Anita Sood filed a consumer case on 30 Jan 2017 against DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd., in the StateCommission Consumer Court. The case no is CC/509/2016 and the judgment uploaded on 30 Jan 2017.
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
U.T., CHANDIGARH
Consumer Complaint | : | 509 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 24.08.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Anita Sood, aged about – years wife of Sh. Pankaj Sood, resident of House No.864, Sector 9, Panchkula (Haryana).
.........Complainant.
Versus
(i) Regd. Office DLF Gatway Tower, Second Floor, DLF City, Phase-III, Gurgaon 122002, Haryana, (India) through its Manager/ Authorized Signatory/Officer-in-charge/Director Sales & Marketing.
(ii) Site Address:- The Valley, Sector 3, Kalka-Pinjore Urban Complex, Distt. Panchkula (Haryana).
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Sumit Narang, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 615 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 21.09.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Col. Amit Mishra, MA Branch (MS-17), Room No.531, A Wing, Sena Bhawan IHQ OF MOD (Army), New Delhi – 110105.
.........Complainant.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd., SCO 190-191-192, Sector-8C, Chandigarh – UT., Pin-160009 through its Managing Director.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by:
Sh. Shubham Jain, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Party.
Consumer Complaint | : | 669 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 670 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Gaurav Kumar S/o Sh. Brijinder Das Kumar, R/o #2, Adarsh Nagar, Faridkot – 151203, Punjab.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 673 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 680 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 13.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Manjit Dahiya S/o Sh. Daljit Singh Dahiya, R/o H.No.516, Sector 14, Sonepat.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 681 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 13.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Both R/o H.No.687, Sector 28, Noida – 201301 (U.P.)
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 682 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 13.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Both R/o #636, Sector – 7, Panchkula.
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 683 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 13.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Both R/o Evergreen House, 1 New Road, Chotta Shimla, Shimla.
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 684 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 13.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Satender Kumar S/o Sh. Satyavir Singh Shastri, H.No.489/30, Dev Colony, Rohtak.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 696 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 17.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 717 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 20.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
Site Address:- The Valley, Sector 3, Kalka-Pinjore Urban Complex, District Panchkula, Haryana.
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Abhishek Singh, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 739 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 26.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 740 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 26.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 741 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 26.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 742 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 26.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Col. Maninder Singh Chahal, S/o Shri Joginder Singh Chahal, R/o House No.577, Phase – 3A, Mohali, Punjab.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 743 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 26.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 744 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 26.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 745 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 27.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Kamlesh Sindhu W/o Late Sh. Kulwant Singh, R/o H.No.2 on Khuda Alisher Road Near Kansal Enclave, Part B, U.T., Chandigarh.
.........Complainant.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Private Limited throughits Managing Director and having the following addresses:-
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Rajvir Singh Sihag, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 746 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 27.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Kamlesh Sindhu W/o Late Sh. Kulwant Singh, R/o H.No.2 on Khuda Alisher Road Near Kansal Enclave, Part B, U.T., Chandigarh.
.........Complainant.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Private Limited through its Managing Director and having the following addresses:-
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Rajvir Singh Sihag, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 747 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 27.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Kamlesh Sindhu W/o Late Sh. Kulwant Singh, R/o H.No.2 on Khuda Alisher Road Near Kansal Enclave, Part B, U.T., Chandigarh.
.........Complainant.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Private Limited through its Managing Director and having the following addresses:-
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Rajvir Singh Sihag, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 750 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 27.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Deva Singh son of Ram Kishan R/o House No.1075, Sector-20-B, Chandigarh.
.........Complainant.
Versus
Site Address:- The Valley, Sector 3, Kalka-Pinjore Urban Complex.
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by:
Sh. Naveen Sheokand, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji, Sh. Parveen Jain and Ms. Sapna Seth, Advocate for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 755 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 03.11.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd., SCO No.190-191-192, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh through its Managing Director/Authorized Signatory.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by: Sh. Savinder Singh Gill, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain for the Opposite Party.
Consumer Complaint | : | 756 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 03.11.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
.........Complainants.
Versus
DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd., SCO No.190-191-192, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh through its Managing Director/Authorized Signatory.
..........Opposite Party.
Argued by: Sh. Savinder Singh Gill, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain for the Opposite Party.
Consumer Complaint | : | 764 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.11.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Reena Rathee W/o Sh. Surender Singh R/o Flat No.40 C, Army Flats, Sector-4, Mansa Devi Complex, Panchkula.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 765 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.11.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Vikrant Sharma S/o Sh. Shiv Darshan Sharma R/o C/o Gurmeet Singh, House No.3124, Sector 71, Mohali.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 766 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.11.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Bimla Devi W/o Sh. Ramesh Kumar, H.No.948, Sector-2, Rohtak.
.........Complainant.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainant.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Consumer Complaint | : | 767 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 04.11.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.01.2017 |
Both R/o H.No.531, Sector 13, Hisar.
.........Complainants.
Versus
..........Opposite Parties.
Argued by: Sh. Narender Yadav, Advocate for the complainants.
Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates for the Opposite Parties.
Complaints under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.
SH. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.
MRS. PADMA PANDEY,MEMBER.
PER DEV RAJ, MEMBER
By this order, we propose to dispose of the aforesaid 28 consumer complaints bearing Nos.509, 615, 669, 670, 673, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 696, 717, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 750, 755, 756, 764, 765, 766 and 767 all of 2016.
2. At the time of arguments, on 20.01.2012 and 24.01.2017 respectively, it was agreed between Counsel for the parties, that issues in law and facts involved in the above complaints, by and large, are the same, and therefore, the aforesaid 28 (22+6) complaints can be disposed of, by passing one consolidated order.
3. Under above circumstances, to dictate order, facts are being taken from consumer complaint bearing No.509 of 2016, titled as ‘Anita Sood Vs. DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.’.
4. In brief, the facts are that the Opposite Parties developed a Residential Group Housing Project under the name and style of “The Valley” situated in Sector 3, Kalka-Pinjore Urban Complex. The complainant booked a flat of saleable area of 1450 sq. ft. in DLF Valley Project on 18.03.2010 and paid an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- vide receipt No.RVL/CRB/00550/0310 dated 22.03.2010. The Opposite Parties entered into an Independent Floor Buyers Agreement (Annexure C-8) on 07.01.2011 whereby independent floor No.E-5/22 (Ground Floor) with a parking number P-GF was allotted to the complainant. It was further stated that the total price of the unit was fixed as Rs.37,98,999.75 for the saleable area of 1450 Sq. Feet. It was further stated that maintenance security of Rs.72,500/- was wrongly included in the said summary of dues. In Para 8 of the complaint, it was stated that complainant had paid Rs.41,21,346.36 including service tax to the Opposite Parties.
5. As per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, the possession of the flat was to be delivered within 24 months from the date of execution of the said Agreement. Further as per Clause 15, if any delay happened beyond 24 months, then the Opposite Parties were to pay compensation @Rs.10/- per sq. feet per month of the saleable area for such delay. Despite the commitments made in the Agreement, the Opposite Parties failed to complete the construction and physical possession thereof has not so far been delivered to complainants, although the period of 24 months expired on 07.01.2013. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties have caused great financial loss to the complainant besides constant harassment, mental pains and suffering, which presently is assessed about Rs.40 lacs approximately.
6. Alleging deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice, on the part of the Opposite Parties, the complainant filed the instant complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short 1986 Act) seeking directions to the Opposite Parties, to hand over the physical and legal possession of unit, in question, with all promised facilities, complete in all respects after obtaining Completion Certificate; pay delayed charges/ compensation @Rs.10/- per sq. ft. of the saleable area w.e.f. 07.01.2013 onwards till the date of actual handing over of possession and also pay future compensation at the same rate of Rs.10/- till date of delivery of possession; refund excess amount of Rs.3,08,655.61 with interest @18% p.a., charged on account of enhanced EDC & service tax; award compensation of Rs.30 Lacs on account of deficiency in rendering service and adoption of unfair trade practice by the Opposite Parties, mental pains, sufferings, agony and physical harassment causing financial risk, hardship, mental agony and harassment caused to the complainant at the hands of the Opposite Parties; Rs.50,000/- as litigation expenses; and grant any other relief which this Commission deems fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the present case.
