Per Hon’ble Mr.S.R.Khanzode, Presiding Judicial Member Since these misc. applications in relation to the appeals as mentioned in the cause title, involves identical questions of fact and law, are disposed of by this common order. Facts in brief which give rise to these appeals in which these condonation of delay applications are made, could be summarized as under:- In a consumer complaint filed by non applicant /respondent i.e. original complainant –Mr.Haresh Savlani (herein after referred as ‘complainant’) against applicant/appellant/original opponent-M/s. Ecole Mondiale World School (herein after referred as ‘School’) alleging deficiency in service on the part of school, for not refunding the entire amount towards the fees deposited for his daughter–Kripa, a minor, consequent to the cancellation of her admission/not pressing her application for admission before her admission was made final. During the pendency of said consumer complaint, the complainant made an application for amendment explaining/incorporating the facts stated about the status of admission prior to it was cancelled. Said application came to be allowed and against this appeal no.A/12/151 is filed by the school. In the course of pendency of the above referred consumer complaint, the school made two applications, one for joinder/ addition of new party viz.Gold Ancher Exim Pvt.Ltd. and another application u/sec.13(4)(ii) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (‘Act’ for brevity) for discovery and disclosure regarding inter-se relationship between the complainant and Gold Ancher Exim Pvt.Ltd. Both these applications came to be rejected/dismissed. All the three orders referred above along with another application for ad-interim relief made by the complainant came to be decided by a common order dated 15/10/2011. These three separate appeals are filed challenging the respective orders in respect of above referred three applications. There is alleged delay of 96 days in filing each appeal and which is sought to be condoned by filing separate misc. applications in the respective appeals, supra. Heard both the parties at length. Perused the record. The first contention raised as to maintainability of these appeals from the orders under challenge, which are in the nature of interlocutory orders or procedural orders passed during the pendency of consumer complaint. It is submitted that against these orders no appeal u/sec.15 of the Act would lie. Ld.counsel appearing for the applicant/appellant submitted that the phrase used, “an order” in section 15 would cover any order passed by the forum including the orders under challenge and, therefore, appeals are maintainable. He placed reliance on a decision in the matter of Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another (2010) 4 SCC 772 and also decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in the matter of R..B.Upadhyayv/s.State Commission for Consumer Disputes & others, 2010(6) Bom. C.R. 241. At the first instance, both these authorities, as relevant to the facts in those matters, refer to the phrase used, “any order” and not “an order”. Section 15 of the Act used the phrase, “an order”. Thus, these authorities are distinguishable referring to the facts under consideration. However, the principle stated as to the rule of interpretation cannot be disputed. It cannot be disputed that right of appeal is a creature of Statute, it was never an inherent right like that of filing of the suit and, therefore, its nature, ambit and width are to be determined from the Statute itself and when language of the Statute regarding nature of the order from which right of appeal has been conferred is clear, no statutory interpretation is warranted either to widen or restrict the same. As earlier pointed out, the phrase used in section 15 dealing with the right of appeal against the order passed by the District Forum to the State Commission, the phrase used is, “an order”. In a commentary of Bakshi’s Consumer Protection Laws foreword by Justice M.B.Shah (2004 Edition) at page 1232 it is observed as under:- “With this broader approach in mind, one has to read Sections 13,14 and 15 of the Act together and construe them harmoniously. Section 13 some what exhaustively provides for the procedure on the receipt of a complaint by the District Forum. The succeeding Section 14, as its very heading shows, provides, in some detail, for the findings of the District Forum in its final order, after complying with the procedure prescribed. It is in this sequence that Section 15 immediately follows and lays down that any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against it to the State Commission. The reference to the order under Section 14, though not explicit, is implicit in the provision. The intent is some what clear that the substantive right of appeal conferred by Section 15, is directed against an order made by the District Forum under Section 14 only. Section 15 talks of an order made by the District Forum and not of any or every order made by it. It bears repetition that such an order has a contextual reference to the preceding Section 14 containing the findings of the District Forum on a complaint preferred before it under Section12. To construe “an