View 1231 Cases Against Dlf Homes
Dharmpal filed a consumer case on 11 Jul 2017 against DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd., in the StateCommission Consumer Court. The case no is CC/841/2016 and the judgment uploaded on 13 Jul 2017.
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
U.T., CHANDIGARH
Consumer Complaint | : | 841 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 23.11.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Dharmpal S/o Sh. Shiv Lal resident of House No.264,
Sector 2, Panchkula.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Shubhankar Baweja, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji & Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Parties No.1 and 2.
Opposite Party No.3 exparte vide order dated 18.01.2017.
Consumer Complaint | : | 10 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.01.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Col. Balwinder Singh Sandhu S/o Sh. Lal Singh, Resident of House No.503, Tower No.18, Royal Estates, Zirakpur, District Mohali (Punjab)
.........Complainant.
Versus
DLF Homes Pvt. Ltd. Panchkula, SCO No.190-192, Sector-8C, Chandigarh through its Managing Director/Authorized Signatory.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by:
Sh. Abhishek S.Bhaskar, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Party.
Consumer Complaint | : | 84 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 25.01.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Major Sunil Dagar son of Late Sh. Satbir Singh, R/o H.No.177-F, Amrawati Enclave, Pinjore, Panchkula, Haryana.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Devinder Singh, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 90 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 27.01.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Parveen Kumar Kamboj S/o Hari Singh, R/o #48, Dinesh Nagar, Near Power House, Babyal Vill, Ambala Cantt-133005, Haryana.
.........Complainant.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd., SCO No.190-191-192, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh through its Managing Director/Authorized Signatory.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by:
Sh. Karan Garg, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Party.
Consumer Complaint | : | 175 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 27.02.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Dilbag Singh Deswal Son of Sh. Balwant Singh Deswal resident of H.No.184, Sector-8, Near BSNL Office, Karnal.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Gorav Kathuria, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji & Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 176 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 27.02.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Balram Dangi Son of Sh. Anand Singh Dangi resident of VPO Madina Korsan, Tehsil Meham, District Rohtak.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Gorav Kathuria, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji & Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 191 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 03.03.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
M/s DLF Homes Panchkula Private Ltd. through its Managing Director/Principal Officer, having its Registered Office at SCO No.190-191-192, Sector-8C, Chandigarh–160017.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by:
Sh. Sumit Narang, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Party.
Consumer Complaint | : | 193 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 03.03.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Suraj Mal, R/o #353/16, Friends Colony, Gurgaon, Haryana.
.........Complainant.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. SCO No.190-191-192, Sector-8C, Chandigarh through its Managing Director/Authorized Signatory.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by:
Sh. Sukaam Gupta, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Party.
Consumer Complaint | : | 195 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 07.03.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Both are Resident of House No.2122 Urban Estate Jind (Haryana).
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Pardeep Rapria, Advocate, proxy for Sh. Sandeep Malik, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 200 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 07.03.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 11.07.2017 |
Manjit Singh Nain S/o Sh. Bhag Singh Nain, R/o House No.1364, Sector-21, Panchkula.
.........Complainant.
Versus
M/s DLF Homes Panchkula Private Ltd. through its Managing Director/Principal Officer, having its Registered Office at SCO No.190-191-192, Sector-8C, Chandigarh–160017.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by:
Sh. Sumit Narang, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for Opposite Party.
Complaints under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.
SH. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.
MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.
PER DEV RAJ, MEMBER
By this order, we propose to dispose of the aforesaid 10 consumer complaints bearing Nos.841 of 2016, 10, 84, 90, 175, 176, 191, 193, 195 & 200 all of 2017.
12. As regards present status of the project, it was stated that occupation certificate(s) of 1669 units had already been received and the offer of possession is under process. It was further stated that occupation certificate applied on 06.01.2016 has already been received on 05.04.2016. It was further stated that offer of possession has also been sent to the complainant vide letter dated 29.10.2016. It was also stated that proper water connection and electricity supply was in place and housekeeping and maintenance services were being provided through leading multinational company namely Jones Lang Lasalle.
13. In the preliminary objections, it was stated that the parties were bound by the terms and conditions mentioned in the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement; that the complainant has made baseless allegations of unfair trade practice, deficiency in service etc. with an ulterior motive to amend/modify/rewrite the concluded Agreement duly executed between parties, purely to invoke jurisdiction of this Commission; that this Commission cannot adjudicate upon the matter where the prima facie prayers are for modification of clauses of the Agreement and that the complainant is not a consumer as he did not disclose the purpose for which the property was purchased nor did she produce any cogent evidence/document to prove that the said property was for earning her livelihood. Another objection raised in the written statement is that as per Clause 55 in the Agreement, all disputes arising out of the Agreement are to be settled amicably, failing which, they shall be referred to the Arbitration. It was further stated that Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 could not be made liable for delay caused due to force majeure conditions, which was on account of stay by Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court of India from 19.04.2012 to 12.12.2012 and delay in grant of approvals in layout plans and service plans. In Sub Para (g) of Para 11 of preliminary objections, it was stated that approvals regarding revision in layout plan and service plans sought on 11.3.2013 and 20.05.2013, were received on 06.09.2013 and 14.08.2014 respectively. Apart from above objections, the territorial jurisdiction of this Commission to entertain and try the complaint has been challenged on the ground that since the property, in dispute, is situated in Panchkula, which comes within the jurisdiction of Panchkula District, only Courts at Panchkula and Punjab & Haryana High Court have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the instant complaint. It was further stated that complainant has not approached this Commission with clean hands and now at a belated stage was attempting to wriggle out of his contractual obligation by filing the instant complaint.
14. The Opposite Parties also moved miscellaneous applications under Sections 5 and 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the following consumer complaints, for referring the matter to the sole arbitration:-
Sr. No. | Complaint Case No. | Miscellaneous Application No.
|
CC/10/2017 | 240/2017 | |
CC/84/2017 | 278/2017 | |
CC/90/2017 | 352/2017 | |
CC/175/2017 | 482/2017 | |
CC/193/2017 | 485/2017 | |
CC/200/2017 | 483/2017 |
The aforesaid applications were disposed of by this Commission by holding that the applicability of the arbitration process would be seen at the time of final arguments in the main case.
