West Bengal

Kolkata-II(Central)

CC/405/2010

MR.AMITABH DOSS - Complainant(s)

Versus

HDFC BANK LTD. - Opp.Party(s)

AVIJIT CHATTERJEE

18 Dec 2013

ORDER


cause list8B,Nelie Sengupta Sarani,7th Floor,Kolkata-700087.
Complaint Case No. CC/405/2010
1. MR.AMITABH DOSS14/H,MIDDLE ROAD,KOLKATA-700014 ...........Appellant(s)

Versus.
1. HDFC BANK LTD.HDFC BANK HOUSE,SENAPATI BAPAT MARG,LOWER PAREL ,MUMBAI-400013. ...........Respondent(s)



BEFORE:
HON'ABLE MR. Bipin Muhopadhyay ,PRESIDENTHON'ABLE MR. Ashok Kumar Chanda ,MEMBERHON'ABLE MRS. Sangita Paul ,MEMBER
PRESENT :AVIJIT CHATTERJEE, Advocate for Complainant

Dated : 18 Dec 2013
JUDGEMENT

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Complainant by filing this complaint has asserted that complainant jointly with his wife MrsMita Doss, son Amitanshu Doss and mother MrsRatan Mala Doss, hold a Non-Resident External (NRE) SB A/c No. 02401560481122 (Customer Id 25107462) with HDFC Bank, service branch located at Shyambazar Branch, 55/1, Bhupendra Bose Avenue, Kolkata and said account was less than one year old in operational terms at the time of disputed debit.

          An online HDFC share trading facility was linked to this account.  The complainant also opened Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) account with the bank, which has also online share trading facility.  As per Bank’s system to transfer funds between the NRE to NRO account, the “Third Party Transfer” facilities was opted some times in March 2009 and duly completed all online security formalities for the same, however, never used the Third Party Transfer facility.

          But op without any authorization debited a sum of Rs.1,92,635.50/- from the complainant’s account on 14.05.2009 which was noticed by the complainant first time that unauthorized transaction in the monthly bank statement of account for the period 03.05.2009 to 02.06.2009, delivered to the complainant by email and complainant after reading the statement on 05.06.2010 found that statement showed four consecutive unauthorized “Visa Money Transfer Debit” transactions on 14.05.2009 and the complainant in compliance of the foot-note instruction on the said statement notified the error/discrepancy and unauthorised debit of Rs.1,92,635.50/- to the bank, vide complainant’s email dated 05.06.2009 and same was acknowledged by bank emails dated 05.06.2009 and 06.06.2009 and Bank’s Customer Support Grievance Redressal, registered this matter with reference No.S-76980638 and promised revert reply within 5 days, but no response was received by the complainant for the same.  Under that the circumstances, the complainant performed his role and duty, notified the error/discrepancy much before stipulated time of 30 days.

          Op only to avoid the responsibility persuaded first personally then followed by email dated 09.06.2010 to the complainant and his wife to sign Bank’s paper device called “Fund Transfer Fraud Customer Letter” wording in the paper device sounded suspicious hence, the complainant did not put his signatures and demanded evidence of usage of the complainant’s password, which was never supplied to the complainant despite repeated reminders.  Such attempt of the op is an unfair trade practice and violation of principles of natural justice.

