1. This First Appeal, by Opposite Parties No. 1 and 2 in the Complaint, namely, M/s Supertech CZAR Suites, is directed against the order dated 10.12.2015, passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi at New Delhi (for short “the State Commission”) in Complaint Case No. 107 of 2012. By the impugned order, while holding that there was deficiency of service on the part of the Appellant herein in not handing over the physical possession of the flat to the Complainant, Respondent No.1 herein, the State Commission has allowed the Complaint and, consequently, directed it to refund the amounts of ₹5,17,245/- and ₹23,69,747/-, along with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of respective deposits till realization, besides ₹1,00,000/- as compensation for inconvenience, harassment etc. and ₹50,000/- towards litigation costs. 2. On 18.11.2006 the Complainant had applied with the Appellant for allotment of a flat in its project, christened as “Supertech CZAR Suites Residential Township, Noida, U.P.” The total sale consideration of the flat was ₹33,67,245/-, out of which a sum of ₹5,17,245/- was paid by the Complainant from his own resources, and further sum of ₹28,50,000/- was paid by Opposite Party No.3, namely, ING Visya Bank Ltd., from which the Complainant had taken a loan for the stated purpose. Though on 23.02.2007 an allotment letter was issued to the Complainant and on 21.02.2008 a Tripartite Agreement was also entered between the Appellant, the Complainant and the Bank, after several visits to the site the Complainant found that the project was incomplete. In the said background, the afore-noted Complaint came to be filed before the State Commission, wherein the Complainant had prayed for refund of the amounts paid on his behalf with interest @ 15%, as also compensation of ₹5,00,000/- for mental agony and harassment undergone by him. 3. On appreciation of the material available before it, including the Written Versions, filed by both the Appellant and ING Vysya Bank, the State Commission, as noted above, came to the conclusion that there was deficiency in service on the part of the Appellant in not handing over the physical possession of the flat to the Complainant and, consequently, while accepting the Complaint, preferred by the Complainant, issued the afore-noted directions to the Appellant. Hence, the present Appeal. 4. It is pointed out by the office that the Appeal is barred by limitation, inasmuch as there is a delay of 398 days in filing the same. An application, praying for condonation of the said delay, has been filed along with the Appeal. In the said Application, the Appellant has furnished the following explanation: “1. That the present Revision Petition is being filed under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, against the impugned judgment and final order dated 10.12.2015 passed by the Hon’ble State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi in Complaint No. 107 of 2012 seeking a limited direction from this Hon’ble Commission to modify the order of the State Commission to allow the Petitioner to refund to the Respondent No.2 Bank Rs.23,69,747/- alongwith interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of deposit till the date of its realization. 2. That after the Complaint came to be allowed by the State Commission, the Complainant filed execution proceedings. 3. In execution proceedings the short dispute is whether the amount of Rs.23,69,747/- which was paid to Petitioner by Respondent No.2 (ING Vysya Bank Ltd.) on behalf of Respondent No.1 should be returned to the Respondent No.1 or the bank Respondent No.2. 4. The Petitioner submits that there is a delay of 417 days in filing the present Revision Petition against the judgment and final order dated 10.12.2015 passed by the Hon’ble State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi in Complaint No. 107 of 2012.” 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the Appellant on the question of delay. 6. Bearing in mind the broad principles laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions, I am of the opinion that the explanation furnished by the Appellant is absolutely unsatisfactory and the Appellant has failed to make out any cause, much less a sufficient cause, for condonation of the afore-stated inordinate delay in filing the Appeal. 7. On disposal of the Complaint, a certified copy of the impugned order, dated 10.12.2015, was issued to the Appellant on 29.12.2015. Having suffered adverse directions at the hands of the State Commission, the Appellant promptly obtained the certified copy of the impugned order, yet the present Appeal was filed with an inordinate delay of 398 days, over and above the statutory period of 30 days, as provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Evidently, the sole object of filing the Appeal is to somehow protract the matter and delay the refund of the huge amounts received by it towards the cost of the flat, after the Complainant has initiated Execution proceedings against it. 8. For all these reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that the Appellant has failed to make out sufficient cause for condonation of an inordinate delay of 398 days in filing the present Appeal and, therefore, I am not inclined to condone the same. In my view, condonation of such unexplained delay would result in further harassment, to the Complainant, who, despite having parted with a huge sum of money about a decade ago, with the fond hope of getting a roof over his head, and also having in his hands favourable order from the State Commission, is still waiting to have it enforced. 9. Consequently, the Appeal is dismissed, in limine, on the short ground of limitation. |