7. The Opposite Parties, in their preliminary submissions in the written statement stated that the complainant filed the instant complaint in total disregard to the terms of Floor Buyer’s Agreement executed between the parties. It was further stated that the complainant is backing out from the executed contract. It was further stated that occupation certificate (Annexure R/1) was received on 05.04.2016 and possession of the floor, in question, would be handed over to the complainant soon. It was further stated that the complainant had the full knowledge about the executed terms of Agreement dated 07.01.2011. It was further stated that the complainant prayed for unfounded demands, which were not as per executed terms of the Agreement and, thus, the Opposite Parties pray to allow 31% cost escalation of the construction as well 47% of the land holding cost, totaling 76% of the sale price. It was further stated that the project was cost escalation free as the complainant shall get the possession of the floor on the same price as committed by the Opposite Parties at the time of allotment of the floor through application form dated 29.03.2010. It was further stated that construction of the project got delayed due to stay on construction, ordered by the High Court and thereafter by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India due to third party litigation involving acquisition proceedings of land of litigants therein, in the years 2010 and 2012.
8. The Opposite Parties have further stated after dismissal of the said litigation by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 12.12.2012, the Opposite Parties vide letter dated 15.04.2013 offered an exit option to the complainant by accepting refund of her entire amount paid till date with 9% interest but she refused to avail the said option and apart from opting to continue with the project, also consented to the extension of time. It was stated that occupation certificate(s) of 1473 units had already been received and offer of possession was under process. It was also stated that proper water connection and electricity supply was in place and housekeeping and maintenance services were being provided through leading multinational company, namely, Jones Lang Lasalle. Further, under the caption “FACTS OF THE COMPLAINT”, it was stated that the complainant paid Rs.4 Lacs at the time of booking of the said floor and thereafter the payments were to be made as per the payment schedule forming part of the application for allotment. It was stated that property No.DVF-E5/22-GF was allotted vide allotment letter dated 29.03.2010, value of which was Rs.37,98,999.75 plus other taxs, as applicable. It was further stated that an Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the complainant and the Opposite Parties on 07.01.2011.
9. In the preliminary objections, it was stated that the parties were bound by the terms and conditions mentioned in the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement; that the complainant has made baseless allegations of unfair trade practice, deficiency in service etc. with an ulterior motive to amend/modify/rewrite the concluded Agreement duly executed between parties, purely to invoke jurisdiction of this Commission; that this Commission cannot adjudicate upon the matter where the prima facie prayers are for modification of clauses of the Agreement; that the complainant is not a consumer as the floor, in question, was booked by her for investment purposes and earning profits and that when given the option to exit vide letter dated 15.04.2013 (Annexure R-4), the complainant agreed to continue with allotment and delay and, as such, she (complainant) voluntarily waived of her right to raise any grievance. An objection was also raised in the written statement that as per Clause 55 in the Agreement, all disputes arising out of the Agreement are to be settled amicably, failing which, they shall be referred to the Arbitration. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties could not be made liable for delay caused due to force majeure conditions, which was on account of stay by Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court of India from 19.04.2012 to 12.12.2012 and delay in grant of approvals in layout plans and service plans. In Sub Para (g) of Para 8, it was further stated that approval regarding revision in layout plan and service plans sought on 11.3.2013 and 20.05.2013, was received on 06.09.2013 and 14.08.2014 respectively. The Opposite Parties moved Miscellaneous Application No.483 of 2016 in Consumer Complaint No.615 of 2016, under Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for referring the matter to the sole arbitration. The said application was disposed of by this Commission by holding that the question qua arbitration would be considered at the time of final arguments in the main case.
10. On merits, it was stated that the complainant on her own will/understanding and accord purchased the floor, in question. It was further stated that vide Clause I of Allottee’s Representation in the Agreement, the Opposite Parties readily provided all the information and clarification as required by her. It was reiterated that the price of the property as per Schedule of Payment (SOP) was Rs.37,98,999.74 plus other taxes as applicable. It was admitted that as per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, possession of the allotted unit, was to be handed over to the complainant within 24 months from the signing of the Agreement subject to force majeure conditions or due to reasons beyond the control of Opposite Parties as mentioned in Clauses 11(b) and 11(c) of the Agreement. It was further stated that the complainant, in all, paid an amount of Rs.37,90,008/- to the Opposite Parties and there was DLI of Rs.19,373.73 on account of default in remitting installments. It was further stated that delivery of possession of the unit, in question, was delayed on account of force majeure conditions. It was further stated that vide letter dated 15.04.2013, the complainant was given an exit option to get refund alongwith interest, which she did not avail.
11. It was further reiterated that occupancy certificate was already received for the floor, in question, on 05.04.2016. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Parties nor they indulged into any unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.
12. The complainant did not file any rejoinder to the written statement filed by the Opposite Parties.
13. The complainant, in support of her case, submitted her affidavit, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.
14. The Opposite Parties, in support of their case, submitted the affidavit of Sh. Shiv Kumar, their Authorized Signatory, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.
15. We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully.
16. It is evident that the complainant was allotted Independent Floor No.DVF-E5/22-GF in DLF Valley, Panchkula by the Opposite Parties vide allotment letter dated 29.03.2010 (Annexure C-2) and Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement between her and the Opposite Parties was executed at Chandigarh on 07.01.2011 (Exhibit C-8). The total price of the said independent floor, as depicted in the Agreement, was Rs.37,29,499.75, besides other charges, securities, deposits and taxes etc. as specified in the Application/Agreement. The complainant, in all, actually paid a sum of Rs.37,90,002/- as mentioned in the Chart showing details of the property, in question, placed on record, under the signatures of the Counsel for the Opposite Party(ies), at the time of arguments on 20.01.2017. As per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, the Opposite Parties were to complete the construction of the said independent floor within a period of 24 months from the date of execution of the said Agreement. It is also on record that vide letter dated 15.04.2013 (Annexure R-4), they (Opposite Parties) sought further time of 12 months, in addition to 24 months, to complete the construction work. Vide that letter, option was also given to the complainant to seek refund alongwith 9% interest. However, the complainant agreed to a further period of 12 months in handing over of possession. As admitted by Counsel for both the parties, as also stated in the aforesaid Chart, given at the time of arguments, possession of the unit, in question, has been offered by the Opposite Parties to the complainant on 10.10.2016 after receipt of occupation certificate on 05.04.2016, during the pendency of the instant complaint filed on 24.08.2016.
17. The Opposite Parties, in preliminary submissions, have prayed to allow them 31% cost escalation of construction as well as 47% of the land holding cost, totaling 76% of the sale price. There is a clear and specific stipulation in Clause 1.2 of the Agreement that price of the unit is escalation free. Since the Opposite Parties failed to complete construction and deliver possession within stipulated period and extended one year period, they (Opposite Parties) are themselves responsible for delay and deficiency in service and their prayer for allowing them escalation cost amounts to seeking amendment of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. The plea, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
18. Since the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement, in the instant case, was executed between the parties on 07.01.2011 and period stipulated therein for handing over possession was to commence from the date of execution of the same (Agreement), the averment of the Opposite Parties that Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court had restrained them from creating any third party rights, during the year 2010, is not relevant.
19. In some of the complaints an objection as regards poor construction quality of the unit(s) has been raised. It has been categorically stated by the Opposite Parties in the written statement(s) filed, that they have hired the services of professionals of international and national level companies to complete the project and all the facilities, amenities are on the verge of completion. No cogent evidence by way of report of an Engineer/Architect in support of allegation(s) of the complainant(s) in regard to poor quality of construction, has been brought on record. In the absence of cogent evidence, such a bald assertion cannot be given any cognizance. These points were also not pressed during arguments.