15. On merits, it was stated that the value of the property as per Schedule of Payment (SOP) was Rs.36,18,830.16 plus service tax. It was further stated that since area of the unit was increased to 1575 sq. ft. from 1450 sq. ft., the price of the unit also stood increased to Rs.40,98,554.12 + service tax. It was further stated that the unit was transferred to the complainant vide transfer letter dated 09.02.2012. It was denied that execution of Agreement was deliberately delayed. It was stated that as per terms and conditions of Agreement, the same is executed only when 25% of the price of the floor is paid by the allottee. It was further stated that the amount paid by the complainant is Rs.30,12,448/-. It was further stated that the complainant himself is in default of making timely payments as resultantly, there is a DLI of Rs.43,160.53 levied against the complainant for delay of 1019 days. It was admitted that as per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, possession of the allotted unit, was to be handed over to the complainant within 24 months from the signing of the Agreement subject to force majeure conditions or due to reasons beyond the control of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 as mentioned in Clauses 11(b) and 11(c) of the Agreement. It was further stated that delivery of possession of the unit, in question, was delayed on account of force majeure conditions. It was further stated that SLP No.21786-88/2010 was filed, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court stayed the construction activities at the project vide order dated 19.04.2012, which was vacated on 12.12.2012 only. It was further stated that after vacation of stay, the construction work again resumed and, therefore, delay in handing over possession was due to force majeure conditions. It was further stated that charging of EDC is purely a transparent transaction between the answering Opposite Parties and the State Government and the same are levied as per notification issued by the competent authority and the same payment is further paid by the developer as per the schedule of payment opted by the buyer.
16. As regards demand raised qua increase in area, it was stated that the total increase in the saleable area of the unit is less than 15% and therefore, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 did not seek any consent of the complainant/allottee. It was further stated that the demand under the head of ‘Other charges’ was strictly as per Clause 1.11 of the Agreement. It was further stated that further the demand of Rs.91,429/- on account of cost of electricity expenditure was in accordance with Clause 23 of the Agreement. It was further stated that IDC charges do not include charges for installation equipment for supply of electricity or sub-station etc. and as such, the same are rightly charged for infrastructure development. Qua contingent deposit of Vat, it was stated that the said Vat shall be demanded/collected as per terms of the Agreement in accordance with the scheme to be notified by the Government of Haryana from time to time and is not being collected as of now. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 nor they indulged into any unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.
17. The complainant, in support of his case, submitted his affidavit, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.
18. Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, in support of their case, submitted the affidavit of Sh. Shiv Kumar, their Authorized Signatory, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.
19. Despite notice, none put in appearance on behalf of Opposite Party No.3. Assuming presumption of deemed service, after lapse of complete one month from the date of sending of notice, it (Opposite Party No.3) was ordered exparte in terms of Regulation 10(2) of Consumer Protection Regulations 2005, vide order dated 18.01.2017.
20. We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully.
21. It is evident that initially Sh. Parkash Chand R/o Street No.4, Mubarik Mehal Colony, Sangrur,Punjab was allotted Independent Floor No.DVF-D6/14-FF#217 in DLF Valley, Panchkula vide allotment letter dated 26.03.2010 (Annexure C-3/R-4) and Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed between him and Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 on 14.12.2010 (Annexure C-4). The said unit was then purchased by the complainant, namely, Sh. Dharampal from Sh. Parkash Chand vide endorsement dated 09.02.2012 (at Page 122) and letter dated 09.02.2012 confirming transfer of the unit in his (complainant’s) name was also issued on 09.02.2012 (at Page 236 of the written statement). The total price of the said independent floor, as depicted in the Agreement, was Rs.32,91,499.75, besides other charges, securities, deposits and taxes etc. as specified in the Application/ Agreement. The complainant, in all, actually paid a sum of Rs.30,12,268/- as mentioned in the Chart showing details of the property, in question, placed on record, under the signatures of the Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, at the time of arguments on 19.06.2017. As per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 were to complete the construction of the said independent floor within a period of 24 months from the date of execution of the said Agreement. It may be stated here that Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, in similar cases relating to this project, had given an exit option to the complainant(s) in June 2013, in view of stay by Hon’ble Supreme Court, to seek refund alongwith 9% interest or to continue with the allotment by agreeing to extend one year period for delivery of possession. However, in the instant case, no such document has been placed on record to show that any such offer was ever given to the allottee in the year 2013. It is, however, on record, that there was stay by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India from 19.04.2012 to 12.12.2012, which in turn, delayed the completion of the project. The complainant has also acknowledged the fact of aforesaid stay. Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 have stated that due to above force majeure condition, the possession got delayed. The possession of the unit, in question, has been offered by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 to the complainant on 29.10.2016 vide offer of possession letter (Annexure R-1 colly) and the instant complaint was filed on 23.11.2016.
22. The allegation of the complainant that interest amount of Rs.2,30,404.86 was included in the Buyer’s Agreement and service tax thereon has been charged without any basis, is not tenable. The Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed with the original allottee on 14.12.2010 from whom the complainant purchased the unit which was transferred in favour of the complainant on 09.02.2012. Before purchase of unit, the complainant had ample opportunity to go through the contents of Buyer’s Agreement and could raise objection, if any, of the terms of the agreement, were not acceptable to him. He purchased the unit with eyes wide open. The objection now raised after lapse of five years is not tenable. Similarly, the objection raised in the complaint that on 17.09.2010, Opposite Parties No.1&2 demanded Rs.1273.92 on account of delayed interest, is also not tenable, the plea having been raised after lapse of around six years.
23. As regards averment of the complainant regarding poor quality construction, no cogent evidence/expert evidence by way of report of an Engineer/Architect, to substantiate the allegation, has been brought in evidence.
24. In Para 16, the complainant has alleged that Opposite Parties No.1&2 are charging EDC @Rs.261.69 per sq. ft. instead of Rs.196.00 per sq. ft.. As per Floor Buyer’s Agreement, the amount of EDC was Rs.2,96,669.92P, whereas in the possession letter dated 29.10.2016, EDC and IDC in the sum of Rs.3,66,382.43 and Rs.32,363.96 respectively, are payable. Opposite Parties No.1&2 in Para 16 of their written statement have stated that charging of the EDC is a purely transparent transaction and the same are levied as per Govt. Notification. As admitted by the complainant himself, Opposite Parties No.1&2 could charge EDC as levied by the Govt. as per Clause 1.13(a) of the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement. Clause 1.13(a) reads as under:-
“1.13(a) The Allottee agrees that any payment towards EDC levied/leviable shall be paid by the Allottee and any further increase in EDC by whatever name called or in whatever form and with all such conditions imposed, by the Government and/or any competent authority(ies) shall also be paid by the Allottee. The pro-rata demand made by the Company to the Allottee with regard to EDC/increae in EDC shall be final and binding on the Allottee. If the EDC/increased EDC is not paid, then same shall be treated as non-payment of the charges as per the Application/Agreement and the Company shall be entitled to cancel the Agreement and forfeit the Earnest Money along with the Non Refundable Amounts. If the EDC/increased EDC is levied (including with retrospective effect) after the Conveyance Deed has been executed then the same shall be treated as unpaid sale price of the Said Independent Floor and in case the Conveyance Deed has been executed, the Company shall have the first charge and lien over the Said Independent Floor till such unpaid charges and paid by the Allottee.
25. The increase is, thus, in accordance with provision in the agreement. As per possession letter, saleable area of the unit is 1575 sq. ft. as against original saleable area of 1450 sq. ft. Further, total EDC/IDC charges being Rs.3,98,752.39, charges per sq. ft. come to Rs.253.18 per sq. ft. and not Rs.261.69 sq. ft. as contended by the complainant.
