1.       This revision petition has been filed under Section 58 (1) (b) of the Act 2019 in challenge to the Order dated 30.11.2022 in Appeal No. 259 of 2022 of the State Commission Maharashtra arising out of Order dated 02.03.2022 of the District Commission in Complaint no.207 of 2021.

2.       Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and have perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 02.03.2022 of the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 30.11.2022 of the State Commission, the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition and the memo. of petition.

3.       It appears that concurrent findings have been returned by two fora below and feeling aggrieved by the OrderS the present revision petition has been filed with the self-admitted delay of 61 days. However, the reported delay by office is 70 days.  

4.       An application seeking condonation of delay has been filed.  As the delay does not appear insignificant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is being heard first on the delay condonation application in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not. 

5.       The submissions made by the learned counsel are no different from the grounds taken in the delay condonation application and they have been virtually repeated once again. Learned counsel has been fair enough to admit that the impugned Order was passed on 30.11.2022 and the free certified copy of the impugned Order had been received on 01.12.2022 itself but the revision has been filed with the reported delay of 70 days. Submission is that the matter was referred to the legal hub of the petitioner.  The legal hub sought opinion from the counsel and then the matter was forwarded to the head office to take appropriate steps and the advocate was appointed to prepare the draft. Some time was also consumed in getting the requisite translations and some time was also got consumed because of indisposition of the counsel which has resulted in the delay.  Learned counsel has also tried to submit that as the matter did not relate to a high valuation claim and, therefore, some time also got consumed in making attempt to negotiate out the matter.  

6.       Having gone through the grounds taken in the delay condonation application the Bench feels constrained to observe that they fall far short of qualifying as sufficient grounds to condone the delay. They can be termed as nothing better than managerial inefficiency. Taking legal opinions is a common practice and there is nothing unusual or abnormal about it but that does not go to mean that the opinions ought not to be procured within time and that the law of limitation should be put in the backyard in that process. The explanations as has been pleaded hardly deserve to be called legitimate explanations which may furnish sufficient cause to condone the delay. The managerial inefficiency or an indifferent attitude towards the law of limitation or towards the progress or status or the development relating to pending cases is hardly a good explanation. The lackadaisical approach on the part of the petitioner and being remiss in pursuing the matter or looking after them in right earnest does not serve as an acceptable excuse.  The Bench, therefore, does not feel inclined to accept the grounds taken in the delay condonation application as being good grounds for furnishing  ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay involved in filing the petition.

7.         Ordinarily the Bench tends to adopt a liberal approach on the aspect of considering the point of delay and lean to take an indulgent view towards the side who seeks its condonation. The Bench prefers that a matter be decided on merits rather than be closed at the threshold stage i.e. on the ground of delay, but that does not imply that the Bench may ever ride roughshod over the statutory requirement regarding the law of limitation wherever it has been provided by the legislature in its wisdom. That is why, whenever there is a delay, and whenever condonation on that aspect is sought, by either side, it has to discharge the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds relying upon which such delay may be condoned. It goes without saying that such explanation has to be genuine and not an explanation just for the sake of explanation. Anything and everything said to bridge up a considerable gap of delay is not to be termed as legitimate explanation, which has to be sincere, honest and persuasively adequate and worthy of credence.

8.     The powers which have been conferred to condone the delay have got to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily and certainly not at will either whimsically or capriciously. The discretion to be exercised in such matters is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is essentially a legal exercise and has to be lawfully harnessed with judicious discipline. The object and purpose behind the law of limitation cannot be either swung into oblivion or be ignored with apathy. A complete disregard of the law of limitation will eventually frustrate and defeat the salutary purpose which inspires the enactment in this regard wherever provided.

9.      In the present case however one does not see even a semblance of an explanation which may constitute a good ground to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is palpably without worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. As such the Bench has no hesitation in dismissing the application.

10.     Resultantly the petition stands dismissed on limitation.

11.     The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.