20. The first question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. This question has already been elaborately dealt with by this Commission in case titled ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126. Paras 25 to 35 of the said order, inter-alia, being relevant, are extracted hereunder:-
25. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration Clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint.
26. To decide above said question, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short the Act), which reads as under;
“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—
The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”
27. It is also desirable to reproduce unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, which reads thus:-
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—
(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”
28. Many a times, by making reference to the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, in the past also, such objections were raised and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, when interpreting the provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act, in the cases of Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6 SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013) etc., came to a conclusion that the remedy provided under Section 3 of 1986 Act, is an independent and additional remedy and existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement, to settle disputes, will not debar the Consumer Foras, to entertain the complaints, filed by the consumers.
29. In the year 2015, many amendments were effected in the provisions of 1996 Act. After amendment, Section 8 of 1996 Act, reads as under:-
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—
(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”
30. Now it is to be seen, whether, after amendment in Section 8 of the principal Act, any additional right has accrued to the service provider(s), to say that on account of existence of arbitration agreement, for settling the disputes through an Arbitrator, the Consumer Foras have no jurisdiction to entertain a consumer complaint. As has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in various cases, and also of the National Commission, in large number of judgments, Section 3 of the 1986 Act, provides additional remedy, notwithstanding any other remedy available to a consumer. The said remedy is also not in derogation to any other Act/Law.
31. Now, we will have to see what difference has been made by the amendment, in the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act. After amendment, it reads that a Judicial Authority is supposed to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement, notwithstanding any judgment, decree, order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, or any other Court, unless it finds that prima facie, no valid arbitration agreement exists. The legislation was alive to the ratio of the judgments, as referred to above, in earlier part of this order. Vide those judgments, it is specifically mandated that under Section 3 of 1986 Act, an additional remedy is available to the consumer(s), which is not in derogation to any other Act. As and when any argument was raised, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the National Commission in the judgments, referred to above, have made it very clear that in the face of Section 8 of 1996 Act and existence of arbitration agreement, it is still opened to the Consumer Foras to entertain the consumer complaints. None of the judgments ever conferred any jurisdiction upon the Consumer Foras to entertain such like complaints. Only the legal issues, as existed in the Statute Book, were explained vide different judgments. If we look into amended provisions of Section 8 of the principal Act, it explains that judicial Authority needs to refer dispute, in which arbitration agreement exist to settle the disputes notwithstanding any judgment/decree or order of any Court. That may be true where in a case, some order has been passed by any Court, making arbitration Agreement non-applicable to a dispute/parties. However, in the present case, the above said argument is not available. The jurisdiction of Consumer Foras to entertain consumer complaints, in the face of arbitration clause in the Agreement, is in-built in 1986 Act. It was not given to these Foras, by any judgment ever. The provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act interpreted vide judgments vis a vis Section 8 of un-amended 1996 Act, were known to the legislature, when the amended Act 2015 was passed. If there was any intention on the part of the legislature, then it would have been very conveniently provided that notwithstanding any remedy available in 1986 Act, it would be binding upon the judicial Authority to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, in case of existence of arbitration agreement, however, it was not so said.
32. We can deal with this issue, from another angle also. If this contention raised is accepted, it will go against the basic spirit of 1986 Act. The said Act (1986) was enacted to protect poor consumers against might of the service providers/multinational companies/traders. As in the present case, the complainant has spent his life savings to get a unit, for his residential purpose. His hopes were shattered. Litigation in the Consumer Fora is cost effective. It does not involve huge expenses and further it is very quick. A complaint in the State Commission can be filed, by making payment between Rs.2000/- to Rs.4000/- (in the present case Rs.4000/-). As per the mandate of 1986 Act, a complaint is supposed to be decided within three months, from the date of service to the opposite party. In cases involving ticklish issues (like the present one, maximum not more than six months to seven months time can be consumed), whereas, to the contrary, as per the principal Act (1996 Act), the consumer will be forced to incur huge expenses towards his/her share of Arbitrator’s fees. Not only as above, it is admissible to an Arbitrator, to decide a dispute within one year. Thereafter, the Court wherever it is challenged may also take upto one year and then there is likelihood that the matter will go to the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Such an effort will be a time consuming and costly one. Taking note of fee component and time consumed in arbitration, it can safely be said that if the matter is referred to an Arbitrator, as prayed, in the present case, it will defeat the very purpose of the provisions of 1986 Act.
33. The 1986 Act provides for better protection of interests and rights of the consumers. For the said purpose, the Consumer Foras were created under the Act. In Section 3 of 1986 Act, it is clearly provided that the said provision is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. The 1986 Act is special legislation qua the consumers. The poor consumers are not expected to fight the might of multinational companies/traders, as those entities have lot of resources at their command. As stated above, in the present case, the complainant has spent his entire life earnings to purchase the plot, in the said project, launched by the opposite party. However, his hopes were shattered, when despite making substantial payment of the sale consideration, he failed to get possession of the plot, in question, in a developed project. As per ratio of the judgments in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC), and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), the consumers are always in a weak position, and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the consumer needs to be accepted. The opinion expressed above, qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, has been given keeping in mind the above said principle.
34. Not only this, recently, it was also so said by the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-
“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”
35. In view of the above, the plea taken by the opposite party, that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected.”
In view of the above, the objection raised by Counsel for the Opposite Parties that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected. Accordingly, the miscellaneous application(s) under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 stands dismissed.
21. The next objection raised by Counsel for Opposite Parties was that the complainant has made baseless allegations of unfair trade practice, deficiency in service etc. with an ulterior motive to amend/modify/rewrite the concluded Agreement duly executed between the parties, purely to invoke jurisdiction of this Commission. It was further stated that the complainant was virtually inviting this Commission to assume powers conferred under the Civil Court and, therefore, this Commission did not have the jurisdiction to consider the present complaint. It may be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of the Opposite Parties, for purchasing the flat, in question, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of Opposite Parties, they were to complete construction of the said Independent Floor within a period of twenty four months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement). Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines ‘service’ as under:-
“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”
22. From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs. Union Of India and Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC), it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, as stated above, Section 3 of the Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has the remedy to file a suit in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by her, as she falls within the definition of a ‘consumer’, as stated above. In the instant case, the complainant is seeking relief on account of violation of terms and conditions of the Agreement by the Opposite Parties and their deficiency in rendering service. It, therefore, cannot be said that the complainant is trying to rewrite/modify the terms of the Agreement. Such an objection, taken by the Opposite Parties, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
23. To defeat claim of the complainant, the next objection raised by the Opposite Parties was that since the complainant had purchased the flat, in question, for earning profits i.e. for resale, as and when there was escalation in the prices of real estate, as such, she would not fall within the definition of ‘consumer, as defined by Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act. It may be stated here that there is nothing, on record to show, that the complainant is a property dealer, and is indulged in sale and purchase of property, on regular basis. In the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by the Opposite Parties, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. Otherwise also, in a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd., 2016 (1) CPJ 31, it was held by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. The principle of law, laid down, in Kavita Ahuja’s case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the unit, in question, was purchased by the complainant, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs. Nirmala Devi Gupta, 2016 (2) CPJ 316. Not only above, recently under similar circumstances, in a case titled as “Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited”, Consumer Case No.70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep. 2016, the National Commission, while rejecting similar plea raised by the builder, observed as under:-
“In the case of the purchase of the house which a builder undertakes to construct for the buyer, the purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose where it is shown, by producing evidence, that the buyer is engaged in the business of a buying and selling of houses and or plots as a trading activity, with a view to make profits by sale of such houses or plots. A person cannot be said to have purchased a house for a commercial purpose only by proving that he owns or had purchased more than one houses or plots. In a given case, separate houses may be purchased by a person for the individual use of his family members. A person owning a house in a city A may also purchase a house in city B for the purpose of staying in that house during short visits to that city. A person may buy two or three houses if the requirement of his family cannot be met in one house. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that in every case where a person owns more than one house, the acquisition of the house is for a commercial purpose. In fact, this was also the view taken by this Commission in Rajesh Malhotra & Ors. vs. Acron Developers Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. First Appeal No.1287 of 2014 decided on 05.11.2015.”
