Pardeep filed a consumer case on 01 Aug 2016 against DLF Homes Panchkula in the StateCommission Consumer Court. The case no is CC/154/2016 and the judgment uploaded on 04 Aug 2016.
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
Consumer Complaint No. | 154 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | 21.04.2016 |
Date of Decision | 01.08.2016 |
Pardeep s/o Sh. Roshan Lal r/o Near Paras Pradhan, Ward No.18, Charkhi Dadri, Bhiwani, Haryana.
.…Complainant
Versus
…..Opposite Party.
…..Performa Opposite Party.
BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.
MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER
MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.
Present: Sh. Savinder Singh Gill, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Advocate for Opposite Party No.1.
Sh. Puneet Tuli, Advocate for Opposite Party No.2.
PER DEV RAJ, MEMBER
In brief, the facts of the case, are that in order to own a residential independent floor in Panchkula for his family and personal use, the complainant purchased a residential independent floor No.DVF-B1/14-SF#217 (hereinafter to be referred as the unit) having saleable area of 1550 sq. ft. in DLF Valley, Panchkula for a total consideration of Rs.50,09,599.84Ps in resale from Sh. Sanjay Sharma and Smt. Monika Sharma, the original allottees, vide agreement dated 29.04.2013 (Annexure C-1). It was further stated that Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the original allottees and Opposite Party No.1 on 13.07.2011 (Annexure C-2). It was further stated that the original allottees paid an amount of Rs.28,74,103, as per detail given in Para 2 of the complaint, before transfer of the said unit in favour of the complainant. It was further stated that as per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, possession of the unit was to be given by Opposite Party No.1 within 24 months (i.e. 2 years) from the date of execution of the said Agreement. It was further stated that the complainant kept on making payment of the demands raised by Opposite Party No.1 from time to time as per the construction linked payment plan and paid Rs.9,45,568/- Rs.83,942/- and Rs.5,80,529/- on 18.11.2013, 21.11.2013 and 3.5.2014 respectively. It was further stated that the complainant also obtained loan of Rs.27 Lacs @10.40% (floating) for a period of 20 years from ICICI Bank - Opposite Party No.2 for making part payment of the unit in question. It was further stated that the complainant, in all, paid an amount of Rs.44,84,142/- to Opposite Party No.1. It was further stated that period of 24 months plus further 12 months expired on 13.07.2013 but Opposite Party No.1 showed its inability to hand over possession. It was further stated that till date, the unit is not complete for possession and the complainant is being burdened with the EMIs by Opposite Party No.2 (Bank), with no likelihood of getting possession early.
2. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts of Opposite Party No.1, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainant, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be called as the Act only), was filed, seeking directions to Opposite Party No.1, to refund Rs.44,84,142/- alongwith interest @18% per annum, from respective dates of deposits; pay Rs.3,50,000/- as compensation for physical harassment and mental agony and Rs.1,00,000/- as litigation expenses.
3. Opposite Party No.1 in its written statement took up certain preliminary objections, to the effect, that the complainant, being investor, had purchased the flat, in question, from original allottees, for earning profits, as and when there is escalation in the prices of real estate, as such, he would not fall within the definition of a consumer, as defined by Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of 1986 Act; that the parties were bound by the terms and conditions mentioned in the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement and the dispute being of contractual nature, could not be considered under the C. P. Act. Apart from above objections, the Counsel for Opposite Party No.1, during arguments, also took an objection as regards referring the matter to the Arbitrator as there exists an Arbitration Clause 55 in the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement.
4. On merits, it was admitted that the complainant purchased the unit, in question, from the original allottees, total value whereof was Rs.50,87,990.84Ps. Execution of Buyer’s Agreement between the original allottees and Opposite Party No.1 was also admitted. It was also admitted that the complainant, till date, had paid an amount of Rs.44,84,142/- to Opposite Party No.1. It was stated that there is a DLI of Rs.57,325.42 levied against the account of the complainant on account of delay of 263 days, which he has not paid. It was further admitted that as per clause 11(a) of the Agreement, the possession of the allotted unit, was to be handed over to the complainant within 24 months from the signing of the Agreement subject to force majeure conditions or due to reasons beyond the control of Opposite Party No.1. It was further stated that the complainant defaulted in making payments of Rs.46,622.66 towards other charges/taxes, Rs.42,676/- towards EDC and further Rs.62,271.65, demands whereof were raised vide letters dated 29.9.2014, 06.10.2014 & 06.11.2014 respectively (Annexure R/16 colly.). It was further stated that the complainant was informed as regards the stay granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the construction activity at the project site. It was further stated that an exit offer vide letter dated 05.06.2013 (Annexure R-3) was given to the complainant, which clearly portrait the exit plan, to carry on with the project and give Opposite Party No.1 another year to complete the project or to get the refund of the amount deposited till date with 9% interest. However, the complainant showed interest in the project. It was further stated that Opposite Party No.1 has already completed construction of 771 independent floors on 257 plots and another 1020 built up units are near completion. It was further stated that out of 1791 built up units, occupation certificate(s) for 771 (257 plots) units have been received and as on date, possession of 140 units has been offered to the owners. It was further stated that proper water connection and electricity supply is in place and full housekeeping and maintenance services are being provided through leading multinational company namely Jones Lang Lasalle (JLL). It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of Opposite Party No.1, nor it indulged into any unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.