          Due to non-satisfactory response from the op, the complainant wrote a registered letter dated 14.06.2009 and alleged following matter without any evidences.  Op alleged that the disputed 4 transactions were found originated from a Nigerian IP and the alleged illegal internet banking transaction was done by unknown parties using correct customer Id & IPIN (Password), op alleged all without any evidence.  It is important to mention here that the complainant is highly educated and professionally well placed and astute user of computer and always operates internet banking from home PC, loaded with updated genuine antivirus.  Complainant being aware of internet baking risk activated only his wife’s password (first name in the joint account).  But complainant did not activate password received for his son (Amitanshu Doss) for better control.  None of the account holder visited or lived in Nigeria and the complainant and other joint account holders are aware of their responsibilities under Cl. 13 of the HDFC Bank Terms & Conditions and op being custodian of complainant’s money has failed to provide safe banking to the complainant and since the complainant notified the erroneous debit to the op within stipulated time of 30 days and used the Net Banking only few times, very securedly, only to check balance in the account from Abu Dhabi (UAE), the op is liable for the unauthorized transactions, under Cl. 13.24, T & C, occurring through the use of NetBanking originating from Nigerian IP (not from Abu Dhabi U.A.E. address) and transfer of funds to the 3 unauthorised bank account holder therefore, op has illegally debited Rs.1,92,635.50/- and harassed the complainant.

          Further the op alleged that on 26.06.2009 they sent “alert email” message to complainant’s is false and baseless, despite of repeated requests by complainant, op failed to re-forward the alleged email alert message or supply authentic evidence to this effectand it is important to mention here that the account under reference being relatively new the complainant had not activated the feature of email alert as it was an optional feature under the T & C Cl. 12.3.1.  However, in the light of the various provisions of the terms and conditions raising context of sending alert email is irrelevant, misleading and another play of the bank to avoid their responsibility, therefore issue to be totally ignored, as alert email has no locus-standi.  The complainant has reported the discrepancy in the monthly bank statement and notified the same to the bank/op within 30 days as mandated in the foot-note of the statement.

          Op vide their reply dated 26.06.2009, induced the NRI complainant to file FIR with police authority in India and complainant did it in good faith to support the op’s endeavor to provide safe and secured banking.  Whereas, it was the duty and sole responsibility of op to file the FIR as they are the custodian of customer’s money and the op’s 3 account holders embezzled the complainant’s Rs.1,92,635.50/-.  But op in their reply letter dated 26.06.2009 admitted that 2 unauthorised account holder namely Mr. Rehan Ahmed Ansari (HDFC Bank account No.08361930001249) and Mr. Himansu Bajaj (HDFC Bank A/C No.04551530002294) have already embezzled the unauthorized transferred amount of Rs.96,215/- and Rs.48,222/- respectively.  Op also admitted that they have failed to recover and credit back to the complainant’s account, the “no-debit” marked Rs.48,000/- from the 3rd undisclosed unauthorized account holder of the bank.  The mentioned embezzlement of funds and op’s failure of timely recovery of unauthorized happened due to improper, negligent due diligence as required under “Know Your Customer”(KYC) is a deficiency in the services.  Due to op’s internal faults or deficiency the complainant suffered loss and is being harassed.

          Further it is submitted by the complainant that as per RBI Circular No. DBOD.LEG.BC.86/09.07.007/2001-02 dated 08.04.2002 reveals that “customer service-reversal of erroneous debits arising on fraudulent or other transactions” in para-3, advised all the commercial banks to compensate the customer promptly and not to defer or delay refund/reversions of customer’s money for completion of any internal or police investigation.  So as per RBI circular the claims of the complainant is found well supported, fault is lying elsewhere and deficiency or op’s banking services and unfair practices gets established for which complainant is entitled to get back the entire amount with interest and also harassment etc.

          On the other hand the op by filing written statement submitted that at the request of Mita Doss, the wife of the complainant the Third Party Funds Transfer (TPFT) through netbanking facility was introduced in the account of the complainant and no doubt the complainant had a joint account with his wife, SmtMita Doss, son Sri Amitanshu Doss and his mother SmtRatan Mala Doss and after availing of the third party funds transfer facility, the said facility was opted by the complainant’s wife was given to understand that the system involves high risk and requires confidentiality of the Customer ID & IPIN for security and safety reasons of the account holder and complainant’s wife had knowledge that she can transfer funds to another third party account within the bank or outside the bank and it was further clearly stated that the complainant or the account holders shall not divulge/share the IPIN and Customer ID with a third party or family members and the said IPIN shall be kept confidential.