The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by the Opposite Parties, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
24. An objection has been raised by the Opposite Parties that the complainant, when given the option to seek refund with 9% simple interest, agreed to continue with allotment and also agreed to delay and, as such, she waived of her right to raise any grievance. This plea of the Opposite Parties is not well based. While seeking option vide letter dated 15.04.2013 (Annexure R-4), the complainant was informed of delay and extension of one year was sought. One year extended period expired on 06.01.2014 whereas the possession was offered on 10.10.2016. Had the Opposite Parties handed over possession before the stipulated period of two years in the Agreement plus one year extended period i.e. by 06.01.2014, position would have been different and in that situation, it would have been accepted that the complainant had waived of her right to raise grievance. The plea being devoid of merit is not tenable.
25. In one of the connected complaints bearing No.744/2016, Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate, Counsel for the complainants, made a statement at bar on 20.01.2017 that he did not press his objection qua demand raised by the Opposite Parties on account of increase in area and PLC as per clauses No.1.10 for PLC and 10, in the Final Statement of Account. It may be stated here that wherever objection in this regard is taken in other connected cases, which we are disposing of vide this consolidated order, the increase being less than 15%, no consent of the complainants was required and the demand raised by the Opposite Parties to this effect, is legal and tenable and the complainants are liable to pay the same in the absence of any evidence by way of report of an Engineer/Architect that such increase in area, (which is less than 15%) did not exist.
26. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, there is delay in offering/delivering possession of the flat, in question. Clauses 11(a) & 11(b) of Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement dated 07.01.2011 [Annexure C-8] read thus:-
“11(a) Schedule for possession of the said Independent Floor:-
The Company based on its present plans and estimates and subject to all just exceptions, endeavors to complete construction of the said Independent Floor within a period of twenty four (24) months from the date of execution of the Agreement unless there shall be delay or failure due to Force majeure conditions and due to reasons mentioned in Clause 11(b) and 11(c) or due to failure of Allottee to pay in time the Total Price and other charges, taxes, deposits, securities etc and dues/payments or any failure on the part of the allottee to abide by all or any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
11(b) Delay due to reasons beyond the control of the company:-
If the possession of the Said Independent Floor is delayed due to Force Majeure conditions, then the company shall be entitled to extension of time for delivery of possession of the said Independent Floor. The company during the continuance of the Force Majeure reserves the right to alter or vary the terms and conditions of the agreement or if the circumstances so warrant, the company may also suspend the development for such period as is considered expedient and the allottee shall have no right to raise any claim compensation of any nature whatsoever for or with regard to such suspension.”
As stated above, according to Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of the Opposite Parties, they were liable to deliver physical possession of unit, within a period of 24 months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement). In the event of failure to deliver possession, as per Clause 15 of the Agreement, the complainants were entitled to get penal compensation @Rs.10/- per square feet, per month, of the saleable area, for the period of delay. It is true that in some litigation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stayed construction at the project site and order passed remained in force from 19.04.2012 up-to 12.12.2012 i.e. for about 8 months. It is also an admitted fact, that by making reference to above fact of granting stay, which resulted into delay in construction at the site, consent of the complainant was sought, vide letter dated 15.04.2013, to complete construction within further 12 months. Option was also given to the complainant, to seek refund of the deposited amount, alongwith simple interest @9% P.A. The complainant exercised former option and continued to make payment(s) thereafter and as admitted by the Counsel for the parties, at the time of arguments, the complainant has made payments in the sum of Rs.37,90,002/-. Taking into account 12 months extension, the Opposite Parties were required to deliver possession on or before 06.01.2014, but not later than that. As stated in the written statement, permission for occupation of the unit, in question, was received on 05.04.2016 (Annexure R-1). By making a misleading statement, that possession of the unit, was to be delivered within maximum period of 24 months from the date of execution of the Agreement and within further extended period of 12 months i.e. latest by 06.01.2014, and by not abiding by the commitment, made by the Opposite Parties, they were not only deficient, in rendering service, but also indulged into unfair trade practice. The argument of the Opposite Parties that delay in handing over possession of independent floor was attributable due to delay in receiving statutory approvals from the competent authorities, the same being absolutely beyond its control, is not tenable. The Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed on 07.01.2011 and before execution thereof, the Opposite Parties ought to have obtained all the approvals. If permissions/approvals for revision in layout plans and service plans were sought on 11.03.2013 and 20.05.2013, approvals for which were also received in due course of time, the initial time taken (approximately 2½ years) for seeking such approvals amounts to clear deficiency on the part of the Opposite Parties and in the absence of any justified reason for not doing so earlier, time consumed in obtaining such approvals would not amount to force majeure condition. The plea taken, therefore, is of no help to the Opposite Parties. Clearly, there is inordinate delay of around three years beyond initial stipulated period of two years and one year extended period in offering possession of the unit, in question to the complainant. The Opposite Parties are, thus, deficient in rendering service.
27. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to compensation, if so, at what rate, for non-delivery of physical possession of the unit, in question, within the stipulated period of 24 months and extended period of 12 months on account of force majeure conditions. As stated above, in the instant case, the Opposite Parties did not deliver possession within 24 months as stipulated in Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement and thereafter within extended period of 12 months, from execution of the Agreement on 07.01.2011 i.e. by 06.01.2014. There is, thus, inordinate delay of around 3 years, even beyond the extended period. Possession of the unit, in question, was offered by the Opposite Parties on 10.10.2016 i.e. during the pendency of the complaint. The Hon’ble National Commission in the case of Shri Suman Nandi & Anr. Vs. M/s Unitech Limited & Anr., Complaint No.277 of 2013, decided on 17.12.2015, held in Para 16 as under:-
“16. On perusal of the Buyer’s Agreement and the affidavits filed by the parties it is clear that the complainants had booked the subject apartments on the expressed promise extended by the opposite parties that subject to Force Majeure, the opposite parties would deliver the possession of the apartments complete in all respect within 30-36 months, as the case may be, of the execution of the Buyers Agreement and being influenced by the said promise the complainants entered into the contract. No doubt in the Buyer’s Agreement some scope for delay due to unavoidable circumstances was kept in mind for which clause 4.a. for compensating the complainants for delay was incorporated but it does not mean that the intention was that even in the event of inordinate delay in completing the construction and delivering the possession, the complainants would be entitled to meagre compensation of Rs.5/- per sq. ft. per month which is much less than the bank rate for loan or fixed deposit. Therefore, in our considered view clause 4.a. was meant for computing compensation in case of a minor delay in delivery of possession. If the argument of the opposite party is to be accepted, it would lead to absurd situation and would give an unfair advantage to the unscrupulous builder who might utilize the consideration amount meant to finance the project by the buyer for his other business venture at nominal interest of 2-3 per cent as against much higher bank lending rates. This could never be the intention of legislation that if such a proposition is accepted, it would result in defeating the object of Consumer Protection Act.”
The National Commission granted 12% interest as compensation from the date of default in delivery of possession.
28. Recently in Capt. Gurtaj Singh Sahni & anr. Vs Manager, Unitech Limited & anr., consumer complaint bearing no.603/2014, decided on 02.05.2016, the Hon’ble National Commission, directed the opposite party/builder to pay interest on the deposited amount, for the period of delay, till delivery of possession of the unit. Relevant contents of the said order read thus:-
“8. If the compensation for the delay in construction is restricted to what is stipulated in the Buyers Agreement, there will be no pressure upon the builder to complete the construction since he will be more than happy to keep on paying paltry compensation of about 3% per annum of the capital investment, instead of arranging funds at much higher cost, to complete the construction.
9. xxxxxxxxxxxxx
10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the complaints are disposed of with the following directions:
(1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(2) The opposite party shall pay compensation in the form of simple interest @ 12% per annum from the expected date of possession till the date on which the possession is actually offered to the complainants after completing the construction in all respects and obtaining the requisite completion certificate.