5. Opposite Party No.2 – ICICI Bank, in its written statement, stated that home loan of Rs.27,00,000/- was sanctioned in favour of the complainant by it vide Home Loan No.LBBWA00002029091 in the month of September 2013, out of which an amount of Rs.9,45,568/- was disbursed on 15.11.2013 and Rs.5,80,529/- on 02.05.2014 as per Opposite Party No.1 demand. It was further stated that no further demand was raised by Opposite Party No.1, after May 2014. It was further stated that Opposite Party No.2 had received permission to mortgage in its favour and had also received the endorsement vide Builder Buyer Agreement. It was further stated that no relief has been claimed by the complainant against Opposite Party No.2 – Bank. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of Opposite Party No.2, nor it indulged into any unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.
6. The complainant filed rejoinder, wherein, he reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and repudiated the same, contained in the written version of Opposite Party No.1. However, in separate rejoinder filed, the complainant admitted the submissions made by Opposite Party No.2 in its reply.
7. The complainant, in support of his case, submitted his own affidavit, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.
8. Opposite Party No.1, in support of its case, submitted the affidavit of Sh. Shiv Kumar, its Authorized Signatory, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.
9. We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully.
10. It is evident that the complainant purchased Independent Floor No.DVF-B-1/14-SF/217 alongwith Parking No.P-2F, in DLF Valley, Panchkula from Opposite Party No.1. Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement executed at Chandigarh on 13.07.2011 (Annexure C-2) with the original allottee was transferred in his name. The total price for the said independent floor, as depicted in the Agreement, was Rs.50,09,599.84Ps and the complainant paid an amount of Rs.44,84,142/- to Opposite Party No.1, receipt whereof has nowhere been specifically denied in its written statement by Opposite Party No.1. It is also evident that the complainant obtained home loan of Rs.27,00,000/- from Opposite Party No.2, in September 2013, out of which, two installments of Rs.9,45,568/- and Rs.5,80,529/- were disbursed to Opposite Party No.1 on 15.11.2013 and 02.05.2014 respectively. Further as per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, Opposite Party No.1 was to complete the construction of the said independent floor within a period of 24 months from the date of execution of the said Agreement. It is also admitted by Opposite Party No.1 in Para 9 of the preliminary objections of its written statement that vide letter dated 05.06.2013 (Annexure R-3), Opposite Party No.1 sought further time of 12 months, in addition to 24 months, to complete the construction work. The complainant was also given the option to seek refund alongwith 9% interest vide letter dated 05.06.2013 (Annexure R-3). However, the complainant agreed to a further period of 12 months in handing over of possession.
11. During arguments, Counsel for Opposite Party No.1 raised an objection that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of Arbitration Act 1996, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint. It may be stated here that the objection raised by Opposite Party No.1, in this regard, deserves rejection, in view of the judgment passed by this Commission in Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another, consumer complaint No.170 of 2015, decided on 01.04.2016, wherein this issue was dealt, in detail, while referring various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India; the National Commission, New Delhi, and also Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Ultimately it was held by this Commission that even in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. It was also so said by the National Commission, recently, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No. 346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-
“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 andNational Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”
In view of the above, and also in the face of ratio of judgments, referred to above, the argument raised by Counsel for Opposite Party No.1, stands rejected.
