The appellant is a carrier/transporter and has filed this appeal against order dated 25/11/14 of the Lr. District Forum, Margao, by which  the  Appellant  has  been directed to pay to the complainant a

sum of Rs. 39,498/- with interest at the rate of 9% w.e.f. 09/08/1996 plus  costs of Rs. 15,000/-. 

2.         The Respondent/Complainant is a firm  of which Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 were partners.  Other Respondents are their legal representatives.    The Respondents have chosen not to contest the appeal though they were duly served, except Respondent No. 3(b).

3.         We have heard Shri. A.R. Kantak, the lr. advocate of the Appellants/OP Nos. 1, 2, 3 who has raised two issues, one of limitation and the other of jurisdiction which issues were also raised by OP Nos. 1, 2, 3 before the Lr. District Forum and which have been answered against the Appellants/OP Nos. 1, 2, 3. 

4.         We have referred to the appellants/OP Nos. 1, 2, 3, in singular.  The OP is a carrier/transporter, having its head office at Calcutta, their administrative office at New Delhi, area office at Panaji and branch office at Margao, and, were described by the complainant – firm as OP Nos. 1 to 4, respectively.  The complainant is a firm of which OP No. 2 Mahabaleshwar and OP No. 3 Anil were partners who have since expired.  The respondents are their legal representatives.

5.         The complainant-firm had ordered raincoats of the value of Rs. 1,39,331/- from OP No. 5 Bengal Water Proof Ltd., which were consigned through the OP.  The said consignment was booked at the office of the OP at Calcutta and was to be delivered at their office at Margao.  The complainant found that 27 pieces of raincoats were totally damaged and 147 pieces were found short and the OP through their office at Margao issued a certificate dated 9/08/06  to the complainant assessing the loss at Rs. 39,498/- so as to enable the complainant to lodge the claim.  This certificate issued by the OP at Margao stated that it was “subject to Calcutta jurisdiction.” 

6.         The complainant lodged their claim on 15/11/1996 to the Delhi office of the OP as per the instruction given by their Margao office claiming the said sum of Rs. 39,498/-.  First,  the OP took the plea by their letter dated 10/2/97 that the consignment was booked at “the owners risk”,  and,  the complainant pointed out by their reply dated 15/3/97 that the consignment was booked at “carrier’s risk”  and the OP had collected some amount towards carrier’s risk, and the same followed by the reminder dated 12/3/98 to settle the claim immediately.   The OP then took the plea by letter dated 27/3/98 that the complainant should settle the claim at 50% as the shortage was due to theft,  whereupon,  the complainant told the Delhi office of the OP that they were not ready to settle the same at 50% and sent a reminder on 03/10/1998 followed by advocate’s notice on 26/06/1999.  The complaint was filed on 16/03/2000. 

7.         As regards the issue of limitation, the Lr. District Forum  has come to the conclusion that the complaint was filed on 16/03/2000 i.e.  within two years from 27/3/1998 which is well within limitation under Section 24A of the C.P. Act, 1986.

8.         As regards this finding, Shri. Kantak, the lr. advocate of the OP  would refer to Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and would submit that the complaint was filed against the carrier for compensation for loss  of goods,  and,  therefore it had to be filed within three years from the date when the  loss or  injury to goods  occurred.  Lr. advocate would submit that the loss occurred in June 1996 and therefore the complaint had to be filed within three years therefrom and the complaint which was filed on 16/3/2000 was clearly time barred.  Lr. Adv. Shri. Kantak has placed reliance on National Insurance Complainant. Ltd., vs. Subhash Road Transport Company (LAWS MPH – 2011-9-101)  which is a decision of a single

Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court with reference to Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  Lr. advocate has also placed reliance on an unreported order of this Commission dated 18/2/13 in FA No. 43/12 filed by Manipal Finance Corporation Ltd.

9.         We are unable to accept the submission made by Shri Kantak.  Section 24A of the C.P. Act, 1986 which was introduced w.e.f. 18/6/1993 provides that a Forum shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from date on which the cause of action has arisen or sufficient cause for not filing the same is shown, within the said period.  Section 24A which now  deals with limitation  for filing of complaints is a special provision in a Special Act and as such would override the general provision  of article 10 dealing with suits  contained in the Limitation Act, 1963.  If any authority is required in support of this proposition,  then reference can be made to the decision of the Bombay High Court reported in 1992(2) GLT 286  which has been rendered relying on the decision reported in  AIR 1995 SC 2398.  Lr. adv. Shri Kantak has also placed reliance on Richard Raja Singh vs. Ford Motor Company, IV 2014 CPJ 509, as well as on Ambe Rice Mill, Kaithal vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., IV (2012) CPJ 343.