(3) No separate compensation would be payable to the complainants either towards the rent if any paid by them or for the mental agony and harassment which they have suffered on account of the failure of the opposite party to perform its contractual obligation.”
29. No doubt, in the Buyer’s Agreement, some scope for delay due to unavoidable circumstances was kept in mind, for compensating the complainant for delay, but it does not mean that the intention was that even in the event of inordinate delay, in completing the construction and delivering the possession, the complainant would be entitled to meagre compensation of Rs.10/- per sq. ft. per month, which is much less than the bank rate for loan or fixed deposit. Therefore, in our considered view, Clauses 11(a) and 15 were meant for computing compensation, in case of a minor delay in delivery of possession.
30. Thus, keeping in view the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble National Commission, in the cases, referred to above, and position stated above, grant of compensation in the form of simple interest @12% on the deposited amount for the period of delay, till delivery of possession of the unit would meet the ends of justice. The possession having been offered on 10.10.2016, the complainant shall be entitled to compensation up-to plus 2 months from 10.10.2016 i.e. 09.12.2016 (30 days for making payment + 30 days grace period). In case after payment by the complainant, the Opposite Parties fail to deliver possession within 30 days, then for delay beyond 30 days, the complainant shall be further entitled to compensation @12% interest till possession is handed over.
31. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to compensation, under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, on account of mental agony and physical harassment, and injury caused to her, for inordinate delay in delivering physical possession of the unit to her, by the Opposite Parties, by the promised date in the Agreement or latest by 06.01.2014 i.e. within the extended period. Admittedly, the possession of unit, in question, has been offered to the complainant on 10.10.2016. The compensation in the sum of Rs.30 Lacs claimed by the complainant is highly exaggerated. The complainant has been adequately compensated by granting 12% interest for the delay period. The price of the unit, in question, is escalation free. The complainant shall also get the benefit of escalation in price of the unit. Under these circumstances, compensation, on account of mental agony and physical harassment, caused to the complainant, due to the acts of omission and commission of the Opposite Parties, if granted, to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/- shall be reasonable, adequate and fair. The complainant, is, thus, held entitled to compensation, in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-.
32. In connected consumer complaints bearing Nos.670/2016, 743/2016 & 744/2016, 669/2016, 673/2016, 696/2016, 739/2016, 740/2016 & 742/2016, Counsel for the complainants argued that delay in execution of the Agreement after allotment of the unit(s), in question, was an act of unfair trade practice by the Opposite Parties, and, therefore, the complainants are entitled to interest on the amount, so deposited, till the Agreement was executed. It may be stated here that the Opposite Parties, in cases pertaining to this project, have been pleading that there being stay by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court during the year 2010 (Annexures R-6 & R-7), it acted as a force majeure and delayed the project but this Commission, has been rejecting the aforesaid plea of the Opposite Parties (Builder) on the ground that since the Agreement(s) was/were executed in December 2010/January 2011 or so, they (Opposite Parties) are not entitled to any benefit out of this delay. The same is applicable in these cases also. In the face of arguments of the Counsel for the complainants, such stay by the High Court shall act as force majeure condition. It may also be stated that it is not immediately after booking of the unit that Buyer’s Agreement is executed and the process, in all fairness, is likely to take 3-4 months. The complainants are, therefore, not entitled to any compensation for delay of around 4 months in execution of Agreement.
33. As regards plea of complainants taken in the complaints, as mentioned in Para 32 above, that liability towards increase in service tax levied after the date by which possession of the independent floor was to be accomplished as per the Agreement, it may be stated here that no details of increase in service tax have been given. Further, delay of one year was on account of stay by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and when the complainants consented and opted to continue with the project, it meant that they accepted liability for increase in service tax during the extended period. The financial implication for the alleged increase is not likely to be significant. In any case, the complainants have been adequately compensated by granting 12% interest on the deposited amount for delay in delivering possession.
33. Similarly, in the following 18 complaints bearing No.615, 670, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 717, 741, 743, 744, 750, 755, 756, 764, 765, 766 and 767 all of 2016, (particulars of which are indicated in Table-A below), the possession of the unit(s) has been offered by the Opposite Parties:-
TABLE – A
Sr. No. | Complaint No. | Date of independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement.
| Due date for possession after 2 years plus 1 year extended period | Date on which possession offered. | Date of receiving Occupation Certificate.
|
1. | 615/2016 | 19.11.2010 | 18.11.2013 | 29.10.2016 | 08.01.2016 |
2. | 670/2016 | 28.12.2010 | 27.12.2013 | 15.11.2016 | 29.06.2016 |
3. | 680/2016 | 15.11.2010 | 14.11.2013 | 15.11.2016 | 19.07.2016 |
4. | 681/2016 | 06.12.2010 | 05.12.2013 | 29.10.2016 | 08.01.2016 |
5. | 682/2016 | 27.12.2010 | 26.12.2013 | 29.10.2016 | 05.04.2016 |
6. | 683/2016 | 07.12.2010 | 06.12.2013 | 15.11.2016 | 19.07.2016 |
7. | 684/2016 | 28.12.2010 | 27.12.2013 | 08.06.2016 | 13.01.2016 |
8. | 717/2016 | 06.07.2011 | 05.07.2014 | 15.10.2016 | 16.06.2016 |
9. | 741/2016 | 08.03.2011 | 07.03.2014 | 10.10.2016 | 05.04.2016 |
10. | 743/2016 | 12.01.2011 | 11.01.2014 | 15.11.2016 | 09.09.2016 |
11. | 744/2016 | 01.02.2011 | 31.01.2014 | 15.11.2016 | 29.06.2016 |
12. | 750/2016 | 27.12.2010 | 26.12.2013 | 26.10.2016 | 02.05.2016 |
13. | 755/2016 | 22.02.2011 | 21.02.2014 | 15.11.2016 | 19.01.2016 |
14. | 756/2016 | 21.12.2010 | 20.12.2013 | 10.10.2016 | 02.09.2015 |
15. | 764/2016 | 17.02.2011 | 16.02.2014 | 29.10.2016 | 16.06.2016 |
16. | 765/2016 | 22.03.2011 | 21.03.2014 | 05.10.2016 | 02.05.2016 |
17. | 766/2016 | 22.12.2010 | 21.12.2013 | 22.07.2016 | 13.01.2016 |
18. | 767/2016 | 27.01.2011 | 26.01.2014 | 05.10.2016 | 09.06.2016 |
34. In complaints at Sr. Nos.3, 4 and 9, delay compensation in not offering possession of the unit(s), in question, within the stipulated period has already been given to the complainant(s) in Final Statement of Account annexed with letters of possession and admitted in the Chart submitted by the Counsel for Opposite Parties at the time of arguments.
35. In complaints at Sr. Nos.1, 8, 13 and 17 there is DLI of Rs.2,45,382.24, Rs.2,33,743.33, Rs.56,863.26 and Rs.94,176.00 respectively on account of delay in remitting installments.
36. In Complaint at Sr. No.18 viz. CC/767/2016, during arguments, Counsel for the complainants has placed on record Acknowledgement dated 05.12.2016, which we mark as Exhibit ‘X’, vide which, the complainants made payment in the sum of Rs.9,63,633.00 & Rs.82,766.00 against the demand raised in the offer of possession letter. Counsel for the Opposite Parties, on getting instructions from Sh. Shiv Kumar, Authorized Signatory of the Opposite Parties, stated that possession, in this case, shall be delivered to the complainants within four weeks.