12. To defeat claim of the complainant, the next objection raised by Opposite Party No.1 was that the complainant, being investor, had purchased the flat, in question, for earning profits, as and when there is escalation in the prices of real estate, as such, he would not fall within the definition of a consumer, as defined by Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of 1986 Act. It may be stated here that there is nothing, on the record to show, that the complainant is a property dealer, and is indulged in sale and purchase of property, on regular basis. In the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by Opposite Party No.1, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. As stated above, the complainant obtained home loan in the sum of Rs.27 Lacs for making part payment towards price of the unit, in question, which meant that he raised the loan to have a unit of his own to reside therein. Otherwise also, in a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd., 2016 (1) CPJ 31, it was held by the National Commission that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. The principle of law, laid down, in Kavita Ahuja’s case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the flat, in question, was purchased by the complainant, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs Nirmala Devi Gupta, 2016 (2) CPJ 316. The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by Opposite Party No.1, in its written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
13. Another objection raised by Counsel for Opposite Party No.1 was that the complainant filed this complaint to amend/modify/rewrite the concluded Agreement duly executed between the original allottee and Opposite Party No.1, purely to invoke jurisdiction of this Commission. It was further stated that the complainant was virtually inviting this Commission to assume powers conferred under the Civil Court and, therefore, this Commission did not have the jurisdiction to consider the present complaint. It may be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of Opposite Party No.1, for purchasing the unit, in question, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of Opposite Party No.1, it was to complete construction of the said Independent Floor within a period of twenty four months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement). Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines ‘service’ as under:-
“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”
14. From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs. Union Of India and Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC), it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, as stated above, Section 3 of the Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has a remedy to file a suit in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by him, as he falls within the definition of a consumer, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the objection of Opposite Party No.1, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
15. The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether there was delay in offering possession, on account of which, the complainant is entitled to refund of the amount deposited by him with interest or not. Clauses 11(a) and 11(b) of Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement dated 13.07.2011, being relevant, are extracted hereunder:-
“11(a) Schedule for possession of the said Independent Floor:-
The Company based on its present plans and estimates and subject to all just exceptions, endeavors to complete construction of the said Independent Floor within a period of twenty four (24) months from the date of execution of the Agreement unless there shall be delay or failure due to Force majeure conditions and due to reasons mentioned in Clause 11(b) and 11(c) or due to failure of Allottee to pay in time the Total Price and other charges, taxes, deposits, securities etc and dues/payments or any failure on the part of the allottee to abide by all or any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
11(b) Delay due to reasons beyond the control of the company:-
If the possession of the Said Independent Floor is delayed due to Force Majeure conditions, then the company shall be entitled to extension of time for delivery of possession of the said Independent Floor. The company during the continuance of the Force Majeure reserves the right to alter or vary the terms and conditions of the agreement or if the circumstances so warrant, the company may also suspend the development for such period as is considered expedient and the allottee shall have no right to raise any claim compensation of any nature whatsoever for or with regard to such suspension.”
No doubt, as per the afore-extracted clauses, Opposite Party No.1 was to complete the construction of the floor, in question, within a period of 24 months from the date of execution of the Agreement dated 13.07.2011 i.e. by 12.07.2013. However, as admitted by Opposite Party No.1, it failed to offer possession within the aforesaid stipulated period of 24 months and vide letter dated 05.06.2013 (Annexure R-3) informed the complainant that it (Opposite Party No.1) would endeavor to complete the project subject to the delay of 12 months, which occurred due to stoppage of the work because of stay on construction activities. In this letter, Opposite Party No.1 also informed the complainant that Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP No.21786-88/2010 vide its order dated 12.12.2012 and the earlier order dated 19.04.2012 passed by it (Supreme Court) not to undertake further construction at the project land stood vacated. Opposite Party No.1 also informed the complainant that in case the complainant did not agree to delay of 12 months, it (Opposite Party No.1) would cancel the allotment and refund the amount deposited with 9% interest. Admittedly, there was no stay as on 12.12.2012 on construction activity. In fact, stay on construction activities was in force for a period of 8 months only. However, Opposite Party No.1 failed to deliver possession of the floor, in question, complete in all respects, to the complainant even within the extended period of 12 months, which expired on 13.07.2014. During arguments, Counsel for Opposite Party No.1 conceded that till date, possession of the floor, in question, has not been delivered to the complainant and the same will be delivered shortly. There is clear cut admission by Opposite Party No.1 that there was delay in offering possession and it even failed