ORDER ANUPAM DASGUPTA This appeal is directed against the order dated 16.02.2011 of the Chandigarh Union Territory Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh (in short, “the State Commission”) in complaint case no. 50 of 2010. 2. By this order, the State Commission held that the appellant/complainant was not a “consumer” under section 2 (1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, “the Act”) and hence dismissed the complaint. That is also the only point involved in this appeal. 3. I have heard Mr. Sanjay Joshi, learned Counsel for the appellant. He has also filed written synopsis of his submissions alongwith copies of judgments on which he wishes to rely. 4. Admittedly, the appellant is a private limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. It was sanctioned and availed of certain credit facilities by the Bank of Punjab Ltd. through its Branch at Sector 35, Chandigarh in 1996. This Bank was subsequently merged with the Centurion Bank Ltd. and then with the HDFC Bank Ltd., the respondent herein. The credit facilities were sanctioned against two collateral securities, viz., residential house no. 305, Sector 6, Panchkula and Industrial Sheds no. 437-438, Industrial Area, Phase 1, Panchkula. It is the case of the appellant/complainant that though it duly complied with the requirements of the credit facilities, the Bank charged excessive interest by mistake that the Bank admitted. This mistake was later corrected and a sum of Rs. 10.00 lakh thus over-charged was waived off from the appellant’s account, as confirmed in the Bank’s letter dated 31.01.2006. Though the complainant also complied with the stipulations of the Bank in the above-mentioned letter and paid the settled amount within time, the Bank released only the title deed of the residential house but not the industrial sheds on the ground that the beneficiary, namely, Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited (in short, “UHBVNL”) had raised a controversy and instituted a civil suit. The dispute relating to UHBVNL was referred for arbitration, as prayed before the Civil Court. According to the complainant, by virtue of the pleadings of the UHBVNL before the Civil Court, it also transpired that the Bank was not justified in retaining title deeds in respect of the industrial property of the petitioner/ complainant, which it had pledged with the Bank for the credit facilities. These acts of the Bank led the petitioner/complainant to file the above-mentioned complaint before the State Commission with the result already noted. 5. Section 2 (1)(d) (ii) of the Act reads as under: “consumer” means any person who,- (i) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who [hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose; Explanation:- For the purposes of this clause, “commercial purpose” does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment” 6. Thus, if any service is availed of by any person for a commercial purpose, that person ceases to be a “consumer” under the Act. It is an admitted position that the appellant/complainant is a private limited company engaged in commercial activity and that the credit facilities availed of by the appellant/complainant were entirely in connection with the commercial purposes of the appellant company. There is nothing on record to show any pleadings on the part of the appellant that the said commercial purpose was for “earning livelihood” through “self-employment” so as to give the benefit of the Explanation below the sub-clause (ii) of clause 2 (1)(d). In such a situation, the entity called “Devi Computeronics Pvt. Ltd.” could not qualify to be a “consumer” under the provisions of the Act in respect of the service it may have availed of from the HDFC Bank Ltd. and its predecessors-in-interest. 7. In this context, Mr. Sanjay Joshi sought to rely on the decisions of this Commission in the cases of Thukaram Anantha Shet v The Manager, Karnataka Bank Ltd. [2009 (1) CPC 373] and ICICI Bank Ltd. v K. Venkatareddy [ 2009 (1) CPC 212] as well as the Apex Court decision in the case of Managing Director, Maharashtra State Financial Corporation & Others v Sanjay Shankarsa Mamarde [2010 (7) SCC 489]. (i) In the first case, the petitioner was a person who was the guarantor of the loan who pledged the documents with the Bank to enable the company/firm to get an overdraft facility. (ii)(a)In this case, it was held as under:- “Under section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, banking services are covered by an inclusive definition. Therefore, in the case where the over draft facility/loan is given to a person against the pledging of the title deeds, and if the loan is returned, the title deeds are required to be returned by the bank to the pledgee. Returning of the pledged documents shall be part of the services to be rendered by the bank. In the present case, admittedly, the Petitioner was a guarantor who pledged the documents, as stated above, with the bank to enable M/s Hedge Traders to get the over draft facility.” (b) There can be no dispute with the general legal principle noted in the above-mentioned order of this Commission. However, it is obvious that it does not answer the question whether this would apply to the case of an entity, which avails of the service of a bank for a clearly commercial purpose. This decision of this Commission, therefore, does not help the appellant in this case. (iii) In the other case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, the respondent was an individual – in fact, a farmer who had availed of a loan from the ICICI Bank Ltd. for developing a poultry farm. It was explicitly noted in the order of this Commission, “It is not the case of the Bank that a private limited or a public limited company had approached it for sanction of the loan for a commercial purpose.” Thus it is clear that the facts of this case are also not similar to those in the case on hand. Therefore, this decision of this Commission also does not help the appellant. (iv) Even a cursory look at the Apex Court’s decision shows that it has no bearing on this case. 8. In view of the clear position that the appellant, a private limited company had availed of the credit facility in question from the respondent bank or its predecessors-in-interest for obviously a commercial purpose, it could not be treated as a “consumer” under section 2 (1) (d)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the findings of the State Commission on this point and that the complaint was thus ab initio not maintainable cannot be faulted with. The State Commission, however, erred seriously in going into the merits of the complaint and returning a finding of deficiency in service on the part of the opposite party/Bank. Once it had come to the conclusion that the complainant could not be treated as a “consumer” under the Act, the only possible conclusion was that the complaint could not be maintained. There was, therefore, no need whatsoever to look into the detailed facts of the case and/or to return any finding on the merits of the allegations. 9. As a result, the appeal is dismissed. However, the findings of the State Commission insofar as they relate to detailed discussion of the facts of the case and whether there was any deficiency in service on the part of the respondent/opposite party Bank are set aside, for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant, may, however, seek its remedy before any appropriate Forum/Court, if so advised and also seek the help of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of “Laxmi Engineering Works v P.S.G. Industrial Institute [(1995) 3 SCC 583]” with regard to limitation. | 