37. In the instant case as also in majority of complaint cases mentioned in Table-A, it was stated at bar that possession has been offered during October 2016 and November 2016 i.e. during the pendency of the said complaints, subject to furnishing of affidavits/documents and making the balance payment. As per the offer of possession letters placed, on record, in these cases, six months’ time has
been given to the complainants to complete the formalities and make the payment without delayed interest. Ms. Ekta Jhanji and Sh. Parveen Jain, Advocates, Counsel for the Opposite Parties, on instructions, stated that in case, any allottee is eager to get possession, he/she will complete formalities and deposit the amount before the period of six months and as and when amount is deposited and other necessary documents are submitted, within 3 weeks thereafter, possession will be handed over, to the complainant(s). She further stated that contingent Vat deposit will not be insisted upon at this stage, subject to furnishing of an affidavit by the allottee to make the payment as and when demanded by the Government. In cases relating to this project, earlier the Opposite Parties, at the time of offering possession, were also raising demand on account of stamp duty and registration charges but now while offering possession, no demand on account of stamp duty and registration charges has been raised. [In Consumer Complaints bearing Nos.684/2016 and 766/2016, wherein possession was offered on 08.06.2016 and 22.07.2016 respectively, demand for stamp duty and registration was also raised].
38. The Counsel for the parties were further in agreement that stamp duty and registration charges shall be payable at the time of execution of the sale deed of the unit, in question, after possession is handed over; charges on account of advocate fee etc. would not be payable by the complainants, but incidental expenses, which may be incurred at the time of registration of sale deed, shall be borne by the complainants. Thus, at this stage, the complainants are held liable to pay the demand raised minus contingent vat, advocate charges etc. Previously, while offering possession, the Opposite Parties were giving only 30 days’ time to deposit the amount towards demand raised in the letter offering possession but since now the Opposite Parties have, as a goodwill gesture, granted six months’ time to complete the formalities and to deposit the amount towards demand raised, coupled with the fact that there would be no holding charges during this period, as already stated above, the ends of justice would be served if the complainants are granted compensation by way of grant of 12% interest, for the delayed period up-to date of offer of possession plus 2 months (30 days for making payment + 30 days grace period). Thus, the complainants are held entitled to interest @12% for the delayed period. However, if despite deposit of amount towards demand raised, the Opposite Parties fail to hand over possession within 30 days, for delay period beyond 30 days, they shall be liable for making payment of compensation.
39. In Consumer Complaint No.684 of 2016 mentioned at Sr. No.7, in the above Table-A, possession was offered to the complainant vide offer of possession letter dated 08.06.2016. During the pendency of the complaint, vide order dated 17.10.2016, it was directed by this Commission that the complainant will deposit the demand raised vide the offer of possession letter less the components of contingent deposit of Vat and Stamp Duty & Registration Charges, within a week from the passing of the said order dated 17.10.2016 and upon doing so, the Opposite Parties would handover/deliver possession of the unit, in question, within a week thereafter. However, during arguments, it was conceded by the Counsel for the Opposite Parties that possession has still not been delivered to the complainant in terms of orders passed.
40. In Consumer Complaints mentioned at Sr. Nos.2 to 7, 9 to 12, 14 to 16 & 18 in Table-A above, the complainants are held entitled to compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- in each case.
41. In Consumer Complaints Nos.615/2016, CC/717/2016, 755/2016 & 766/2016 mentioned at Sr. Nos.1, 8, 13 & 17 respectively, there has been DLI in the sum of Rs.2,45,382.24, Rs.2,33,743.33, Rs.56,863.26 & Rs.94,176.00 respectively against the complainants. Delay in payment of installments partly contributes to delay in completion of unit. Therefore, in these complaints, the complainants are not entitled to same amount of compensation. Grant of compensation in the sum of Rs.1,25,000/- in each of these cases would serve the ends of justice.
42. In Consumer Complaints No.669, 673, 696 739, 740 and 742 all of 2016, details whereof are given hereunder in Table B, possession of the unit(s), in question, has not been offered to the complainants by the Opposite Parties:-
TABLE – B
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5
|
Sr. No. | Complaint Case No. | Date of independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement.
| Due date for possession after one year extended period | Date of receiving Occupation Certificate.
|
1. | 669/2016 | 09.02.2011 | 08.02.2014 | 21.10.2016
|
2. | 673/2016 | 04.02.2011 | 03.02.2014 | 21.10.2016 |
3. | 696/2016 | 13.01.2011 | 12.01.2014 | 21.10.2016 |
4. | 739/2016 | 11.02.2011 | 10.02.2014 | 12.01.2016 (Not placed on record) |
5. | 740/2016 | 07.02.2011 | 06.02.2014 | 12.01.2016 (Not placed on record) |
6. | 742/2016 | 27.12.2010 | 26.12.2013 | 21.10.2016 |
43. In Consumer Complaint bearing No.740 of 2016, the complainants, have prayed for possession alongwith interest on the deposited amount for the delayed period in not offering/handing over possession of the unit, in question, @ 18% p.a., plus compensation of Rs.10 Lacs besides Rs.55,000/- as litigation expenses. The Counsel for the Opposite Parties argued that total price of the unit, as per Agreement, being Rs.94,86,424.99, by adding compensation amount, value being beyond Rs.1 Crore, complaint shall not fall within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission. It may be stated here that Counsel for the complainants, at the time of admission hearing, vide order dated 01.11.2016, restricted the claim qua compensation for mental agony and physical harassment, to the extent of Rs.5 lacs only instead of Rs.10 lacs. Excluding the interest claimed, the aggregate relief falls within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission. This Commission in Surjit Singh Thadwal Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Complaint Case No.484 of 2016, decided on 15.12.2016, has already dealt with the issue qua interest by holding as under:-
“13. Now we will deal with another contention of the opposite parties that for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, it is not open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint. As per admitted facts, the complainant has sought refund of amount paid i.e. Rs.48,95,264/- alongwith interest @12% p.a. from the respective date of deposits; compensation to the tune of Rs.5 lacs, for mental agony and physical harassment and cost of litigation to the tune of Rs.55,000/-. It is argued by Counsel for the opposite parties that if his entire claimed amount is added, alongwith interest claimed, it will cross Rs.1 crore and in that event it will not be open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint, for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. To say so, reliance has been placed upon ratio of judgment of a Larger Bench of the National Commission, in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra). In the said case, it was specifically observed that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, it is the value of the goods and services, which has to be noted and not the value of deficiencies claimed. Further, that interest component also has to be taken into account, for the purpose of determining pecuniary jurisdiction.
14. In the first blush, if we look into the ratio of the judgment, referred to above, it appears that this Commission will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. However, on deep analysis, we are going to differ with the argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties. Judgment in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) was rendered by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission, without noting its earlier view of the subject. This issue, whether, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/ Consumer Foras, interest is to be added with other relief claimed or not, came up for consideration, before the Three Judges Bench of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors., II 2003 CPJ 81 (NC). In the said case, noting similar arguments, it was observed as under:-
“3. Complaint (at pp 17-36) was filed with the following prayer
“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the complaint be allowed and the opposite parties be directed to pay the claim to the tune of Rs. 18,33,000/- plus interest @ 18% from the date of claim till its realization. Also the suitable damages caused to the complainant be ordered to be paid to the complainant.”
4. Bare reading of the prayer made would show that the interest claimed by appellant pertains to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future. Rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of State Commission and the stage for exercise of such a discretion would be the time when the complaint is finally disposed of. Thus, the State Commission had acted erroneously in adding to the amount of Rs. 18,33,000/- the interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon till date of filing of complaint for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction before reaching the said stage. Order under appeal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. However, in view of change in pecuniary jurisdiction w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the complaint is now to be dealt with by the District Forum instead of State Commission.”
15. It was specifically stated that interest claimed by appellant/complainant pertained to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future, need not be added in the relief claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/Consumer Foras. It was rightly said that the rate and period for which the interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of the particular Consumer Fora, and the stage for exercise of such discretion would be the time, when final order is passed. We are of the considered opinion that the view taken is perfectly justified. There may be cases, where the complainant may not be entitled to claim any interest upon the amount paid, like the one, where he is rescinding his contract and further at what rate interest is to be granted will be determined by the competent Consumer Fora, by looking into the facts of each case. All cases cannot be put into a straitjacket formula, to add interest claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. The interest, which is a discretionary relief, cannot be added to the value of the goods or services, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. As per provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act) value of the goods purchased or services plus (+) compensation claimed needs to be added only, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras.