          An undertaking was given by the complainant’s wife to the effect that she will not hold the bank liable for any risk involved in third party funds transfer through net banking.  It is further alleged that the instant case in the complainant’s account through Visa Money Transfer a sum of Rs.1,92,437/- was debited on 14.05.2009 and there were 4 transactions through Visa MoneyTransfer module of net banking for that total amount on 14.05.2009 and the transactions were made using the complainant’s wife MrsMita Doss Customer ID and Internet Banking Password one of joint account holders and the password and customer Id is known only to the customer and as such transactions were made using valid customer ID and Net Banking Password (IPIN) the ops validated the said transactions in the account of the complainant and the ops have no responsibility for Visa Money Transfer transactions carried out in good faith and in the instant case a valid Customer ID and Net Banking Password was used for the transactions.

          The said transactions had taken place as the complainant or the other joint account holders in the instant complaint did not at all keep the IPIN confidential and had revealed the IPIN to a third party.  For a successful Net Banking transaction to be carried out by a valid Customer Id and for Net Banking Password (IPIN) is required to be entered and as those transactions were done using the correct customer ID and IPIN, the ops validated the same and additionally, in order to initiate any transaction through net banking, the customer needs to be registered for third party transfer and the third party transfer is activated for the customer only after receiving a form signed by the customer which is submitted at the branch.  Until and unless the complainant’s wife Mrs. Mita Doss claims that she has not done the transactions then her account sensitive details have not been compromised by the complainant’s wife.

          Further it is stated that bank has a system of sending an autogenerated email alert to its customer’s for Net Banking Transactions on the registered email address of customer.  As soon as the transactions in the customer’s account took place on 14.05.2009 the ops through an autogenerated email alerted on the registered email address informed the complainant about such transactions and thus warned the complainant.  Inspite of receipt of the said e-mail alert sent to the customer on the registered e-mail address i.e. amitabhdoss@hotmail.com on 14.05.2009 at 8:49 PM no response or instruction was received from the complainant by ops and as no response and instruction was given by the complainant, the ops blocked the IPIN so that further transactions cannot take place in the account.  The customer ID was disabled on 15.05.2009, on the basis of internal investigation done by our risk monitoring team as there were unusual transaction pattern in the account and the transactions were found originating from a Nigerian IP and the transactions in the account of the complainant took place on 14.05.2009 and in spite of receipt of the e-mail alert on the same date at 8:49 PM the complainant did not raise any objection.  The complainant lodged the complaint to the ops on 06.06.2009 i.e. after expiry of 22 days about such fraudulent transfers.

          Further it is submitted that op on enquiry they came to learn that A/c No.08361930001249 stands in the name of Rehan Ahmed Ansari having account at KurlaBrnach of HDFC Bank and the other A/C No.04551530002294 stands in the name of Himansu Bajaj having account at Jogeshwari West Branch of HDFC Bank the said amounts Rs.49,000/- and Rs.47,215/- totaling Rs.96,215/- and Rs.48,222/- respectively were transferred.  Another sum of Rs.48,000/- was transferred to the A/C No.0455153000202 at Jogeswari West, S.B. Road Branch of HDFC Bank stands in the joint names of Vijay Bajaj and Himahghu Bajaj.  Though the said amount of Rs.48,000/- was transferred but as the amount was not withdrawn from the account by the account holders the said amount was saved from such transfer.

          Op further requested the complainant to lodge an FIR and tointiate appropriate criminal cases against the said Rehan Ahmed and Himanshu Bajaj.

          It is further submitted that there was no deficiency on the part of the ops.  Had the complainant responded to the e-mail alert dated 14.05.2009 of the ops the instant fraudulent transfers would not have matured.  It reveals that the complainant is negligent and in Visa Money Transfer after every transaction an alert is sent to the customer so as to enable and make the customer about the particular transaction.  Except this all the allegations of the complainant are false and fabricated.