26. There is a clear and specific stipulation in Clause 1.2 of the Agreement that price of the unit is escalation free. Since the Opposite Parties failed to complete construction and deliver possession within stipulated period and extended one year period, they (Opposite Parties) are themselves responsible for delay and deficiency in service and their prayer for allowing them escalation cost of construction as well as land holding amounts to seeking amendment of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. The plea, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
27. Since the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement, in the instant case, was executed between the parties on 14.12.2010 and period stipulated therein for handing over possession was to commence from the date of execution of the same (Agreement), the averment of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 that Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court had restrained them from creating any third party rights, during the year 2010 (06.04.2010 to 23.07.2010) (Annexures R-5), is not relevant.
28. A specific allegation as regards delay in execution of the Agreement has been made by the complainant in Para 5 of his complaint. It was stated that Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 deliberately executed the Agreement after more than 9 motnhs from the date of issuance of provisional allotment letter. It was argued that delay in execution of the Agreement was an act of unfair trade practice by Opposite Parties No.1&2, and, therefore, the complainant is entitled to compensation from the date of allotment till Agreement was executed. It may be stated here that Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, in cases pertaining to this project, as also in the instant case, have been pleading that there being stay by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court during the year 2010, it acted as a force majeure and delayed the project. Since the Agreement was executed in December 2010, they (Opposite Parties No.1 & 2) are not entitled to any benefit out of this delay. In the face of arguments of the Counsel for the complainant, that there was delay in execution of Floor Buyer’s Agreement such stay for about four months by the Hon’ble High Court (Annexures R-5) shall act as force majeure condition. It may also be stated here that it is not immediately after booking of the unit that Buyer’s Agreement is executed and the process, in all fairness, is likely to take 3-4 months. There being no significant delay, no deficiency is attributable to Opposite Parties No.1&2. The complainant is, therefore, not entitled to any compensation for delay in execution of Agreement.
29. The first question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. This question has already been elaborately dealt with by this Commission in case titled ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126. Paras 25 to 35 of the said order, inter-alia, being relevant, are extracted hereunder:-
“25. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration Clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint.
26. To decide above said question, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short the Act), which reads as under;
“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—
The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”
27. It is also desirable to reproduce unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, which reads thus:-
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—
(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”
28. Many a times, by making reference to the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, in the past also, such objections were raised and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, when interpreting the provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act, in the cases of Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6 SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013) etc., came to a conclusion that the remedy provided under Section 3 of 1986 Act, is an independent and additional remedy and existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement, to settle disputes, will not debar the Consumer Foras, to entertain the complaints, filed by the consumers.
29. In the year 2015, many amendments were effected in the provisions of 1996 Act. After amendment, Section 8 of 1996 Act, reads as under:-
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—
(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”
30. Now it is to be seen, whether, after amendment in Section 8 of the principal Act, any additional right has accrued to the service provider(s), to say that on account of existence of arbitration agreement, for settling the disputes through an Arbitrator, the Consumer Foras have no jurisdiction to entertain a consumer complaint. As has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in various cases, and also of the National Commission, in large number of judgments, Section 3 of the 1986 Act, provides additional remedy, notwithstanding any other remedy available to a consumer. The said remedy is also not in derogation to any other Act/Law.
31. Now, we will have to see what difference has been made by the amendment, in the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act. After amendment, it reads that a Judicial Authority is supposed to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement, notwithstanding any judgment, decree, order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, or any other Court, unless it finds that prima facie, no valid arbitration agreement exists. The legislation was alive to the ratio of the judgments, as referred to above, in earlier part of this order. Vide those judgments, it is specifically mandated that under Section 3 of 1986 Act, an additional remedy is available to the consumer(s), which is not in derogation to any other Act. As and when any argument was raised, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the National Commission in the judgments, referred to above, have made it very clear that in the face of Section 8 of 1996 Act and existence of arbitration agreement, it is still opened to the Consumer Foras to entertain the consumer complaints. None of the judgments ever conferred any jurisdiction upon the Consumer Foras to entertain such like complaints. Only the legal issues, as existed in the Statute Book, were explained vide different judgments. If we look into amended provisions of Section 8 of the principal Act, it explains that judicial Authority needs to refer dispute, in which arbitration agreement exist to settle the disputes notwithstanding any judgment/decree or order of any Court. That may be true where in a case, some order has been passed by any Court, making arbitration Agreement non-applicable to a dispute/parties. However, in the present case, the above said argument is not available. The jurisdiction of Consumer Foras to entertain consumer complaints, in the face of arbitration clause in the Agreement, is in-built in 1986 Act. It was not given to these Foras, by any judgment ever. The provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act interpreted vide judgments vis a vis Section 8 of un-amended 1996 Act, were known to the legislature, when the amended Act 2015 was passed. If there was any intention on the part of the legislature, then it would have been very conveniently provided that notwithstanding any remedy available in 1986 Act, it would be binding upon the judicial Authority to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, in case of existence of arbitration agreement, however, it was not so said.
32. We can deal with this issue, from another angle also. If this contention raised is accepted, it will go against the basic spirit of 1986 Act. The said Act (1986) was enacted to protect poor consumers against might of the service providers/multinational companies/traders. As in the present case, the complainant has spent his life savings to get a unit, for his residential purpose. His hopes were shattered. Litigation in the Consumer Fora is cost effective. It does not involve huge expenses and further it is very quick. A complaint in the State Commission can be filed, by making payment between Rs.2000/- to Rs.4000/- (in the present case Rs.4000/-). As per the mandate of 1986 Act, a complaint is supposed to be decided within three months, from the date of service to the opposite party. In cases involving ticklish issues (like the present one, maximum not more than six months to seven months time can be consumed), whereas, to the contrary, as per the principal Act (1996 Act), the consumer will be forced to incur huge expenses towards his/her share of Arbitrator’s fees. Not only as above, it is admissible to an Arbitrator, to decide a dispute within one year. Thereafter, the Court wherever it is challenged may also take upto one year and then there is likelihood that the matter will go to the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Such an effort will be a time consuming and costly one. Taking note of fee component and time consumed in arbitration, it can safely be said that if the matter is referred to an Arbitrator, as prayed, in the present case, it will defeat the very purpose of the provisions of 1986 Act.
33. The 1986 Act provides for better protection of interests and rights of the consumers. For the said purpose, the Consumer Foras were created under the Act. In Section 3 of 1986 Act, it is clearly provided that the said provision is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. The 1986 Act is special legislation qua the consumers. The poor consumers are not expected to fight the might of multinational companies/traders, as those entities have lot of resources at their command. As stated above, in the present case, the complainant has spent his entire life earnings to purchase the plot, in the said project, launched by the opposite party. However, his hopes were shattered, when despite making substantial payment of the sale consideration, he failed to get possession of the plot, in question, in a developed project. As per ratio of the judgments in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC), and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), the consumers are always in a weak position, and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the consumer needs to be accepted. The opinion expressed above, qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, has been given keeping in mind the above said principle.