As per ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.10941-10942 of 2013, decided on 04.12.2015, we would like to follow the view expressed by Three Judges Bench (former Bench) of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), in preference to the ratio of judgment passed by a Bench of co-equal strength (subsequent Bench) of the National Commission in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra).
In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. case (supra), it was specifically observed by the Supreme Court that when a former Bench of co-equal strength has given a finding qua one legal issue, it is not open to the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength to opine qua that very legal issue and give a contrary finding. At the maximum, the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength can refer the matter to the President/Chief Justice of India to constitute a bigger Bench, to look into the matter and reconsider the legal proposition. It was further specifically held that, in case, there are two contrary views by the former and later co-equal strength Benches, the former will prevail. It was so said by looking into the ratio of judgment rendered by the Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 2 SCC 673, wherein, when dealing with similar proposition, it was observed as under:-
“12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-
(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and
(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.”
16. In Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra), ratio of judgment-Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) was not even discussed and considered. In view of above proposition of law laid down by the Five Judges Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr.’s and also Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), it is not open to the Bench of co-equal strength to give contrary findings, to the view already expressed by a Former Bench of same strength. In Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), decided on 02.04.2003, it was specifically observed by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, interest component claimed by the complainant/party, is not to be added. We are of the considered view that in view of proposition of law, as explained above, the view taken in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), to determine pecuniary jurisdiction without taking interest claimed, will prevail. As such, in the present case, we are not looking into the interest claimed by the complainant, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission. If the interest part is excluded, the amount claimed in the relief clause fell below Rs.1 crore and above Rs.20 lacs. Hence, this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present complaint. In view of above, the objection raised by the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.”
In view of above, the complaint is very much within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission.
44. In Consumer Complaints bearing No.669/2016, 673/2016, 696/2016 and 742/2016, the occupation certificates of the units, in question, have been received by the Opposite Parties on 21.10.2016. However, in Consumer Complaints bearing Nos.739/2016 & 740/2016, as per the details given in the chart, the occupation certificates were stated to have been received on 12.01.2016 but copies of the same have not been placed on record. As stated above, possession of the units, in question, has not been offered/delivered by the Opposite Parties to the complainants. Therefore, in view of observations made in the preceding paras, the complainants, in these cases, are entitled to possession of the units, in question, complete in all respects on payment of amount due. The complainants, in these cases, are held entitled to 12% p.a. interest on the deposited amount for the delayed period beyond three years i.e. from 09.02.2014, 04.02.2014, 13.01.2014, 11.02.2014, 07.02.2014 and 27.12.2013 respectively till possession is handed over. In CC/669/2016, CC/673/2016, 739/2016 & 740/2016, the complainants are entitled to compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- on account of mental agony, physical harassment and deficiency in service. Since in CC/696/2016 & CC/742/2016, there is a DLI of Rs.61,714.00 and Rs.55,575.00 on account of delay in remittance of installments, which has a bearing on the completion of project, the complainants, are held entitled to compensation in the sum of Rs.1,25,000/- in each case.
45. In complaints bearing Nos.745, 746 and 747 all of 2016 particulars of which are indicated in Table ‘C’ below, the complainants have sought refund of the deposited amounts:-
TABLE – C
Sr. No. | Description/Details | Complaint Case No. | ||
|
| 745/2016 | 746/2016 | 747/2016 |
1. | Amount deposited. (Rs.) | Rs.54,99,953.08(*) | Rs.50,45,675.00(*) | Rs.47,42,116.15(*) |
2. | Date of Agreement. | 28.12.2010 | 21.01.2011 | 20.01.2011 |
3. | Due date for offering possession. | 27.12.2013 | 20.01.2014 | 19.01.2014 |
4. | Whether possession offered | 05.10.2016 | 05.10.2016 | 05.10.2016 |
5. | Delay in offer of possession | 3 Years approx.. | 3 Years approx.. | 3 Years approx.. |
6. | Whether first allottee | Yes
| Yes
| Yes
|
7. | DLI | Rs.21,642.00 Ps | Rs.50,866.00 Ps | Rs.47,151.79 Ps |
(*) During arguments, the Counsel for the Opposite Parties admitted the receipt of the amount as shown against the Column ‘Amount deposited (Rs.)’ at Sr. No.1 in the table.
46. As is evident from record of these complaints, the Independent Floor Buyer’s Agreement was executed on 28.12.2010, 21.01.2011 & 20.01.2011 respectively. As per Clause 11(a) of the Agreement, the Company was to endeavor to complete construction of the independent floor within a period of 24 months from the date of execution of the agreement unless there was delay or failure due to reasons mentioned in Clauses 11(b) and 11(c) or due to failure of the allottee to pay in time the total price and other charges, taxes and cesses, deposits, securities etc. and dues/payments or any failure on the part of the allottee to abide by all or any of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. Clause 12 of the Agreement stipulated that company upon obtaining certificate of occupation and use from the Governmental Authority, shall offer in writing, possession of the independent floor to the allottee in terms of the Agreement to be taken within 30 days from the date of issue of such notice and the Company shall give possession provided the allottee is not in default of any terms and conditions of the Agreement and has complied with all provisions, formalities, documentation etc., as may be prescribed by the Company in this regard. In these cases, 24 months period plus the extended period of 12 months from the date of execution of the agreements expired on 27.12.2013, 20.01.2014 & 19.01.2014 respectively. However, the possession of the units, in question, was offered on 05.10.2016. No reason or circumstances, which were beyond the control of the Opposite Parties for such delay beyond initial period of two years and one year extended period, have been explained. There is, thus, inordinate delay in offering possession of the allotted unit. This Commission in the case of Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016, decided on 24.05.2016, in the light of law settled by Hon’ble National Commission in such cases, held that the complainant is entitled to refund of the amount deposited with the Opposite Party. Relevant Paras of the aforesaid judgment read thus:-
“Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same. It was so held by the National Commission in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC). Recently also, under similar circumstances, in the case of M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, held as under:-
“I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the complainants was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery”.
The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case. It is therefore held that the complainants could not be held guilty, of filing the present complaint, seeking refund of the deposited amount, alongwith interest and compensation, as possession of the unit was not offered to them by the stipulated date.
It was clearly stated by the National Commission, in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC), that when the promoter has violated material condition, in not handing over possession of the unit, in time, it is not obligatory for a purchaser to accept possession after that date. Recently in a case titled as Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Case No.70 of 2015 decided on 14 Sep 2016, under similar circumstances, the National Commission negated the plea taken by the builder while holding as under:-
“I am in agreement with the learned senior counsel for the complainant that considering the default on the part of the opposite party in performing its contractual obligation, the complainant cannot be compelled to accept the offer of possession at this belated stage and, therefore, is entitled to refund the entire amount paid by him alongwith reasonable compensation, in the form of interest.”
Therefore, the complainants, in these complaints, are held entitled to refund of the amount alongwith interest @15% per annum from the dates of respective deposits.
47. As regards compensation for mental agony, harassment etc., in CC/745/2016 and CC/747/2016, the complainants are held entitled to compensation of Rs.1,75,000/-.
48. Since there is DLI of Rs.50,866.00 in CC/746/2016, on account of delay in remittance of installments, which has a bearing on the completion of project, the complainant is not entitled to get the same compensation, which this Commission has been granting in such cases. In the facts and circumstances, the complainant is held entitled to compensation for physical harassment and mental agony to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/-.
49. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties, in all the cases.
