STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

Sanjeev Kumar, S/o Lt. Sohan Lal, aged about 25 years, r/o H.No. 3245, Maloya, Chandigarh.

……Appellant/Complainant

V e r s u s

[1]   ICICI Bank, SCO No. 09-10-11, Sector 9-D, Madhya Marg, Chandigarh, through its General Manager.

[2]   Head Office, ICICI Bank, 9^th  Floor, South Towers, ICICI    Towers, Bandhra, Curla Complex, Bandhra East,     Mumbai, through its Chief Managing Director

 ....Respondents/Opposite Parties

Appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

BEFORE:    JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER, PRESIDENT.

                   MRS. NEENA SANDHU, MEMBER.

Argued by:  Sh. Balkar Singh, Advocate for the appellant.

PER  JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER, PRESIDENT

1.               This appeal is directed against the order dated 31.01.2012, rendered by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-II, U.T., Chandigarh (hereinafter to be called as the District Forum only) vide which, it dismissed the complaint filed by the complainant (now appellant).

2.               The facts, in brief, are that the complainant took a personal loan of Rs.94,823/-, on 12.6.2007, from Opposite Party No.1. The loan was to be returned in 39 installments of Rs.3,162/-, per month. The terms and conditions were settled, between the parties, by way of executing the documents. It was stated that the complainant had been regular, in making payments, every month, since 2007, and had paid a total amount of Rs.1,23,318/- upto 5.9.2010. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties, claimed higher amount,  than what was agreed to, at the time of grant of loan. It was further stated that though the loan amount of Rs.94,823/-  paid to the complainant, yet the Opposite Parties, started recovering the installments, in respect of the amount of Rs.97,000/-. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties did not disclose the hidden charges, if any, at the time of sanction of loan, in favour of the complainant. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties, demanded 48 installments, instead of 39 installments,  as agreed upon. It was further stated that at the time of sanction of loan, four un-dated cheques  of which three cheques amounting to Rs.9,486/-, and the fourth one amounting to Rs.1,23,318/-, were handed over to the Opposite Parties, but the same were not returned by them, even after the repayment of loan, by the complainant. It was further stated that the complainant made repeated visits to the office of Opposite Party No.1, with a request to return the said cheques, but they failed to give any satisfactory reply. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts of the Opposite Parties, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, as also indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainant, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be called as the Act only), was filed.

3.               The Opposite Parties, filed their written version, in the shape of affidavit of Himendra Pal Singh, Manager, ICICI Bank Limited, Chandigarh. It was pleaded that the matter related to the settlement of accounts, and, as such, the Consumer Fora, had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case. It was stated that the complainant, availed of loan, in the sum of Rs.97,000/-, from the Opposite Parties, It was further stated that the loan was repayable in 48 Equated Monthly Installments of Rs.3,162/- starting from 05.07.2007. It was further stated that Rs.2,177/-  were deducted, as processing charges, at the time of release of the remaining amount of loan. It was further stated that the documents were executed by the complainant, at the time of sanction of loan. It was further stated, that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Parties, nor they indulged into unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.

4.               The Parties led evidence, in support of their case.

5.               After hearing the Counsel for the parties, and, on going through the evidence, and record of the case, the District Forum, dismissed the complaint, as stated above, in the opening para of the instant order

6.               Feeling aggrieved, the instant appeal, has been filed by the appellant/complainant.

7.               Alongwith the appeal, an application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,  for condonation of delay of 53 days, as per the applicant/appellant (40 days as per the office report), in filing the same (appeal), was moved, by the applicant/appellant, on the ground, that he received the order dated 31.01.2012, at his residence on 10.02.2012. He showed the said order to his friend, who told him that the complaint had been decided, in his favour, and, hence, no appeal was required to be filed.  Thereafter, the applicant/appellant, went to his Counsel, with a copy of the order on 24.04.2012, and was told about the dismissal of the complaint, and was advised to file an appeal.  It was stated that on account of this reason, the delay of 53 days, (40 days as per the office report), occurred. It was further stated that the delay, aforesaid, in filing the appeal was neither intentional nor deliberate. Accordingly, a prayer, referred to, at the outset of this paragraph, was made.

8.               We have heard the Counsel for the applicant/appellant, on the application, for condonation of delay, as also, in the main appeal, and, have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully. 

