REKHA GUPTA

        Revision petition no. 3175 of 2014 has been filed against the judgment and order dated 12.02.2014 passed by the Uttar Pradesh State Consume Disputes Redressal Commission, Lucknow (‘the State Commission’) in Appeal no. 767 of 2005.

2.     The brief facts of the case as per the respondent/complainant are that the respondent has deposited a total sum of Rs.1,66,131.50 with the petitioner/ opposite party for allotment of plot of land under the scheme. The respondent filed a consumer complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Meerut (‘the District Forum’) against the petitioner for refund of the amount in question. The petitioner filed a written statement before the District Forum and opposed the complaint, but it was admitted that the respondent had deposited a sum of Rs.1,66,131.50 with reference to the allotment of plot and remaining pleadings were not admitted. On hearing the parties, the District Forum perused the record and passed the below-mentioned order:

“Complaint is allowed and opposite party is ordered that they refund deposited amount of Rs.1,66,131.50 to complainant along with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of depositing till the date of payment within the period of one month. In addition to this opposite party to pay Rs.12,000/- as compensation and Rs.5,000/- as cost of this complaint and if this order is not complied with in case this order becomes absolute, then further proceedings under section 25/27, Consumer Protection Act, 1986 would be initiated against opposite party”.

3.     Aggrieved by the order of the District Forum, the petitioner/ opposite party filed an appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission while allowing the appeal partially modified the order and set aside the compensation of Rs.12,000/- and confirmed the rest of the order of the District Forum.

4.     Hence, the present revision petition.

5.     Along with the revision petition an application for condonation of delay has been filed. The number of days of delay have not been mentioned in the application. However, as per the office report, there is a delay of 86 days in filing the present revision petition. The reasons given for the delay are as under:

• On 09.05.2014 the counsel for the petitioner has received the file for filing revision petition before the Hon’ble Commission.
• The documents, i.e., complaint, written statement, affidavit, impugned judgments and the documents filed before the lower form are in Hindi and the same got translated into English. It took much time for translation.
• The undersigned prepared the revision petition and sent the affidavit for attestation and it was received on 05.08.2014.

6.     It is seen from the above, that the application for condonation of delay has been filed in a most casual and careless manner. It does not even mention the number of days delay to be condoned nor does it mention the date of receipt of the order. The Registry has reported that the impugned order was received on 12.02.2014, however, the application does not explain the delay of almost three months between 12.02.2014 to 09.05.2014, when the counsel for the petitioner supposedly received the file for filing the revision petition. Further, there is no explanation for the delay of almost three months from 09.05.2014 to 05.08.2014, i.e., from the date the counsel received the file, till the date when the counsel received the revision petition after attestation on 05.08.2014.

7.       At the same time, it is also well settled that “sufficient cause” with regard to condonation of delay in each case, is a question of fact.

8.     In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held:                  

“The party should show that besides acting bonafide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]”.

9.  In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

10.    Similarly in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., vs Kailash Devi and Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that:

        “There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.”
 

11.        In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2)

Scale 108, it has been observed:

“We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.”

12.        Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Post Master and Others vs Live Media India Ltd., and Another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held:

“After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under;

“It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.”

          The Court further observed;

“It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs”.

13.    In the matter of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), the Apex Court has highlighted the object of Consumer Protection Act particularly expeditious and in expensive remedy to the consumers.

  “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”.

14.    The present case is fully covered under the case laws cited above Supra. Further, the petitioner has failed to give any reasons to explain the day to day delay of 86 days.

15.    Accordingly, we find that there is no ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay of 86 days in filing the present revision petition. The application for condonation of delay is without any merit as well as having no legal basis and is not maintainable. Consequently, the present revision petition being time barred by limitation and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.