50. For the reasons recorded above, all the complaints bearing Nos.509, 615, 669, 670, 673, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 696, 717, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 750, 755, 756, 764, 765, 766 and 767 all of 2016 are partly accepted, with costs, in the following manner:-
Consumer Complaints bearing No:
509, 615, 670, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 717, 741, 743, 744, 750, 755, 756, 764, 765, 766 and 767 all of 2016 |
In these cases (except CC/684/2016 and CC/766/2016), the Opposite Parties have offered possession in October 2016 and November 2016, asking the complainants to deposit the amount(s) within six months, whereas in CC/684/2016 and CC/766/2016, it (possession) was offered on 08.06.2016 and 22.07.2016 respectively and the complainants have been given 30 days to make payment. In case, any allottee is eager to get possession, he/she will complete formalities and deposit the amount before the period of six months, and pay the amount towards demand raised, except the demands towards, contingent VAT deposit and Advocate charges, (also stamp duty, registration charges in respect of CC/684/2016 and CC/766/2016) and as and when, amount is deposited and other necessary documents are submitted, possession will be handed over to complainant(s), by the Opposite Parties within 30 days.
In case, the Opposite Parties fail to deliver possession within 30 days from the date of making payment/submission of documents by the complainants, for such delay, beyond 30 days, compensation by way of interest @12% p.a. on the deposited amount for each month, till possession is delivered, shall also be payable by 10th of the following month and failure shall entail penal interest @15% p.a. instead of 12% p.a. till payment is made.
The Opposite Parties, in each of these cases, are, jointly and severally, directed as under:-
(i) | To hand over physical possession of the unit(s), allotted in favour of the complainant(s), complete in all respects, to the complainant(s), within a period of 30 days, from the date balance payment is made/documents are completed by the complainant(s). |
(ii) | Execute and get registered the sale deed in respect of the unit(s), in question, within two months from the date of handing over of possession to the complainant(s). The stamp duty, registration charges and incidental expenses, if any, shall be borne by the complainant(s). |
(iii) | To pay compensation, by way of interest @12% p.a., on the deposited amount, to the complainant(s), with effect from 07.01.2014, 19.11.2013, 28.12.2013, 15.11.2013, 06.12.2013, 27.12.2013, 07.12.2013, 28.12.2013, 06.07.2014, 08.03.2014, 12.01.2014, 01.02.2014 27.12.2013, 22.02.2014, 21.12.2013, 17.02.2014, 22.03.2014, 22.12.2013 & 27.01.2014 respectively up-till two months from the date of offer of possession i.e. up-to 09.12.2016, 28.12.2016, 14.01.2017, 14.01.2017, 28.12.2016, 28.12.2016, 14.01.2017, 07.08.2016, 14.12.2016, 09.12.2016, 14.01.2017, 14.01.2017, 25.12.2016, 14.01.2017, 09.12.2016, 28.12.2016, 04.12.2016, 21.09.2016 & 04.12.2016 respectively or up-to the date on which possession is actually handed over, whichever is earlier, within 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the said amount shall carry penal interest @15% p.a., instead of 12% p.a., from the date of default, till realization. [In CC/680/2016, CC/681/2016 & CC/741/2016, compensation in the sum of Rs.6,40,527.00, Rs.6,19,063.22 & Rs.5,00,444.00, on account of delay in possession has been credited in Final Statement of Account. The same shall be deducted from the compensation amount by way of interest @12% for delay period] In case, the Opposite Parties fail to deliver possession within 30 days from the date of making payment by the complainants, for such delay, beyond 30 days, compensation by way of interest @12% p.a. on the deposited amount for each month, till possession is delivered, shall be payable by 10th of the following month and failure shall entail penal interest @15% p.a. instead of 12% p.a. till payment is made. |
(iv) | Pay compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-, in each case, [In CC/615/2016, CC/717/2016, CC/755/2016 & CC/766/2016 - Rs.1,25,000/- in each case] on account of mental agony, physical harassment and deficiency in service and Rs.35,000/- as litigation costs, in each case, to the complainant(s), within 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order, failing which, the said amount shall carry interest @12% p.a., from the date of filing the complaint(s) till realization. |
In all these complaints, as agreed between the parties, the Advocate Charges shall not be charged by the Opposite Parties. The actual expenditure for registration of Sale Deed(s) besides Stamp duty and Registration charges, shall, however, be borne by the complainant(s).
As agreed, the amount of contingent Vat deposit will not be insisted upon at this stage, subject to furnishing an affidavit by the allottee to make the payment as and when demanded by the Government. The amount of contingent vat, shall be payable by the complainant(s) as and when the same becomes payable by the Opposite Parties to the Government. The complainant(s) shall deposit contingent vat within three weeks from the date the same is paid by Opposite Parties to the Government and the complainant(s) are informed of this fact. Delay beyond three weeks from the receipt of notice shall attract simple interest @12% per annum.
Since the demand(s) raised have, by and large, been held to be justified, in cases wherever, there is delay in making payment towards demand raised beyond two months, period taken beyond two months shall be excluded for the purpose of payment of 12% interest compensation on delayed period.
Consumer Complaint bearing No:
669, 673, 696, 739, 740 and 742 all of 2016. |
The Opposite Parties (DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd.), in each of these cases, are jointly and severally, held liable and directed as under:-
(i) | To hand over physical possession of the unit, allotted in favour of the complainant(s), complete in all respects, to the complainant(s), within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, on payment of the amount(s), by the complainant(s), due against them. |
(ii) | Execute and get registered the sale deed(s) in respect of the unit(s), in question, within two months from the date of handing over of possession to the complainant(s). The stamp duty, registration charges and incidental expenses, if any, shall be borne by the complainant(s). |
(iii) | To pay compensation, by way of interest @12% p.a., on the deposited amount(s), to the complainant(s), with effect from 09.02.2014, 04.02.2014, 13.01.2014, 11.02.2014, 07.02.2014 & 27.12.2013 respectively till 31.01.2017, within 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the said amount(s) shall carry penal interest @15% p.a., instead of 12% p.a., from the date of default, till realization. |
(iv) | To pay compensation by way of interest @12% p.a. on the deposited amount(s), to the complainant(s) w.e.f. 01.02.2017, onwards (per month), till possession is delivered, by the 10th of the following month, failing which, the same shall also carry penal interest @15% p.a., instead of 12% p.a., from the date of default, till payment is made. |
(v) | Pay compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- (in CC/669/2016, CC/673/2016, CC/739/2016 & CC/740/2016) and Rs.1,25,000/- (in CC/696/2016 & CC/742/2016) on account of mental agony, physical harassment and deficiency in service and Rs.35,000/- as litigation costs, in each case, to the complainant(s), within 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order, failing which, the said amount(s) shall carry interest @12% p.a., from the date of filing the complaint till realization. |
Consumer Complaints bearing No:
745, 746 and 747 all of 2016. |
The Opposite Party is held liable and directed as under:-
(i) To refund the amounts of Rs.54,99,953.08 (in CC/745/2016), Rs.50,45,675.00 (in CC/746/2016) & Rs.47,42,116.15 (in CC/747/2016), alongwith simple interest @15% per annum, to the complainant, from the respective dates of deposits, till realization, within 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the Opposite Party shall pay the aforesaid amounts alongwith simple interest @18% per annum, instead of 15% per annum, from the date of default till actual payment;
(ii) To pay an amount of Rs.1,75,000/- each (in CC/745/2016 & CC/747/2016) and Rs.1,50,000/- (in CC/746/2016) as compensation for mental agony, physical harassment & deficiency in service and Rs.35,000/-, in each case, as litigation costs, to the complainant, within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order, failing which, the Opposite Party shall pay the aforesaid amount alongwith simple interest @15% per annum from the date of filing the complaint till actual payment;
51. However, it is made clear that in case, the complainant(s) has availed loan facility from any financial institution(s), such an institution shall have the first charge on the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due against the complainant(s).
52. Certified copy of this order, be placed on the file of consumer complaints bearing Nos.615, 669, 670, 673, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 696, 717, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 750, 755, 756, 764, 765, 766 and 767 all of 2016.
53. Certified copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.
54. The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.
Pronounced.
30.01.2017
[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]
PRESIDENT
(DEV RAJ)
MEMBER
(PADMA PANDEY)
MEMBER
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