34. Not only this, recently, it was also so said by the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-
“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”
35. In view of the above, the plea taken by the opposite party, that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected.”
In view of the above, the objection raised by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
30. Another objection raised by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 was that as per Clause 55 of the Agreement, the Courts at Panchkula alone and the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, shall have Jurisdiction, to entertain and adjudicate the complaint, and, as such, the Jurisdiction of this Commission was barred. It was stated that since the property, in question, is situated in District Panchkula and a part of cause of action arose at Panchkula. According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to him. Clearly, application for allotment of Unit (Annexure R-3) was made by the complainant at Chandigarh address viz. Shop No.101-102, Ist Floor, DLF City Centre Mall, Rajiv Gandhi, I.T. Park, Kishangarh, Chandigarh. Allotment letter dated 26.03.2010 (Annexure C-3) also bore the same address at the top, meaning thereby the allotment letter was also issued by the Kishangar Address of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2. Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was also executed between the parties on 14.12.2010 at Chandigarh. Since, as per documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. It may be stated here that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable, except those, mentioned in Section 13 (4) of the Act, to the proceedings, in a Consumer Complaint, filed under the Act. For determining the territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, this Commission is bound by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In Associated Road Carriers Ltd., Vs. Kamlender Kashyap & Ors., I (2008) CPJ 404 (NC), the principle of law, laid down, by the National Commission, was to the effect, that a clause of Jurisdiction, by way of an agreement, between the Parties, could not be made applicable, to the Consumer Complaints, filed before the Consumer Foras. It was further held, in the said case, that there is a difference between Sections 11/17 of the Act, and the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, regarding the place of jurisdiction. In the instant case, as held above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh. In Ethiopian Airlines Vs Ganesh Narain Saboo, IV (2011) CPJ 43 (SC)= VII (2011) SLT 371, the principle of law, laid down, was that the restriction of Jurisdiction to a particular Court, need not be given any importance in the circumstances of the case.
31. In Cosmos Infra Engineering India Ltd. Vs Sameer Saksena & another I (2013) CPJ 31 (NC) and Radiant Infosystem Pvt. Ltd. & Others Vs D.Adhilakshmi & Anr I (2013) CPJ 169 (NC) the agreements were executed, between the parties, incorporating therein, a condition, excluding the Jurisdiction of any other Court/Forum, in case of dispute, arising under the same, and limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts/Forums at Delhi and Hyderabad. The National Commission, in the aforesaid cases, held that such a condition, incorporated in the agreements, executed between the parties, excluding the Jurisdiction of a particular Court/Forum, and limiting the Jurisdiction to a particular Court/Forum, could not be given any importance, and the complaint could be filed, at a place, where a part of cause of action arose, according to Sections 11/17 of the Act. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to facts of the instant case. It may also be stated here, that even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that the complainant had agreed to the terms and conditions of the agreement, limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts, referred to above, the same could not exclude the Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh, where a part of cause of action accrued to him, to file the complaint. The submission of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
32. The next objection raised by Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1&2 was that the complainant has made baseless allegations of unfair trade practice, deficiency in service etc. with an ulterior motive to amend/modify/ rewrite the concluded Agreement duly executed between the parties, purely to invoke jurisdiction of this Commission. It was further stated that the complainant was virtually inviting this Commission to assume powers conferred under the Civil Court and, therefore, this Commission did not have the jurisdiction to consider the present complaint. It may be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of Opposite Parties No.1&2, for purchasing the flat, in question, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, they were to complete construction of the said Independent Floor within a period of twenty four months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement). Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines ‘service’ as under:-
“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”
From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs. Union Of India and Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC), it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, as stated above, Section 3 of the Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has the remedy to file a suit in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by him, as he falls within the definition of a ‘consumer’, as stated above. In the instant case, the complainant is seeking relief on account of violation of terms and conditions of the Agreement by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 and their deficiency in rendering service. It, therefore, cannot be said that the complainant is trying to rewrite/modify the terms of the Agreement. Such an objection, taken by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
33. To defeat claim of the complainant, the next objection raised by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 was that since the complainant had purchased the flat, in question, for earning profits i.e. for resale, as and when there was escalation in the prices of real estate, as such, he would not fall within the definition of ‘consumer, as defined by Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act. It may be stated here that there is nothing, on record to show, that the complainant is a property dealer, and is indulged in sale and purchase of property, on regular basis. In the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. Otherwise also, in a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd., 2016 (1) CPJ 31, it was held by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. The principle of law, laid down, in Kavita Ahuja’s case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the unit, in question, was purchased by the complainant, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs. Nirmala Devi Gupta, 2016 (2) CPJ 316. Not only above, recently under similar circumstances, in a case titled as “Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited”, Consumer Case No.70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep. 2016, the National Commission, while rejecting similar plea raised by the builder, observed as under:-
“In the case of the purchase of the house which a builder undertakes to construct for the buyer, the purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose where it is shown, by producing evidence, that the buyer is engaged in the business of a buying and selling of houses and or plots as a trading activity, with a view to make profits by sale of such houses or plots. A person cannot be said to have purchased a house for a commercial purpose only by proving that he owns or had purchased more than one houses or plots. In a given case, separate houses may be purchased by a person for the individual use of his family members. A person owning a house in a city A may also purchase a house in city B for the purpose of staying in that house during short visits to that city. A person may buy two or three houses if the requirement of his family cannot be met in one house. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that in every case where a person owns more than one house, the acquisition of the house is for a commercial purpose. In fact, this was also the view taken by this Commission in Rajesh Malhotra & Ors. vs. Acron Developers Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. First Appeal No.1287 of 2014 decided on 05.11.2015.”
The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
34. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, there is delay in offering/delivering possession of the flat, in question. Clauses 11(a) & 11(b) of Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement dated 14.12.2010 read thus:-
“11(a) Schedule for possession of the said Independent Floor:-
The Company based on its present plans and estimates and subject to all just exceptions, endeavors to complete construction of the said Independent Floor within a period of twenty four (24) months from the date of execution of the Agreement unless there shall be delay or failure due to Force majeure conditions and due to reasons mentioned in Clause 11(b) and 11(c) or due to failure of Allottee to pay in time the Total Price and other charges, taxes, deposits, securities etc and dues/payments or any failure on the part of the allottee to abide by all or any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
11(b) Delay due to reasons beyond the control of the company:-
If the possession of the Said Independent Floor is delayed due to Force Majeure conditions, then the company shall be entitled to extension of time for delivery of possession of the said Independent Floor. The company during the continuance of the Force Majeure reserves the right to alter or vary the terms and conditions of the agreement or if the circumstances so warrant, the company may also suspend the development for such period as is considered expedient and the allottee shall have no right to raise any claim compensation of any nature whatsoever for or with regard to such suspension.”