          It is specifically mentioned invariably due to laches on the part of the complainant’s wife anyhow the joint holders of the account it may be somehow 3rd party got IPIN and the Id valid password for which the transaction took place and the allegations against the op in paragraph-4 (b) of the complaint are denied and practically ops have no fault for which the complaint should be dismissed.

 

Decision with reasons

 

          In the present case after studying the complaint and written version and also relying upon the documents as produced by the parties particularly the complainant’s documents it is apparently proved that on 14.05.2009 4 money transactions were made to the extent of Rs.49,000/-, Rs.47,125/-, Rs.48,222/- & Rs.48,000/- i.e. total Rs.1,92,437/- what had been debited from the joint account of the complainant and his wife, son and mother.  It is also admitted fact that all visa card Pin numbers are with the complainant which has been admitted by the complainant in his letter to the op dated 05.06.2009.  But it is case of the complainant that they never used any debit card and it is also admitted fact Amitanshu Doss the complainant has his e-mail address i.e. amitabhdoss@hotmail.com and complainant sent that e-mail (letter) on 05.06.2009 from Dubai and that letter was forwarded through e-mail.  So, it is clear that the complainant has one e-mail address and it is maintained by the complainant till now.  It is also fact that HDFC Bank replied and stated that Bank sent alerts to the registered e-mail Id of the complainant (amitabhdoss@hotmail.com)informing about transaction dated 14.05.2009.  But against that no reply was received by the bank.  But complainant has alleged that he did not receive such e-mail.  But truth is that complainant has his valid e-mail address (amitabhdoss@hotmail.com).Then it is the duty of the bank to prove that e-mail was received by the complainant.  But banking authority has failed to prove that e-mail alert set by the complainant above e-mail address on 14.05.2009 was received by the complainant.  Fact remains that bank has accepted that when it was detected by them 3 unusual transactions borne in the account and the transactions were found originated from Nigeria IPIN, only to save the remaining fund the account was closed and thereafter somehow op/bank was able to save Rs.48,000/- in one of the account which had been marked as no debit by the bank and it is admitted that the funds in respect of other transactions had already been withdrawn from the account by the beneficiaries when the bank checked their accounts and it is undisputed fact that all the transactions were made from Nigeria IPIN.  Then question is whether complainant and his wife went to Nigeria when said transaction happened at Nigeria at that time and anyhow it is proved that complainant never went to Nigeria and op has also failed to prove that complainant and his family members ever went to Nigeria on the transaction date 14.05.2009 and question of their visiting at Nigeria does not arise in view of the fact.  Op by his letter dated 26.06.2009 has admitted that on the basis of interest investigation by their risk monitoring team it was deducted that there was unusual transaction pattern in the account and the transfer was found from Nigeria, then it is proved that op has admitted that some fraudulent persons acted in such a fashion and adopted such unfair means and for which complainant was asked to file an FIR and no doubt on the request of the op, complainant filed an FIR in respect of the amount of Rs.96,215/- and Rs.48,222/-.

