Delhi

StateCommission

FA/1113/2013

D.R. SHARMA - Complainant(s)

Versus

ICICI BANK LTD. - Opp.Party(s)

02 Mar 2015

ORDER

IN THE STATE COMMISSION

(Constituted under section 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986)

 

Date of Decision: 02.03.2015

 

First Appeal-1113/2013

 

1.  Sh. D.R. Sharma

     C/o, DA-8, 2^nd Floor,

     Vikas Marg, Shakarpur,

     Delhi-92.                                                                    ….Appellant

 

Versus

 

      ICICI Bank

      Regd. Office Land Mark,

      Race Course Circle

      Vadodra-390007

      Branch Office-Preet Vihar,

      Vikas Marg, Delhi   

                      

                                                                                     ....Respondent

 

CORAM

Justice Veena Birbal, President

Salma Noor - Member

 

 

Salma Noor, Member

 

1.                The appellant has preferred the present appeal against the order dated 24.06.2013 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, East in complaint case no. 656/10 titled as D.R. Sharma Vs ICICI Bank.

2.                The District Forum has passed an award in favour of the appellant/complainant. Not satisfied with the award passed by the District Forum the appellant/complainant has preferred this appeal for enhancement of the awarded amount.

3.               Along with the appeal the appellant has moved an application for condonation of delay.

4.                In his application the appellant has not mentioned about the days for which he is seeking the delay to be condoned. According to our calculation there is a delay of about 75 days.

5.           We have heard Sh. Rahul Madan, counsel for the appellant and Ms. Sujata Piplani, Counsel for the respondent on the application and perused the record.

6.                 It is submitted by the appellant that the arguments were heard on 08.05.2013 in his complaint and the case was reserved for judgment. However, no specific date was given. His further submission is that after some time on enquiring he came to know that the order was already passed on 24.06.2013. After that he applied for the certified copy of the impugned order and the same was received on 16.09.2013 and the appeal was filed thereafter.

7.             We are not inclined to agree with the averments pertaining the non receipt of the impugned order dated 26.06.2013 by the appellant in absence of any documentary evidence because complaint was filed by the complainant and he should have been vigilant about his case himself. It appears that appellant has taken this plea of non-receiving copy of impugned order just to cover the limitation period. Appellant has failed to put forth any justified ground before us to condone the delay in filing the present appeal.

8.           It is well settled that ‘sufficient cause’ with regard to condonation of delay in each case is a question of fact.

10.           In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

                “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then that Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant”.  

11.           Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that;

                “There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of which is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence”.

12.              In “R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2013(1) CCC 525 (NS) : 2009(2) Scale 108”, it has been observed.

                 “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition”.

13.                 Supreme Court in “Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2013(1) CCC 910(NS) : IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC)” laid down that;

                “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matter and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated it this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras.”

14.         Under these circumstances, no sufficient cause is made out for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal. Accordingly, application for condonation of delay is subject as not maintainable.

15.             Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed being time barred.

                FDR, if any, be released in favour of appellant as per rules.

                File be consigned to record room.

 

(Justice Veena Birbal)

President

 

 

(Salma Noor)

Member