to deliver possession after seeking one year extension, which expired on 13.07.2014. The argument of Opposite Party No.1 that delay in handing over possession of independent floor was attributable due to delay in receiving statutory approvals from the competent authorities, the same being absolutely beyond its control, is not tenable. The Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed on 13.07.2011 and before execution thereof, Opposite Party No.1 ought to have obtained all the approvals. If permissions for revision in layout plans and service plans were sought on 11.03.2013 and 20.05.2013, approval for which was also received in due course of time, the initial time taken for seeking such approvals amounts to clear deficiency on the part of Opposite Party No.1 and in the absence of any justified reason for not doing so earlier, it would not amount to force majeure condition. The plea taken, therefore, is of no help to Opposite Party No.1. The total price of the unit was Rs.50,09,599.84Ps and the complainant had made payments in the sum of Rs.44,84,142/- to Opposite Party No.1, uptil 03.05.2014 (Page 89 of the file), which was undoubtedly his hard earned money. Clearly the complainant needed a residential unit and instead of seeking refund, as offered by Opposite Party No.1 vide letter dated 5.6.2013 (Annexure R-3), he agreed to extension of one year, which too expired on 13.07.2014. When Opposite Party No.1 itself failed to deliver possession to the complainant even by the extended period and till date, the argument put forth by it that complainant waived off his right by not opting for exit policy, is not tenable. The complainant had agreed to one year extension and when there is delay of more than 2 years even beyond the extended period, Opposite Party No.1 is liable to refund the entire amount paid by the complainant with interest. Further, when Opposite Party No.1 was ready to refund the deposited amount in June, 2013 (Annexure R-3) alongwith 9% interest, its objection to refund the deposited amount is not tenable. As already stated above, possession was to be delivered by 12.07.2013 and the complainant very fairly, on the asking of Opposite Party No.1, extended the same for one year i.e. up to 13.07.2014. Even the extended period expired on 13.07.2014 and still Opposite Party No.1 is not in a position to offer possession. It was clearly stated by the National Commission, in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC), that when the promoter has violated material condition, in not handing over possession of the unit, in time, it is not obligatory for a purchaser to accept possession after that date. Recently in Parsvnath Exotica Ghaziabad Resident's Association Vs. Parsvnath Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2016 (2) CPR 764, compensation in the form of simple interest @12% per annum with effect from the date of each payment till refund is made alongwith compensation of Rs.3 Lacs and litigation cost were awarded. Thus, in view of law laid down in aforesaid judgments, the complainant is entitled to refund of Rs.44,84,142/-.
16. It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount refunded can be granted, in favour of the complainant. It is not in dispute that an amount of Rs.44,84,142/- was paid by the complainant, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The said amount has been used by Opposite Party No.1, for its own benefit. There is no dispute that for making delayed payments, Opposite Party No.1 was charging heavy rate of interest, for the period of delay in making payment of installments. It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party which ex ae quo et bono ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the right to interest. It was also so said by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014. In view of above, the complainant is certainly entitled to get refund of the amount deposited by him to the tune of Rs.44,84,142/- alongwith interest @15% simple interest from the respective dates of deposits till realization. (As per clause 39(a) of the Buyer’s Agreement, Opposite Party No.1 was charging interest @15% P.A., for a delay of 90 days and, thereafter, penal interest @18% P.A.).
17. The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to any compensation or not. The complainant deposited his hard earned money, in the hope that he will have a house to live in. As admitted by Opposite Party No.1, the construction at the site which was stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India vide order dated 19.04.2012, was vacated on 12.12.2012. The stay, thus, operated only for eight months but Opposite Party No.1 failed to deliver possession to the complainant even after the lapse of extended period of 12 months, on 13.07.2014. Admittedly, possession has not been delivered by Opposite Party No.1 till date meaning thereby that there has been further delay of more than two years. On account of non-delivery of possession of the floor, in question, by Opposite Party No.1, to the complainant, complete in all respects, within the stipulated period or the extended period, or even till the filing of the complaint, the fact that possession is not ready even as on date, and by not refunding the amount to him (complainant), the complainant had certainly suffered physical harassment and mental agony on account of the acts of omission and commission of Opposite Party No.1, and escalation in prices, for which, he needs to be suitably compensated. In our considered opinion, compensation in the sum of Rs.3,00,000/-, if granted, would be just and adequate, to meet the ends of justice.
18. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties.
19. For the reasons, recorded above, the complaint is partly accepted, with costs, against Opposite Party No.1 only. Opposite Party No.1 is held liable and directed in the following manner:-
20. Opposite Party No.2 – ICICI Bank Limited shall have the first charge, on the amount to be refunded to the complainant by Opposite Party No.1, to the extent, the amount is due to it, against the complainant as it had advanced loan in his favour for part payment of the price of unit, in question.
21. However, the complaint against Opposite Party No.2 is dismissed with no order as to costs.
22. Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.
23. The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.
Pronounced
August 01, 2016.
[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]
PRESIDENT
[DEV RAJ]
MEMBER
[PADMA PANDEY]
MEMBER
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