          In the present case apparently after considering the evidence of the op and also this letter sent to the complainant, it is clear that op has admitted that the said 4 transactions were made by unknown persons from Nigeria IPIN and after detection they have also somehow saved Rs.48,000/-.  Then it is clear that fraud had been practiced by Nigerian People or any other people sitting at Nigeria and ops investigation cell found that the said 4 transactions were unusual transaction pattern in the account.  So, it is clear that usually transaction pattern was not used at the time of said money transaction.  But admitted fact is that in the name of the wife of the complainant Mrs. Mita Doss there is one IPIN and 3rd party transfer facility occurred which was obtained in the month of March 2009 and also they have their on line share trading facility and further the facility to transfer fund on behalf of the NRI to NRO account and complainant admitted that though complaint knows on line security formalities for the same but it is their claim they never used 3rd party share facility.  But question is whether complainant even presented code of IPIN number and also Card Number PIN number etc. in this regard the complainant is silent and wife of the complainant has also not adduced any evidence in support of that.  But it is fact that on 14.05.2009 that Visa Money Transfer debit was made and it was operated from Nigeria but fact remains that complainants were not at Nigeria at the relevant time and op has not denied that fact.  Fact remains that complainant was asked to file an application to fund transfer Fraud Customer Department by sending a fund transfer fraud customer letter but complainant did not sign it on the ground in the said proof letter there is one sentence “the customer Id and netbanking problem we find anything national compromise/share by me.  I acknowledge the transaction as per validity and executed as per the bank’s record”.  Considering that line complainant did not sign in that letter and no doubt complainant rightly did not sign when complainant challenges the said transactionas a fraud transaction and it was possible for 3rd party due to lack of banking of safety measures by the op/bank and when op has admitted that the transaction was not entirely of present pattern in the account.  Then it is clear that op/bank admitted that the said transaction was not made by the present complainant or the card holders.  When it is proved by internal investigation of the op/bank that the said transaction pattern was entirely separate in the account and transactions were found originated from Nigeria IPIN and fact remains op/bank at that point of time to save the remaining funds of the account of the complainant somehow saved Rs.48,000/-.  Though it was admitted as fraudulent transaction already done and considering that version of the op in the letter dated 26.06.2009 it is found that op admitted that it was fraudulent transaction made by some unknown persons from Nigeria and it is also admitted by the op that those persons were from Nigeria and it was transferred to the account of Rehan Ahmed Ansari of S.B. Road Branch of HDFC Bank andJogeswari WestBranch of HDFC Bank, then it was the liability to such bank to file this case when those persons are also customer of the HDFC Bank at other branches and against them by op/bank ought to have file police case for recovery of the said amount but that has not been done.  But as per advice of op, complainant filed police case.  But as per RBI guide line due to pending of police case, no customer shall be harassed and it is found by internal investigation that same has been fraudulently withdrawn by 3rd person by adopting some unfair means, then the entire amount should be refunded to the customer with such interest.

          In this regard we have gone through the circular of the RBI vide Circular No.DBOD.LEG.BC.86/09.07.007/2001-02 dated 08.04.2002 reveals that “customer service-reversal of erroneous debits arising on fraudulent or other transactions” and wherefrom we have gathered that RBI advices to all banks to comply and not to defer or delay refund/reverse of customers money in place of any internal or police investigation and in consideration of ops admission that type of instruction illegally originated through net banking from Nigeria IPIN.  Then it is clear that as per circular op/bank is bound to refund the said amount without raising any allegation against the complainant’s wife.

          But in this case the Ld. Lawyer for the op specifically argued by stating that the wife of the complainant Mita Doss has not appeared and filed any such affidavit in support of the complaint to that effect that she never used the card and never disclosed the password and IPIN to any 3rd person.

          On the other hand the Ld. Lawyer for the complainant submitted that practically the wife’s card was used once, thereafter it was not used and there areseveral theorization of hacking and somehow adopting of trapping and fissing method that was done and practically in Europe Visa Money Fund Transfer are often attacked by adopting segmented 3 types of theorization one logical attack another currency fraud and further mail wire hacking and after studying the present theorization and also white paper as published in different journals it is found that in most of the Visa Money Fund Transfer most different attacks are being made by adopting logical attack practice on the software, operating system and communication system and logical attacks means the damaging in terms of the quantity of the consumer data compromised and the accumulation from the proportionately operating system to Microsoft windows technology at greater connectivity and encounter activity of such transaction within home system and white paper as published in different journal it is found that in most of the Visa Money Transfer most different attacks are being made by adopting logical attack practice on the software, operating system and communicating system and logical attacks demolishes in terms of the quantity of the consumer data compromised and the accumulation from pre-operating system to Microsoft windows technology at greater connectivity and inter-connectivity of such transfer within home system and other instructor connectivity find to internet are the practice and logical security theft and logical attacks new Vandals who authors but exploit to operating system and for such sort of case hackers installed malware to violet the confidentiality integrity or authenticity of transfer related data after setting the malware hacking system and from the book computer engineering we have gathered that with a computer system the purpose of installing malware is made to enter into data on the computer system anddesign to collect card holder data and or dispense of cash malware hacking both locally and remotely.