As stated above, according to Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, they were liable to deliver physical possession of unit, within a period of 24 months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement). In the event of failure to deliver possession, as per Clause 15 of the Agreement, the complainant was entitled to get penal compensation @Rs.10/- per square feet, per month, of the saleable area, for the period of delay. It is true that in some litigation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stayed construction at the project site and order passed remained in force from 19.04.2012 up-to 12.12.2012 i.e. for about 8 months. It is also admitted that above fact of granting stay resulted into delay in construction at the site.
35. Though in similar cases of this project, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 have been taking benefit of one year on account of stay by Hon’ble Apex court from April 2012 to December 2012 but in the instant case, no exit option is available on record. Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 have specifically pleaded that there was stay by the Hon’ble Apex court, which in turn delayed the project. In view of this, the two years period stipulated in the Agreement and one year extended period on account of stay by the Hon’ble Apex Court, expired in December 2013 on 13.12.2013. No justification whatsoever for delay in offering possession beyond 13.12.2013 has been explained by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2. The argument of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 that delay in handing over possession of independent floor was attributable due to delay in receiving statutory approvals from the competent authorities, the same being absolutely beyond its control, is not tenable. The Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed on 14.12.2010 and before execution thereof, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 ought to have obtained all the approvals. If permissions/approvals for revision in layout plans and service plans were sought on 11.03.2013 and 20.05.2013, approvals for which were also received in due course of time, the initial time taken (more than two years) for seeking such approvals amounts to clear deficiency on the part of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 and in the absence of any justified reason for not doing so earlier, time consumed in obtaining such approvals would not amount to force majeure condition. The plea taken, therefore, is of no help to Opposite Parties No.1 & 2. Possession of the unit, in question, having been offered vide offer of possession letter dated 29.10.2016 (Annexure R-1 colly.), clearly, there is inordinate delay in offering possession of the unit, in question to the complainant. Delay in offering possession to the complainant is an act of clear deficiency of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2. Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 are bound to remove the deficiencies/snags, if any, in the construction of the unit, in question, and deliver the possession to the complainant, after deposit of amount by him (complainant).
36. The next question, which falls for consideration, is, whether the demands raised in possession letter dated 29.10.2016 were justified. While offering possession vide letter dated 29.10.2016, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 raised demand in the sum of Rs.11,22,268.53 besides Rs.82,766.00 account of IBMS & CAM charges. As per stipulation in the offer of possession letter, the complainant was required to deposit the amount towards various demands within 30 days and upon his doing so, possession was to be delivered by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2. As admitted by Counsel for the parties, neither the amount towards demand raised vide offer of possession letter dated 29.10.2016 was deposited with Opposite Parties No.1&2 nor the requisite documents submitted. The demands raised are as under:-
1.(a) | Basic Sale Price | Rs.4,45,794.73 |
| EDC (External Development Charges) | Rs.71,158.43 |
| IDC (Internal Development Charges) | Rs.3,799.45 |
(b) | Change in Area & PLC | Rs.2,56,250.00 |
| Service Tax | Rs.31,205.00 |
II. | Other charges vide clause 1.11 of the Floor Buyers Agreement @Rs.91.30 per sq. ft. | Rs.67,725.00 |
| Service Tax (as applicable) | Rs.10,159.00 |
III. | Electricity, Water and Sewerage charges as per relevant clause of the Floor Buyer’s Agreement. (a)Proportionate cost of electricity expenditure @Rs.58.05 per sq. ft. | Rs.91,429.00 |
| (b)Electrical Meter and Connection charges to individual floor/unit Rs.30,497.00 per unit. | Rs.30,497.00 |
| Service Tax @15.00% | Rs.18,289.00 |
IV. | Contingent Deposit for VAT @Rs.14.55 per sq. ft. | Rs.22,916.00 |
V.a) | Club Charges (50% of membership Fees) | Rs.15,000.00 |
| Service Tax @14.50% | Rs.2,250.00 |
b) | Club Security Deposit | Rs.20,000.00 |
|
|
|
| Balance Payable by Gunjan Agarwal in favour of DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. | Rs.11,22,268.53 |
VII. | Interest Bearing Maintenance Security & CAM Charges. |
|
(a) | Interest Bearing Maintenance Security (IBMS) @Rs.50/- per sq. ft. | Rs.78,750.00 |
(b) | 1 Quarter Advance CAM @Rs.0.85 per sq. ft. per month. | Rs.4,016.00 |
| Total Payable by Gunjan Agarwal in favour of Valley Residents Welfare Society | Rs.82,766.00 |
37. Out of the above, the major amount is towards increase in area of independent floor. The complainant in Para 18 of the complaint has stated that he is not liable to pay for the increased area as Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 have not even informed the complainant at any point of time. Admittedly, the complainant was duly informed about the increase in area while offering possession, vide letter dated 29.10.2016, that the demand raised by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, included Rs.2,56,250/- on account of change in area as per clauses No.1.10 for PLC and 10 for change in area as per Floor Buyer’s Agreement. Regarding increase in area, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 relying upon Clause 10 of the Agreement, have stated that if there was an increase/decrease of more than 15% in the saleable area of the independent floor, then, only Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 will intimate the complainant(s)/ allottee(s) in writing and obtain his/her consent. It has been stated that the total increase in the saleable area in the instant case being less than 15%, the Opposite Parties were not bound to seek any consent of the complainant/allottee. It may be stated here that saleable area of the unit, in question, as per the Agreement was 1450 sq. ft. While offering possession, in the final statement of account, annexed with the possession letter dated 29.10.2016, it was mentioned that the final area of the unit was 1575 sq. ft. Thus, there was increase of 125 sq. ft. When compared with the original area of the unit viz. 1450 sq. ft., the increase is only 8.60%, which is less than 15%. The complainant came to know about change in the area when possession was offered to him on 29.10.2016. In case, the complainant had any grievance regarding increase in area, in terms of Clause 10 of the Agreement, he could raise objections to the changes within 30 days from the date of notice of changes. There is nothing on record to show that the complainant raised any objection during the period of 30 days or till filing of the complaint on 23.11.2016. The complainant has also not adduced any evidence by way of report of an Engineer/Architect that increase in area did not exist. The demand raised by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 to this effect, is, thus, legal and tenable and the complainant is liable to pay the same.