9.               First coming to the application, for condonation of delay, it may be stated here, that the same is liable to be dismissed, for   the   reasons, to be recorded hereinafter. The question, that arises for consideration, is, as to whether, there is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 53 days, in filing the appeal, under Section 15 of the Act, or not. It was held in Smt.Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR 1995 Punjab & Haryana 32, a case decided by a Full Bench of the  Punjab & Haryana High Court,  that sufficient cause, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must be a cause, which is beyond the control of the party, invoking the aid of the Section, and the test to be applied, would be to see, as to whether, it was a bona-fide cause, in as much as, nothing could be considered to be bonafide, which is not done, with due care and attention. In  New Bank of India Vs. M/s Marvels (India): 93 (2001) DLT 558, Delhi High Court   held as under ;

“No doubt the words “sufficient cause” should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. However, when it is found that the applicants were most negligent in defending the case and their non-action and want of bonafides are clearly imputable, the Court would not help such a party. After all “sufficient cause” is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guide-lines can be given and Court has to decide on the facts of each case as to whether the defendant who has suffered ex-parte decree has been able to satisfactorily show sufficient cause for non- appearance and in examining this aspect, cumulative effect of all the relevant factors is to be seen.”

10.         In  Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it was held as under;

“There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice, but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.”

11.         Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, it is to be seen, as to whether, the applicant/appellant, has  been able to establish that it was, on account of the circumstances, beyond his control, that he could not file the appeal, in time.  In the instant case, the ground, set up in the application, for condonation of delay, does not appear to be bonafide. Once, a certified copy of the order, pronounced by the District Forum, was received by the complainant/applicant/appellant, he was required to contact his Counsel, to find out, as what was the result of the case. In that event, the Counsel would have immediately told him, that the complaint had been dismissed. It appears that the applicant/appellant, acted leisurely. He did not seek the advice of an advocate, as to whether,  an appeal was required to be filed against the order of the District Forum, or not.  This is, therefore, not a fit case, in which this Commission should exercise its discretion, in favour of the applicant/appellant, in condoning the delay. The delay, in filing the appeal, by the applicant/appellant, was on account of complete inaction, and lack of bonafides, attributable to him. The cause, set up, by the applicant/appellant, in the application, for condonation of delay, could not be said to be such, as was beyond his control, which prevented him, from filing the appeal, in time. The delay, in filing the appeal was, thus, intentional and deliberate. The Counsel for the applicant/appellant, therefore, failed to prove any sufficient cause, in filing the appeal, after the delay of 53 days. Since, no sufficient cause is constituted, from the averments, contained in the application, the delay of 53 days, cannot be condoned. The application is, thus, liable to be dismissed.     

12.         Coming to the merits of appeal, the Counsel for the appellant, at the very outset, submitted that though the loan amount of Rs.97,000/-, was sanctioned, to him, by the Opposite Parties, yet, he was only given a cheque of Rs.94,823/-. He further submitted that the remaining amount was deducted from the loan sanctioned, in favour of complainant, by the Opposite Parties, without any rhyme or reason. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, does not appear to be correct. It is an admitted case of the parties, that loan of Rs.97,000/- was sanctioned,  in favour of the complainant. When an application is moved by a person, for the grant of loan, the same is required to be processed, by the bank, so as to ascertain various facts. The processing fee, was, thus, charged by the bank, for the processing of such application and grant of loan. The amount of Rs.2,177/- , as is proved from the evidence, on record, was charged by the Opposite Parties, as processing fees. This amount was deducted from the loan amount, sanctioned, in favour of the complainant,  and the remaining amount of loan, to the tune of Rs.94,823/-, was paid to him. Under these circumstances,  the District Forum, was right, in coming to the conclusion, that there was no deficiency,  in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Parties.

13.         The next submission of the Counsel for the appellant was to the effect, that, at the time of sanction of loan, it was agreed to between the parties, that the same would be repaid in 39 installments, of Rs.3,162/-  per month, but later on, he was made to pay the same, in 48 installments, without his consent. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, also does not appear to be correct. There is a personal loan application at pages 99 to 109, submitted by the appellant. This was duly signed by the complainant.  It is evident from page 109 of the District Forum file, forming part of the application, that the complainant agreed to pay loan in  48 Equated Monthly Installments of Rs.3,162/-, per month. Since, the document was duly signed, by the complainant, he was bound by the terms and conditions thereof. Under these circumstances, the case of the complainant, to the effect that at the time of sanction of loan, it was agreed upon, between the parties,  that the same would be recovered in 39 installments, but, on the other hand, it was recovered in 48 installments, does not appear to be correct. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

14.         No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the appellant.

15.         The order passed by the District Forum, being based on the correct appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point, does not suffer from any illegality or perversity, warranting the interference of this Commission.

16.         For the reasons recorded above, the application for condonation of delay of 53 days is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by time, and, on merits, is also dismissed, at the preliminary stage, with no order as to costs. The order of the District Forum is upheld.

17.         Certified Copies of this order, be sent to the parties, free of charge.

18.         The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion

Pronounced.

May 11, 2012

Sd/-

[JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER]

PRESIDENT

Sd/-

[NEENA SANDHU]

MEMBER

Rg