          The legal attacks operate by excising the different method and by loading malware using an USB driver or adopting USB skipper to internal communication in between the card holder and the internet whereas attacks on the network card on some point in communication with the host or back end instructor and in the eye of the authors even as per Fadia’s theorization the sophisticated attacks are carried out by well fitted hackers organization.  Regarding malware theft it is committed by the knowledge technologist and software knowing persons and malware of that particular method are on the rise and constantly evolving in an attempt to stay ahead of security measures and by adopting that process physical and administrative access to even ATM platform operating system can be controlled.

          Indian Masque reading as Microsoft ware windows one installed, malware can operate for months together capturing card holder data instruction and all matters.

          As per Gates theorization this type of section use of violating of methods to correct error conditions that result in transfer reversal by the processor due to reported in ability to dispense.

          Considering the present system of fraud as adopted in Europe it is found that Europe base is not also safe and in Europe in every quarter III million is lost due to fraud adopted by the hackers by applying several methods and card trapping in respect of ATM and in respect of online transfer Visa Money Transfer etc. by logical attacks and malware and hacking are applied and day to day the user of the internet in the Banks and other transaction centers is taking and using antifraud device in addition to the implementation of adopting more scientific type of technology of Visa Master Card etc.   So, considering the present policy of the op including the system as adopted by hacker all over the world it is found that sophisticated criminal networks was able to transfer the money by adopting Visa Money Transfer T from Nigeria and it is a global problem for each day.  So, it is the duty of the different organisations who are using such sort of system or technology for transferring money to give safeguards to the customers and no doubt in the present case there was certain fault on the part of the op for which this money was transferred and another factor is that antifraud device were not properly used by the Bank and at the same time in view of the observation of the authors of computer technology and software technologies at the time of any transfer intimation from outside to another countries Bank or any other banks it is the duty of the Bank not to forthwith transfer the sum but to give a signal to the person who is trying to transfer any amount from outside country, wait for such transfer and before that it is the duty of the Bank to confirm the customers who had such Visa Money Transfer card etc. and at the same time antifraud devices should be used and in the eye of computer Technologist Mr. Fadia if antifraud devices are used with caution the chance of such fraudulent transfer must drop.  In this context we want to say that in the USA most technologically developed country also has been facing card related fraud and a study released in 2011 by the AIT Group that for such type of card fraud cases USA industries lose $ 8.6 million annually and loss consumer confidence.  This theorisation are collected from the online in the heading of white paper ATM and other fraud and security circulated by DIE BOLD innovation delivered and from that Article we have gathered that most prevalent type of fraud in Asia is skimming, trapping, fissing logical attack and malware hacking and particularly logical and malware and hacking are adopted in case of online money transfer and in this regard we may say without hesitation that practically there was no cross check up and anti-device use for taking proper safeguard and security in respect each and every transaction through Visa Money Transfer by the op practically such sort of fraud was practiced and a fraud star sitting at Niegria committed such act practically for fault of the Bank employees who did not take proper step to safeguard the same when one after another transfer was made in a day from outside foreign country and it is no doubt a sophisticated attack which was carried out by well trained hacker having their sound knowledge to control the software system of the Bank and it is also a logical attacks and invariably they have installed malware to violate the confidential integrity or authenticity transfer related data and no doubt safety in this regard was not taken by the op for which in one day 4 fraudulent transactions were made by the hackers but bank was found sitting idle.

          But from the own conduct of the op it is proved on enquiry and investigation they were satisfied that the transfer was made from Nigeria IPIN and it was done in casual manner.  So, considering all the above fact and materials we are convinced to hold that there was laches, lapses on the part of the op to give safeguard against such fraud transaction and for which by applying most scientific method (malware or skimming) the transfer from Nigeria was made and money was transferred to 3rdparties’account.