38. The other demands are on account of other charges i.e. Rs.67,725/- @Rs.91.03 per sq. ft; proportionate cost of electricity expenditure @Rs.58.05 per sq. ft. to the tune of Rs.91,429/-; electrical meter and connection charges to the floor in the sum of Rs.30,497/- per unit, contingent deposit of VAT @Rs.14.55 per sq. ft. in the sum of Rs.22,916/-; club charges in the sum of Rs.15,000/- and club security deposit in the sum of Rs.20,000/-. The Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 vehemently argued that all these charges are in accordance with terms and conditions of the Agreement only. It may be stated here that at internal page 6 of the Agreement, it was stipulated that the total price was to be calculated on the basis of saleable area of the floor in question, which did not include other amounts, charges, security amount etc., which are payable by the allottee, as and when demanded by the Company in accordance with the terms of the application/agreement, for instance:-
Besides, as per Clause 1.11 of the Buyer’s Agreement, the complainant agreed that in addition to total price, the complainant shall be liable to pay all taxes as stipulated therein. Further from perusal of application form annexed by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 alongwith its written statement, it clearly transpires that 5% of Total Price + IBMS + Club + Registration + Stamp Duty + Other Charges, if any, were payable at the time of offer of possession. Thus, clearly, the amount towards demand qua Basic Sale Price (Rs.4,45,794.73), External Development Charges (Rs.71,158.43) and Internal Development Charges (Rs.3,799.45), being justified, is payable by the complainant.
39. It was agreed by the counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 that demand raised on account of contingent deposit of Vat in the sum of Rs.22,916/- shall be payable by the complainant, as and when the same becomes payable by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 to the Government.
40. Thus, in view of above, offer of possession and demand(s) raised on account of different components are in accordance with terms and conditions of the Agreement. Therefore, except contingent deposit of vat, the complainant should have made payment of the amount towards other components of demand to Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 within a period of 30 days or at best, could take another 30 days grace period. Since the demand raised, has, by and large, been held to be justified, the complainant shall not be entitled to compensation for delay beyond the date of offer of possession i.e. 29.10.2016, plus two months i.e. (30 days given in the offer of possession letter + 30 days grace period), i.e. up to 28.12.2016.
41. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to compensation, if so, at what rate, for non-delivery of physical possession of the unit, in question, within the stipulated period of 24 months and extended period of 12 months on account of force majeure conditions. As stated above, in the instant case, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 did not deliver possession within 24 months as stipulated in Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement and thereafter within extended period of 12 months, from execution of the Agreement on 14.12.2010 i.e. by 13.12.2013. There is, thus, inordinate delay of around 2 years 10 months, even beyond the extended period. As already stated above, possession of the unit, in question, was offered by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 on 29.10.2016. Clearly there is delay in offering possession on account of which, the complainant deserves to be compensated. The Hon’ble National Commission in the case of Shri Suman Nandi & Anr. Vs. M/s Unitech Limited & Anr., Complaint No.277 of 2013, decided on 17.12.2015, in Para 16 held as under:-
“16. On perusal of the Buyer’s Agreement and the affidavits filed by the parties it is clear that the complainants had booked the subject apartments on the expressed promise extended by the opposite parties that subject to Force Majeure, the opposite parties would deliver the possession of the apartments complete in all respect within 30-36 months, as the case may be, of the execution of the Buyers Agreement and being influenced by the said promise the complainants entered into the contract. No doubt in the Buyer’s Agreement some scope for delay due to unavoidable circumstances was kept in mind for which clause 4.a. for compensating the complainants for delay was incorporated but it does not mean that the intention was that even in the event of inordinate delay in completing the construction and delivering the possession, the complainants would be entitled to meagre compensation of Rs.5/- per sq. ft. per month which is much less than the bank rate for loan or fixed deposit. Therefore, in our considered view clause 4.a. was meant for computing compensation in case of a minor delay in delivery of possession. If the argument of the opposite party is to be accepted, it would lead to absurd situation and would give an unfair advantage to the unscrupulous builder who might utilize the consideration amount meant to finance the project by the buyer for his other business venture at nominal interest of 2-3 per cent as against much higher bank lending rates. This could never be the intention of legislation that if such a proposition is accepted, it would result in defeating the object of Consumer Protection Act.”
The National Commission granted 12% interest as compensation from the date of default in delivery of possession.
42. Recently in Capt. Gurtaj Singh Sahni & anr. Vs Manager, Unitech Limited & anr., consumer complaint bearing no.603/2014, decided on 02.05.2016, the Hon’ble National Commission, directed the opposite party/builder to pay interest on the deposited amount, for the period of delay, till delivery of possession of the unit. Relevant contents of the said order read thus:-
“8. If the compensation for the delay in construction is restricted to what is stipulated in the Buyers Agreement, there will be no pressure upon the builder to complete the construction since he will be more than happy to keep on paying paltry compensation of about 3% per annum of the capital investment, instead of arranging funds at much higher cost, to complete the construction.
9. xxxxxxxxxxxxx
10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the complaints are disposed of with the following directions:
(1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(2) The opposite party shall pay compensation in the form of simple interest @ 12% per annum from the expected date of possession till the date on which the possession is actually offered to the complainants after completing the construction in all respects and obtaining the requisite completion certificate.
(3) No separate compensation would be payable to the complainants either towards the rent if any paid by them or for the mental agony and harassment which they have suffered on account of the failure of the opposite party to perform its contractual obligation.”
No doubt, in the Buyer’s Agreement, some scope for delay due to unavoidable circumstances was kept in mind, for compensating the complainant for delay, but it does not mean that the intention was that even in the event of inordinate delay, in completing the construction and delivering the possession, the complainant would be entitled to meagre compensation of Rs.10/- per sq. ft. per month, which is much less than the bank rate for loan or fixed deposit. Therefore, in our considered view, Clauses 11(a) and 15 were meant for computing compensation, in case of a minor delay in delivery of possession.
43. Thus, keeping in view the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble National Commission, in the cases, referred to above, and position stated above, grant of compensation in the form of simple interest @12% on the deposited amount for the period of delay, beyond two years plus one year extended period i.e. w.e.f. 14.12.2013 till delivery of possession of the unit would meet the ends of justice. The possession having been offered on 29.10.2016, the complainant shall be entitled to compensation up-to plus 2 months from 29.10.2016 i.e. 28.12.2016 (30 days for making payment + 30 days grace period). The complainant is, thus, held entitled to compensation by granting interest @12% on the deposited amount for the delay period as above.
44. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to compensation, under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, on account of mental agony and physical harassment, and injury caused to him, for inordinate delay in delivering physical possession of the unit to him, by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, by the promised date in the Agreement. Admittedly, the possession of unit, in question, has been offered to the complainant on 29.10.2016. The complainant has been adequately compensated by granting 12% interest for the delay period as stated above. The price of the unit, in question, is escalation free. The complainant shall also get the benefit of escalation in price of the unit. The compensation in the sum of Rs.5 lacs + Rs.5 lacs = Rs.10 Lacs claimed by the complainant is exceedingly on the higher side. Grant of compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- would serve the ends of justice. Under these circumstances, the complainant is held entitled to compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-.
