court for not being physically fit and remained in hospital for some days, not sufficient as it was not necessary for petitioner to come personally- Condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting period of limitation by this Court in place of period prescribed by Legislature for filing SLP- No cogent reason to condone delay.”

7.      The learned counsel further argued that it is necessary to explain the day-to-day delay in delayed filing of the appeals.  The application for condonation of delay filed by the appellants before the State Commission does not explain this day-to-day delay.  Thus, the State Commission has grossly erred in allowing the application for condonation of delay and the order dated 19.07.2016 of the State Commission needs to be set aside.

8.      I have carefully perused the material on record and have given a thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel.  It is important to see the following observations made by the State Commission for allowing the application for condonation of delay:-

“We considered the arguments of both the parties.  Though we do admit that the ground which has been taken by the learned counsel for the appellants for delay caused due to departmental process, that is not satisfactory, the departmental proceedings should be completed within the period of limitation.  Though looking into the matter on merits the points for consideration have emerged out therein that: Whether the provisions of Rule 23(1) of the Urban Disposal Act of the Jaipur Development Authority being in force, the decision taken by the Internal Committee of the Jaipur Development Authority can supersede those provisions.  Therefore, the appeals seem to be arguable on these points. For delay the compensation can be awarded to the complainants.”

9. Thus, prima-facie, the State Commission has found some merit in the appeals on legal points and therefore delay has been condoned on cost. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjeev. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others.,  (2013) 12 SCC 649,has laid down  the following:-    

21.  “From the aforesaid authorities (case laws referred) the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2  (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

21.3.  (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5  (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6.   (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8   (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9  (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11.  (xi)  It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

22.  To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

10.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another judgment N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy, (1998) Supp. 1 SCR 403, has laid down the following:-

“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain V. KuntalKumari, MANU/SC/0335/1968: [AIR 1969 SCR1006 and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, MANU/SC/0534/1971: [1972]2SCR874a.

13.  It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.”

11.    As per Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the provision for appeal is as follows:-

“15.  Appeal- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

      Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period”

12.    From the above, it is clear that the State Commission is well within its rights to condone the delay if it is satisfied. From the observations of the State Commission mentioned above, it is clear that the State Commission was satisfied in the interest of justice to condone the delay. As per guidelines given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others (supra) and judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy ( supra) , the condonation of delay may be allowed on payment of cost to the other party.  In both the cases cited by the learned counsel there are inordinate delays of 233 days and more than 1000 days, whereas in the instant case the delay is only of 77 days. The forum has right to condone the delay in the interest of justice. Even otherwise also, by allowing the application for condonation of delay, the State Commission has decided to proceed with the appeals and expectedly these appeals will be decided on merits and both parties will get the opportunity to put forward their cases before the State Commission for adjudication of the appeals. Hence, no prejudice is caused to the petitioners if the appeals are decided on merits by the State commission.

13.    Based on the above examination, I am of the view that the State Commission has taken a balanced view in its order dated 19.07.2016 and it does not suffer from any illegality. 

14.    Accordingly, I do not find any force in these revision petitions No.3040 of 2016, 3041 of 2016, 3042 of 2016, 3043 of 2016 and 3044 of 2016 and the same are dismissed in limine.