Haryana

StateCommission

A/766/2017

AMRIK SINGH - Complainant(s)

Versus

HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LTD. - Opp.Party(s)

PARAMJIT SINGH JAMMU

17 Aug 2017

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION HARYANA, PANCHKULA

 

                                                 

First Appeal No.   766 of 2017

Date of Institution: 23.06.2017

Date of Decision:   17.08.2017

 

Amrik Singh son of Gurmeet Singh, resident of Village Patli Dabar, Tehsil and District Sirsa.

                                      Appellant-Complainant

Versus

1.      Hyundai Motor India Private Limited, Plot No.1, SIPCOT Industrial Park, Irrungattukottai, Sriperubadur Taluk, Kapennepuram, District Tamil Nadu-602105 through its Authorized Signatory.

2.      Raja Motors Hyundai, Dabwali Road, Sirsa through its Proprietor/Partner/Manager/Authorized Signatory.

3.      National Insurance Company Limited through its Divisional Manager, Sirsa (Issuing Cover Note No.400910803360, Book No.40091032135 of Vehicle No.HR24M-3455)

4.      United India Insurance Company Limited, through its Divisional Manager, City Thana Road, Suratgarhia Bazar, Sira.

                             Respondents-Opposite Parties

 

 

CORAM:   Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nawab Singh, President.

                   Shri Balbir Singh, Judicial Member.

                                                                             

Present:     Shri Tarun Sharma, Advocate for the appellant.

                          

                                                   O R D E R

 

NAWAB SINGH J, (ORAL)

 

Amrik Singh-complainant has filed the instant appeal against the order dated July 28^th, 2016 passed by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Sirsa (for short ‘District Forum’) whereby complaint was dismissed being barred by limitation.

2.      The complainant has also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of 299 days delay in filing the appeal. The ground taken in the application is as under:-

“2.     That the learned District Forum has dismissed the complaint vide order dated July 28^th, 2016 and certified copy of the same was received by the clerk of the counsel before the learned District Forum and has not disclosed this fact to the appellant and when the appellant visited the counsel in the third week of June, 2017, only then the appellant came to know that the complaint filed by him has already been dismissed on July 28^th, 2016 and immediately thereafter the appellant got all the documents and rushed to Chandigarh for filing the present appeal and without committing any further delay, the present appeal is being filed before this Hon’ble Commission.”

 

3.      Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the delay caused in filing of the appeal is unintentional and it has occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant.

4.      This Commission has considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. The explanation for the delay caused in filing of the appeal is vague and far from being satisfactory.

5.      It is well settled that the delay cannot be condoned on the ground of equity and generosity. While proceeding with the prayer made it has to be kept in mind that expiration of the period of limitation prescribed gives a right to the adversary to treat the order as binding between the parties and this legal right provided by lapse of time should not be disturbed light heartedly. Similar view dovetails from the following authoritative pronouncements:-

6.      Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bikram Dass Versus Financial Commissioner and others, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held as under:-

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his right must explain every day’s delay.”

7.      In State of Nagaland versus Lipokao and others 2005(2) RCR (Criminal) 414 Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that to get any appeal admitted or to get the delay condoned, it is condition precedent to first prove the “sufficient cause” for exercise of discretion by the Court in condoning the delay. Unless and until the sufficient cause is not proved, the delay cannot be condoned.

8.      Hon’ble Apex Court in 2012(2) CPC 3 (SC)–Anshul Aggarwal  Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority observed as under:-

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”.

Thus, it becomes clear that there is no reasonable explanation at all for condonation of inordinate delay of 140 days. In such circumstances, application for condonation of delay is dismissed”. 

9.      In view of the above, this Commission has to bear in mind that the object of expeditious disposal of consumer dispute would get defeated if such like applications filed on frivolous grounds are allowed. The law comes to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. So, this Commission does not find it a fit case to condone the delay of 299 days. Hence, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

10.    Even on merits, there is no force in this appeal. It is not in dispute that the complaint was filed after five years of cause of action. 

11.    Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 bars any forum set up under the Act, from admitting a complaint, unless the complaint is filed within two years from the date on which, the “cause of action” has arisen.  The provision expressly casts a duty upon all the Fora not to admit a complaint filed beyond the period prescribed in the Section, unless the complainant satisfies the Consumer Forum, that the complainant had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the period of two years from the date on which the “cause of action” had arisen.

12.    In SBI Vs. B.S. Agriculture Industries (2009) 5 SCC 121, dealing with the same provision, the Supreme Court has opined, thus:

          “11…..It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is peremptory in nature and requires the consumer forum to see before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action.  The consumer forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if sufficient cause is shown.  The expression, ‘shall not admit a complaint’ occurring in Section 24A is sort of a legislative command to the consumer forum to examine on its own whether the complaint has been filed within the limitation period prescribed thereunder.

          12.    As a matter of law, the consumer forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the compliant has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing.  In other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take notice of Section 24A and give effect to it.  If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the consumer forum decides the complaint on merits, the forum would be committing an illegality and therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside.” 

         

13.    It has thus been held by the Supreme Court that Section 24A of the Act mandates that before admitting a complaint, all the Fora constituted under the Act, must examine whether or not the complaint under the Act has been preferred within two years from the date on which the “cause of action” has arisen.

14.    Explaining the meaning and import of the term “cause of action” in Kandimalla Raghavaiah and Company Vs. National Insurance Company and Another (2009), 7, Supreme Court Cases 768, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-

          “The term “cause of action” is neither defined in the Act in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but is of wide import.  It has different meanings in different contexts, that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual or right to sue.  Generally, it is described as “bundle of facts”, which if proved or admitted entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for.  Pithily stated, “cause of action” means the cause of action for which the suit is brought.  “Cause of action” is cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit.”  

 

15.    Tested on the touchstone of the afore-noted principle, the complaint preferred by the complainant on December 07^th, 2015 was barred by limitation and in the absence of an application for condonation of delay in filing the same in terms of the Sub Section 2 of the Section 24A of the Act, it could not be admitted by the Fora below for adjudication.

16.    In view of the above, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed on both the grounds, that is, limitation as well as on merits.

  

Announced 17.08.2017

(Balbir Singh) Judicial Member

(Nawab Singh) President

UK