45. Similarly, in following 8 complaints bearing No.10, 84, 90, 175, 176, 191, 193 and 195 all of 2017, particulars of which are indicated in Table-I below, the possession of the unit(s) was offered by the Opposite Parties on the dates indicated against the respective complaints:-
TABLE-I
Sr. No. | Complaint No. | Date of independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement. | Due date for possession after 2 years plus 1 year extended period | Date on which possession offered | Whether amount and documents deposited after offer of possession. | Whether documents submitted | DLI (Rs.) |
A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F | G | H |
1. | 10/2017 | 07.01.2011 | 06.01.2014 | 28.04.2017 | - | - | Rs.42,562.00 |
2. | 84/2017 | 14.01.2011 | 13.01.2014 | 29.10.2016 | Yes on 23.05.2017
| Pending | - |
3. | 90/2017 | 24.01.2011 | 23.01.2014 | 15.11.2016 | Not paid despite this Commission order dated 13.01.2017. | -do- | - |
4. | 175/2017 | 17.02.2011 | 16.02.2014 | 10.10.2016 | Not deposited | -do- | Rs.2,94,239.88 |
5. | 176/2017 | 10.03.2011 | 09.03.2014 | 15.11.2016 | -do-
| -do- | - |
6. | 191/2017 | 24.12.2010 | 23.12.2013 | 10.10.2016 | Yes on 07.04.2017, 10.4.2017 & 11.05.2017
| -do- | - |
7. | 193/2017 | 27.12.2010 | 26.12.2013 | 10.10.2016 | Not paid | -do- | Rs.1,02,717.00 |
8. | 195/2017 | 01.02.2011 | 31.01.2014 | 15.11.2016 | Not paid
| -do- | - |
46. In Complaint at Sr. No.1 through initially the complainant prayed for refund but subsequently as per zimini order dated 05.04.2017 sought possession.
47. In the aforesaid complaint cases, no demand qua stamp duty and registration charges has been raised while offering possession. As per offer of possession letter(s) placed, on record, six months’ time was given to the complainant(s) to complete the formalities and make the payment, which in all the above cases except Sr. No.1 has already lapsed.
48. Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates, Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, on instructions, stated that in case, the complainant in complaint at Sr. No.1 in the above table is eager to get possession, he will complete formalities and deposit the amount before the period of six months and as and when amount is deposited and necessary documents are submitted, within 3 weeks thereafter, possession will be handed over, to him. It was further stated that contingent Vat deposit need not be deposited at this stage, subject to furnishing of an affidavit by the complainant(s) to make the payment as and when demanded by the Government.
49. Out of aforesaid eight complaints, as stated by Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, during arguments, in two complaints bearing Nos.84 and 191 both of 2017, amount(s), demand(s) whereof was raised vide offer of possession letters, minus contingent deposit of vat, stood deposited by the complainant(s). However, in remaining six complaints, no amount towards the demand raised vide offer of possession letters has been deposited by the complainant(s). Moreover, in all the above eight complaints, the requisite documents have also not been submitted by the complainant(s).
50. In Complaint Case No.10 of 2017, the complainant had prayed for refund of the deposited amount but on 05.04.2017, Counsel on getting instructions from the complainant, stated that let possession be handed over to the complainant and his right to claim delayed possession etc. be kept intact. To the prayer made, no objection was raised by the Counsel for the Opposite Parties. In view of the prayer made, it was ordered that let possession of the unit, in question, be offered to the complainant forthwith and on remitting necessary payment, possession be delivered accordingly before the next date of hearing. Thereafter, possession, in the instant case, was offered 28.04.2017 after filing of the complaint.
51. In Complaint Case No.191 of 2016, it was stated by Counsel for the Opposite Parties that after removing the snags, reminder was sent to the complainant(s) on 14.06.2017 to take possession.
52. It was stated by Counsel for the Opposite Parties that the snags/deficiencies, if any, will be removed, before delivering possession.
53. Therefore, in all the aforesaid complaints, particulars of which are given in Table-I, the complainants are held entitled to compensation by way of grant of 12% interest, for the delayed period, (after two years + one year extended period) up-to the date of offer of possession plus 2 months (30 days for making payment + 30 days grace period), as under:-
TABLE – II
Sr. No. | Complaint No. | Date of offer of possession | Date up-to which entitled to compensation |
1. | 10/2017 | 28.04.2017 | 27.06.2017 |
2. | 84/2017 | 29.10.2016 | 28.12.2016 |
3. | 90/2017 | 15.11.2016 | 14.01.2017 |
4. | 175/2017 | 10.10.2016 | 09.12.2016 |
5. | 176/2017 | 15.11.2016 | 14.01.2017 |
6. | 191/2017 | 10.10.2016 | 09.12.2016 |
7. | 193/2017 | 10.10.2016 | 09.12.2016 |
8. | 195/2017 | 15.11.2016 | 14.01.2017 |
54. If after deposit of amount minus contingent deposit of vat and submission of requisite documents, possession is not delivered, for delay beyond 30 days, the complainants shall be further entitled to compensation by way of interest @12% p.a. on the deposited amount.
55. In one consumer complaint bearing No.200 of 2017, particulars of which are given hereunder, possession of the unit, in question, stands delivered to the complainant, after deposit of the amounts, towards demands raised vide offer of possession letter, minus the demand qua component of contingent deposit of vat. This was admitted by the Counsel for the parties during arguments.
Complaint No. | 200/2017 |
Date of independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement.
| 09.02.2011 |
Whether second allottee | Yes (12.10.2015)
(Undertaking at Page 198 of written statement)
|
Date on which possession offered.
| 05.10.2016 |
Date on which possession taken | 09.05.2017 |
56. In this case, during arguments, it was stated by counsel for both the parties, that possession of the unit, in question, stood delivered to the complainant on 09.05.2017, after receipt of amount towards the demand raised vide offer of possession letter dated 05.10.2016. The complainant is a subsequent allottee, the unit having been transferred in his name on 12.10.2015 (Annexure C-2). Before transfer of unit in his name, he (complainant) executed an undertaking (at Page 198 of the written statement of Opposite Parties), duly notarized on 30.09.2015. Paras 4 & 5 of his undertaking being relevant read thus:-
“4. I undertake that I am not entitled for any compensation/claims on account of delay possession of the said Independent Floor as agreed upon the First Allottee and all the relevant paras in this regard in the Application form/Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement become null and void.
5. I undertake that I am satisfied themselves with all the aspects concerning the substitution of the Floor in their name and the I hereby undertakes not to hold the company responsible and liable in the event any discrepancy of whatsoever nature is noticed in any of the documents at a later date.”
57. Under similar circumstances, an undertaking was given by the complainant in Complaint No.71 of 2016 titled Lt. Col. Naveen Suri Vs. DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd., which was decided alongwith other complaints vide order dated 25.07.2016, passed in Complaint Case No.54 of 2016 titled Hari Ram Dangra & Anr. Vs. DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. wherein this Commission in Para 46 held as under:-
“46. Perusal of contents of the aforesaid undertaking, however, reveal as if the unit was ready for possession, whereas, the fact is otherwise and the possession was offered only on 14.01.2016 (Annexure C-6). The complainant in that case apparently furnished the undertaking under the impression that possession of the unit, in question, would be handed over to him immediately. Such an undertaking by no stretch of imagination would mean that complainant was not entitled to compensation for delay after the date of undertaking. Therefore, from the date of undertaking/date when unit was transferred in his name i.e. 27.03.2015, till possession is handed over to the complainant, he (complainant) is entitled to compensation by way of interest @12% per annum on the deposited amount.”
