PER SUBHASH CHANDRA Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant on IA No.20069 of 2019 which is an application seeking condonation of delay in filing of the instant Appeal. 2. This Appeal has been filed against the order dated 04.06.2019 of the Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh (for short “the State Commission”) in Complaint No.139 of 2019. IA No.20069 of 2019 seeking condonation of delay of 133 days in filing the instant Appeal is filed on the ground that while the certified free copy of the impugned order was received by the Appellant on 15.07.2019, the Appeal could be filed only on 24.12.2019. The reasons stated by the Appellant are that after receipt of the certified free copy, the matter was forwarded by the Estate Officer to the Legal Branch who, after approval of the Chief Administrator, HUDA on 29.08.2019 sought approval of the Advocate General, Punjab on 06.09.2019 for engagement of an empanelled counsel and thereafter, sanction to engage a counsel was issued on 19.09.2019. Thereafter, time was taken to approve the Appeal and in sending certain information and clarifications prior to approval which was finally received on 23.12.2019. Hence, the delay was not intentional on account of procedural reasons. 3. During oral submissions, learned Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through LRs & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr., Civil Appeal No.5867 of 2015 decided on 09.10.2023 wherein it was held that “impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests”. It was argued that the present case is also similarly covered and therefore, the delay in filing of the Appeal may be condoned. 4. In Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.” 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC), has stated that a court has to apply the basic test while dealing with the matters relating to condonation of delay, whether the Petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence or not. The court has held as under: "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.” 6. While dealing with the matters under the Act, it has also been held in the case of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the special nature of the Act has to be kept in mind while dealing with the special period of limitation prescribed therein. The court has held as under: “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora." [ Emphasis added ] 7. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the Appellant have been considered. 8. The learned Counsel has relied upon Sheo Raj Singh (supra) to explain the delay on grounds of inherent delays in governmental entities. However, this case is distinguishable from the facts of the present case since that matter related to enhanced compensation payable to land owners in proceedings for acquisition of land involving a large number of land losers who were to be duly compensated and hence the delay of 479 days had been condoned by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the ground that a pragmatic view on balancing of competing interests was desirable in matters of condonation of delay. In the present case, the facts are entirely different and relate to an individual who was an applicant before the Appellant for the purpose of allotment of a plot. Public interest involving large numbers of parties and impact on public policy is not the issue in the case on hand. Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides for time schedules in keeping with the Act’s intention to treat consumer related issues on a different footing from matters before a Civil Court. However, the argument of impersonal, bureaucratic functioning of Government to justify condonation of delay, cannot be considered in this case since it would defeat the objective of the Act. It would open a door for cases to be filed after considerable delays thereby defeating the objective of expeditious adjudication and the need to obviate judicial contests in the hierarchy of Consumer Fora established with the intention of expeditious resolution of consumer related issues. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 SCC 563 held that the departments are not absolved from observing the period of limitation prescribed by the statute. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - “12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.” (Emphasis added) 10. In view of the foregoing, the cause shown for the condonation of delay is not considered to be sufficient or justified. IA No.20069 of 2019 is dismissed. Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation. 11. Pending IAs, if any, stand disposed of with this order. | 