          But fact remains that ops are aware of the fact in whose account this amount was transferred.  Though invariably the HDFC Bank Authority may ask the said branchesto take up the matter with such transactions in whose account the amount has been transferred by that person from Nigeria by using the IPIN and password of the present account holder.  But we are convinced that complainant or his wife never used the same and at the same time as per circular of the RBI as already discussed the op is bound to refund the entire amount with interest @ 8% p.a. from the date on which date this fraudulent transaction was made by the hackers.

          After proper study of the entire facts and circumstances including the use of system devices by the hackers by placing malware etc. we are convinced that all organisations who are engaged in monetary transaction must be more careful and shall have to appoint expert in hacking or who are well aware to protect each and every transaction by applying inactive devices against such fraud stars who are using such sort of devices for the purpose of continuing fraud during online transaction or transfer and if safety measures are not taken in each case by the bank or any financial institution or by the Government in that case figure of loss in each month shall be increased.  No doubt after visiting different banks at the time of withdrawing money or transferring money we have gathered that bank employees are very much casual in operating the same and they are not well trained how to check any transaction whether it is fraudulent or correct. Very recently in Kolkata the hackers showed their skill in hacking under the umbrella of an organization of India institute of engineering and management and we feel that the bank employees, government employees and other employees who are engaged in such sort of money transfer etc. shall have to train themselves first how to hack and there is a very scientific story and observation of Gates that hacking and fraud in respect of internet money transfer is required to be learnt at first how to commit theft i.e. hacking.  If same is not learnt in that case it is not possible to give any defence by applying anti devices to check the fraud or hacking and this is the scientific procedure.

          Anyhow in the written version op has not pointed out what sorts of safeguard for saving fraud or hacking was taken by the op Bank Authority or their employees in respect of each transaction of this complaint.  No doubt the transaction was a fraud and it was made by a fraud star residing not at Kolkata but staying at Nigeria and it is proved that at the time of transaction bank employees were casually operated the same.  But from their own investigation it was found that sometime they casually transacted and if it is fact at the time of transaction they did not check the same or they fail to do so for which we are convinced that all laches are on the part of the op and for their latches and lapses and not for taking such defensive security against hacking or fraud, this fraud transaction was successful operation by the fraud stars staying at Nigeria and this is the situation of the Banking security in respect of online transaction or any other transaction through internet.

          In the light of the above observation we are convinced to hold that ops are at fault they are negligent and for which they are bound to pay the entire fund along with 8% interest w.e.f. 14.05.2009 and till date of full payment of the entire amount to the account of the complainant or deposit of the same in the account of the complainant which is lying under the HDFC Bank of the op.

 

          Thus, the complaint succeeds.

          Hence, it is

ORDERED

 

          That the complaint be and the same is allowed on contest with cost of Rs.10,000/- against the ops.

          Ops are directed to pay and refund the sum of Rs.1,92,636/- to the complainant’s account which is lying in the ops’ Bank in the name of the complainant and also 8% interest per annum starting from 19.05.2009 to till payment of the same in the complainant’s account with an interest @ 8% p.a. and it must be made within one month from the date of this order failing which ops shall have to pay punitive damages @ Rs.400/- per day till full payment of this amount and decretal cost of Rs.10,000/- to the complainant’s account and if the punitive damages is collected it shall be deposited to the present Forum by the ops.

          Ops are directed to comply the order very strictly within one month from the date of this order failing which penal proceeding shall be started and further penalty of Rs.10,000/- shall be imposed upon them for which they shall be liable.

 


[HON'ABLE MR. Ashok Kumar Chanda] MEMBER[HON'ABLE MR. Bipin Muhopadhyay] PRESIDENT[HON'ABLE MRS. Sangita Paul] MEMBER