58. Since the unit in the instant complaint viz. complaint bearing No.200 of 2017 omeHomwas transferred in the name of the complainant on 12.10.2015 (Annexure C-2), he would be entitled to compensation for delay in possession w.e.f. 13.10.2015.
59. Therefore, in this complaint, the complainant is held entitled to compensation @12% p.a. interest for the period of delay, w.e.f. 13.10.2015 till the date of offer of possession of the unit i.e. 05.10.2016 plus 2 months (30 days for making payment + 30 days grace period), i.e. up-to 04.12.2016 would meet the ends of justice.
60. The complainant(s) in the aforesaid complaints, are also entitled to compensation for mental agony, harassment and deficiency in rendering service.
61. In Consumer Complaints bearing Nos.10, 84, 90, 176, 191, 195 & 200 all of 2017, the complainants are held entitled to compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- in each case, on account of mental agony, physical harassment and deficiency in service.
62. However, in Consumer Complaints bearing Nos.175 & 193 both of 2017, there has been DLI in the sum of Rs.2,94,239.88 & Rs.1,02,717.00 respectively, against the complainants. Delay in payment of installments partly contributes to delay in completion of unit. Therefore, the complainants, in these cases, are not entitled to same amount of compensation. Grant of compensation in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- and Rs.1,25,000/-, respectively would serve the ends of justice.
63. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties, in all the cases.
64. For the reasons recorded above, all the complaints bearing Nos.841 of 2016, 10, 84, 90, 175, 176, 191, 193, 195 & 200 all of 2017 are partly accepted, with costs, in the following manner:-
Consumer Complaints bearing No:
841 of 2016, 10, 84, 90, 175, 176, 191, 193 & 195 all of 2017 |
In these cases, the Opposite Parties have offered possession in October 2016 and November 2016, (except complaint bearing Nos.10 of 2017, in which possession was offered on 28.04.2017 i.e. after filing of the said complaint). The amounts towards demand raised, except the demands towards, contingent VAT deposit and Advocate charges have been deposited by the complainants in Complaint No.84 and 191 of 2017. The payment(s) are yet to be made in the remaining complaints. The documents in all the complaints are yet to be submitted. The Opposite Parties shall hand over possession after removing the snags, if any, within 30 days.
The Opposite Parties (DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd.), in each of these cases, are, jointly and severally, directed as under:-
(i) | To hand over physical possession of the unit(s), allotted in favour of the complainant(s), complete in all respects, to the complainant(s), after removing the snags, if any, within a period of 30 days, from the date balance payment, wherever due, is made/documents are completed by the complainant(s). |
(ii) | Execute and get registered the sale deed in respect of the unit(s), in question, within one month from the date of handing over of possession to the complainant(s). The stamp duty, registration charges and incidental expenses, if any, shall be borne by the complainant(s). |
(iii) | To pay compensation, by way of interest @12% p.a., on the deposited amount, to the complainant(s), with effect from 14.12.2013, 07.01.2014, 14.01.2014, 24.01.2014, 17.02.2014, 10.03.2014, 24.12.2013, 27.12.2013 & 01.02.2014 respectively up-till two months from the date of offer of possession i.e. up-to 28.12.2016, 27.06.2017, 28.12.2016, 14.01.2017, 09.12.2016, 14.01.2017, 09.12.2016, 09.12.2016 & 14.01.2017 respectively, within 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the said amount shall carry penal interest @15% p.a., instead of 12% p.a., from the date of default, till realization. For failure of Opposite Parties to deliver possession within 30 days from the date of making payment/submission of documents by the complainant(s), for such delay, beyond 30 days, compensation by way of interest @12% p.a. on the deposited amount for each month, till possession is delivered, shall be payable by 10th of the following month and failure shall entail penal interest @15% p.a. instead of 12% p.a. till payment is made. |
(iv) | Pay compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-, in each case i.e. [in CC Nos.841 of 2016, 10, 84, 90, 176, 191 & 195 all of 2017], and Rs.1,00,000/- & Rs.1,25,000/-, in [CC Nos.175 & 193 both of 2017] respectively, on account of mental agony, physical harassment and deficiency in service and Rs.35,000/- as litigation costs, in each case, to the complainant(s), within 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order, failing which, the said amount shall carry interest @12% p.a., from the date of filing the complaint(s) till realization. |
However, complaint against Opposite Party No.3, in consumer complaint No.841 of 2016 stands dismissed.
Consumer Complaint bearing No:
200 of 2017. |
In this case, possession of the unit, in question, stands handed over to the complainant.
The Opposite Party, in this case, is held liable and directed as under:-
(i) | Execute and get registered the sale deed in respect of the unit, in question, within two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. The stamp duty, registration charges and incidental expenses, if any, shall be borne by the complainant. |
(ii) | To pay compensation, by way of interest @12% p.a., on the deposited amount, to the complainant, with effect from 13.10.2015 till 04.12.2016 respectively, within 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the said amount shall carry penal interest @15% p.a., instead of 12% p.a., from the date of default, till realization. For failure of the Opposite Party to deliver possession within 30 days from the date of making payment by the complainant, for such delay, beyond 30 days, compensation by way of interest @12% p.a. on the deposited amount, till the date possession was delivered, shall be payable within 45 days and failure shall entail penal interest @15% p.a. instead of 12% p.a. till payment is made. |
(iii) | Pay compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- on account of mental agony, physical harassment and deficiency in service and Rs.35,000/-, as litigation costs, to the complainant, within 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order, failing which, the said amount shall carry interest @12% p.a., from the date of filing the complaint till realization. |
65. In all these complaints, as agreed between the parties, the Advocate Charges shall not be charged by the Opposite Parties. The actual expenditure for registration of Sale Deed(s) besides Stamp duty and Registration charges, shall, however, be borne by the complainant(s).
66. As regards the amount of contingent Vat deposit, the complainant(s) shall furnish an affidavit to make the payment as and when demanded by the Government. The complainant(s) shall deposit amount of contingent vat within three weeks from the date the same is paid by Opposite Parties to the Government and the complainant(s) are informed of this fact. Delay beyond three weeks from the receipt of notice shall attract simple interest @12% per annum.
67. Certified copy of this order, be placed on the file of consumer complaints bearing Nos.10, 84, 90, 175, 176, 191, 193, 195 & 200 all of 2017.
68. Certified copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.
69. The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.
Pronounced.
11.07.2017
[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]
PRESIDENT
(DEV RAJ)
MEMBER
(PADMA PANDEY)
MEMBER
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