1. This revision petition has been filed under section 58 (1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 in challenge to the Order dated 04.03.2022 passed by the State Commission in appeal no. 669 of 2017 arising out of the Order dated 01.03.2017 passed by the District Commission in complaint no.166 of 2014. 2. The instant revision petition has been filed with reported delay of 199 and admitted delay of 87 days as per petitioners’ explanation. As the delay is neither insignificant nor small, the learned counsel has been first heard on the delay condonation application in order to see whether the same deserves to be condoned or not. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners / opposite parties no.1 and no. 2 on the point of seeking condonation of delay. Perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 01.03.2017 passed by the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 04.03.2022 of the State Commission and the memo of petition as well as both applications for condonation of delay. 4. Initially, a different delay condonation application had been moved but subsequently finding the same to be whole inadequate, permission to file a better affidavit was sought and granted. Thus, another delay condonation application has now been brought on record. 5. Learned counsel has tried to reiterate the grounds taken in the delay condonation application. It has been submitted that impugned Judgment / Order was passed on 04.03.2022 but the representing counsel failed to apprise the petitioners about the impugned Order and there was a communication gap which occasioned the delay. It has also been submitted that the free certified copy was not received by the petitioners and it had applied for the certified copy on 17.06.2022 and procured the same on 29.06.2022. Then only the petitioners came to know about passing of the impugned Order. Submission is that therefore the period of limitation should be counted from the date of receiving of the certified copy and not from the date of the impugned Order which will reduce the period of delay to 87 days which deserves to be condoned. It has been submitted that some time also got consumed in translation of the documents and all these things together contributed to the delay involved in the matter. Further submission is that the petitioners were in constant touch with the representing counsel but he filed the revision petition on 23.12.2022 which should be called a lapse on the part of erstwhile counsel and so the delay may be condoned. 6. It may be observed that in the ordinary course the advisable approach to be adopted in such matters by a judicial or quasi-judicial Forum as the case may be, is to lean favourably towards the defaulting petitioner who fails to file the petition within the limitation period. It is ordinarily preferred not to adopt a pedantic approach but to proceed with a pragmatic view and to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation. But while saying so Commission should not be understood to mean or to imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided by the Act can either be blissfully ignored or be soft paddled at will. Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment of the law of limitation. The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with. In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period. It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the given Fora looking into the matter that there were actually justifiable reasons which go to explain as to why the petition was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Forum cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which even this Commission exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously. The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioner who seeks judicial indulgence in this regard. While undertaking the exercise of such evaluation the Bench also keeps in perspective the practical side of the working of institutions which are not personal entities and tries to adopt a pragmatic approach making due allowance in that regard but that must not also be misconstrued to imply that in the name of being an institution any party can claim to have such long rope which may render the law regarding the period of limitation nugatory as if it signifies nothing. 7. When this Bench proceeds to evaluate the submissions made by the learned counsel and the grounds pleaded in the delay condonation application in order to explain the delay it finds that they scarcely go qualify being called good or justified grounds or which may go to constitute sufficient cause to earn the condonation of delay. Prime submission made regarding the belated acquisition of the knowledge of the impugned Order or belated procurement of the copy of the impugned Order flies in the face of record and is belied by the same. Certified copy of the State Commission’s Order is available on record which specifically mentions the date when the free certified copy of the Order was provided to the petitioner and that date is 09.03.2022 just after 05 days after the impugned Order was passed. It may be relevant in this context to mention that as per the Regulation 21 of The Consumer Protection (Consumer Commission Procedure) Regulations, 2020 if a Consumer / Party needs a certified copy and applied for the same it may be given on the payment of a nominal fee. But on the subsequently applied and issued certified copy the concerned Commission is required to clearly mention as to when the first / free copy of the impugned Order was dispatched or delivered to the applicant. It may be relevant to extract the Regulation 21 which reads as follows: 21. Certified copy. – (1) A copy of the final order is to be given to the parties free of costs as required under the Act and the rules made thereunder. (2) In case a party requires an extra copy, it shall be issued to him duly certified by the Registry on a payment of rupees twenty irrespective of number of pages. (3) A certified copy of an order shall clearly specify the date when free copy was issued, date of application, date when the copy was made ready and the date when it was so delivered to him. There seems to be an object behind making these ‘columns’ and the aforesaid provision as has been enacted goes to serve a salutary purpose. One of the obvious purposes which it goes to serve is to bring on record as to when the free copy had been dispatched / delivered. Any party who files a petition belatedly may hide behind the cover of the plea that it acquired the knowledge belatedly. The aforementioned Regulation provides at least some kind of check to test the veracity of such kind of plea. There has to be some convincing material to substantiate the belated acquisition of knowledge which is wholly lacking in the matter at hand. In fact, in the present matter we see the stamp affixed on the certified copy of the impugned Order. We also find that the mode of delivery of the free copy appears to be ‘by-hand’. There are two words written in the stamp, one is ‘by-hand ’ and another is ‘ by-post ’. There is a ‘tick mark’ on the word ‘by-hand ’. If that is so, it is clear that the free copy of the State Commission’s Order had already been delivered to the petitioners on 09.03.2022. Even if we proceeded on the belief that the free copy was sent ‘by-post’ as is done in most of the cases, there has to be presumption about its delivery to the petitioners. Submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners never received the certified copy of the impugned Order, is nothing but an unsubstantiated bald plea which cannot be accepted on its face value. At any rate, even for the sake of argument, if we reckon the period of limitation from 29.06.2022 when the petitioners claim to have received the certified copy even then the present petition has been filed only on 23.12.2022 not after days or weeks but many months thereafter which remains wholly unexplained. It has been admitted that the petitioners were in constant touch with their counsel which fact makes the non-filing of the petition soon thereafter still more inexplicable. Learned counsel has tried to make the erstwhile counsel just an escape goat and has tried to pass the buck on his desk which is nothing but a convenient method to somehow bridge-up the gap and which separates the date of passing of the impugned Order and the date of filing of the present petition. This delay is not a small one to be lightly ignored or soft pedalled. 8. In the present case, the Bench feels constrained to observe that it does not see even a semblance of good explanation which may constitute a sufficient cause to condone the delay. The onus is on the petitioners to show the factual basis from which may emanate such ground remains undischarged. The application for condonation of delay being without worth or substance is unworthy of acceptance. Sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. 9. The application being sans merit must therefore meet its legal nemesis and as such the same stands dismissed. 10. As the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, the petition too concomitantly stands dismissed. 11. The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to the parties in the petition and to learned counsel for the petitioners as well as to the fora below within three days. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission within three days. |