order” in Sec.15, when carried to logical lengths, would lead to an obvious absurdity. If it were to be so, then every order, whether inter locutory, interim or one merely giving an adjournment made by the District Forum would come within the sweep of Section 15. This could hardly be the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is well settled that even where two interpretations are possible, the one which leads to absurd or mischievous where two interpretations are possible, the one which leads to absurd or mischievous results, has to be necessarily avoided. Therefore, to read Section 15 as laying down that any and every order of whatever nature, passed by the District Forum would become appealable thereunder, appears to us as running patently against the basic canons of construction. Kohinoor Carpets, Panipat and others v/s. Mr.Rajinder Arora, II (1991) CPJ 429 (Chand).” We fully endorse the above referred opinion expressed. While dealing with the scope of appeal u/sec.27-A of the Act, this Commission in the matter of Amir Ali Tharani V/s.Rajesh Sukhtankar & another reported in II (2011) CPJ 23 relying upon the case of the Apex Court in the matter of Central Bank of India v/s. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799, also observed that the interlocutory orders or procedural orders during the pendency of the lis or steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The Legislature could not have intended that parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is pain to the parties to set forth error, defect, irregularity, if any in such an order as a grant of objection in the appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. It is further observed that what is to be kept in mind that the course of litigation should normally proceed unhampered and if at every stage the appellate court has to entertain an appeal, there cannot be a speedy culmination of the litigation at all. These observations we find, are equally applicable to the facts before us. Thus, we further find that the appeals against the impugned orders are not at all tenable under section 15 of the Act and, thus, once the appeals itself are not tenable, there arise no question to consider as to whether there is any delay in filing the appeals or not. For the sake of argument even if it is assumed that the appeals could be entertained, let us consider the reasons given for condonation of delay which are identical in all these three applications. It is submitted that the copy of the impugned order dated 15/10/2011 was made available to the advocate on record of the applicant/appellant on or about 30/10/2011. Certified copy of the impugned order shows that it was issued on 31/10/2011. After receipt of the said copy applicant/appellant/school were under belief that no appeal would be maintainable. However, advocate who has received copy of the impugned orders through inadvertence and/or under mistaken belief did not hand over the copy of the order passed to the school till 25/11/2011. School thereafter got it translated and placed it before the administration/the management for consideration for taking the decision (to file an appeal). Unfortunately, son of the Legal officer of the school dealing with the matter met with an accident on 02/12/2011 and was required to be hospitalized for quite some time and this forced the Legal Officer to remain absent and, it resulted into causing the delay. Lawyer of the school was not available during the Christmas vacation from 25/12/2011 till 04/01/2012 and after consulting the said lawyer, he opined that appeals could be filed and then the school took steps to file the appeals resulting into delay of 96 days calculated from 30/10/2011. Actual delay after the lapse of period of limitation by 30/11/2011, the actual delay would come to about 63 days. It may be pointed out that son of the legal officer of the school who met with an accident on 02/12/2011 is the event which had occurred after lapse of period of limitation. Inadvertently or by mistaken belief that no appeal would lie, held by the school or lapses on the part of advocate to hand over copy of the order till 25/11/2011 to the school cannot offer any sufficient cause to the school to get condoned the delay. When the Legal officer of the school again started attending the affairs of the school is also not stated. Having nourished belief that no appeal would lie and another lawyer when contacted giving different opinion about maintainability of the appeals and, thereafter, taking steps to file the appeal would also not give any legitimate, nay, sufficient reason to condone the delay in question. Thus, we find on merit, applicant/ appellant i.e. school failed to show any sufficient cause to condone the delay. For the above stated reasons, we hold accordingly and pass the following order:- ORDER 1. Misc.application No.MA/12/96 in Appeal No.A/12/151, Misc.application No.MA/12/97 in Appeal No.A/12/152 and Misc.application No.MA/12/98 in Appeal No.A/12/153 for condonation of delay stands rejected. 2. Consequently, the appeals does not survive for consideration and stands disposed off, accordingly. 3. In the given circumstances, no order as to costs. Pronounced on 3rd January, 2013. | 