10.     We have perused the said decisions.  In the first case the period of two years was reckoned from the date the airbags were not deployed and in the second case from the date of theft of 37 rice bags.  In the case at hand, only at the time of delivery-date not known – that the complainant came to know about the damage and short supply and the claim lodged by the complainant was accepted by certificate dated 9.8.96 and then again reduced to 50% by letter dated 27.3.98 which was rejected by the complainant by letter dated 20/7/98 and  then  the  complaint  was   filed   within   two years, on

16/3/2000.  The complaint had to be filed within two years from the date of cause of action.  The expression “cause of action” is not defined either in the C.P. Act or the C.P. Code but it is always understood to mean a bundle of essential facts which is necessary for a plaintiff – or a complainant – to prove before she can succeed in the suit or a complaint.  In R.P. No. 15/13 filed by Vivek Gupta, by order dated 22/7/13 this Commission has held as follows:   

“12.       Section 11(2)(c) is  akin to-in pari  materia  the same -  as section 20 (c) of CPC, 1908,  but neither  the Consumer Protection Act nor the CPC or for that matter any other enactment defines the said expression.  However, by settled judicial pronouncements in this country, “ cause of action” has come to mean a  bundle of essential facts,  which it is necessary for the party seeking relief to prove if traversed by the OP, inorder to secure the relief prayed for. “Cause of action” has been held from the earliest times to mean every fact which  is material to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse.  Cause of action also means a bundle of essential facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit. Lord Esher in a well known case of Read vs. Brown  has defined the expression as:

“every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, inorder to support this right to the judgment of the court.  It does not comprise any  piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact but every fact which is necessary to be proved.”

In the words of Lord Waston the cause of action has no relation  to  the  defense set  up  by the defendant  and it refers

entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as cause of action,  or,  in other words, to the media, upon which the plaintiff  ask  the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. (see pages  368, 369 and 370 of Sarkar’s Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.)

11.     The first submission therefore needs to be rejected. 

12.     The submission of Shri. A.R. Kantak, the lr. advocate of the appellants on jurisdiction, is that the claim was made as per certificate issued to the complainant  dated 9/8/1996 and in the said certificate it was clearly indicated that it was “subject to Calcutta jurisdiction.”  Lr. advocate submits that the said certificate cannot be  accepted by the complainant in part but had to be accepted as whole and as such any complaint had to be filed at Calcutta.

13.     We are not impressed with the said submission. It is not the case of the Appellant that any part of the cause of action took place at Calcutta.  The consignment note also does not show that the consignment was accepted by the OP at Calcutta subject to Calcutta jurisdiction. Moreover, it appears that consignment was accepted by the OP at their head office at Calcutta to be delivered to the consignee i.e. to the complainant, through their office at Margao.  As already stated it is not the case of the OP that any part of cause of action took place within the jurisdiction of any Forum at Calcutta.  We fail to understand at to how the OP through their office at Margao could unilaterally impose a condition on the certificate that it was issued subject to Calcutta jurisdiction when no part of cause of action had taken place at Calcutta.  The said condition unilaterally printed  on  the  certificate  by  the  OP  through  their  Margao office was  certainly  not  binding on the complainant and the complainant

was entitled to file the complaint at Margao, as part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of South Goa District Forum.

14.     The last submission made by Shri. A.R. Kantak, is that the Lr. District Forum has directed the OP to pay interest at the rate of 9% from 09/08/1996.  Lr. advocate submits that it was no fault of the OP that the Lr. District Forum took 14 years to decide the complaint.

15.     It is rather unfortunate that the Lr. District Forum took 14 years to decide the complaint, a complaint which was required to be decided with 3/5 months.   We have brought this sorry state of affairs to the notice of the Government but nothing concrete has happened.  The question is whether the complainant should suffer because the Lr. District Forum has taken 14 years to decide this complaint?  Admittedly, the loss was caused to the complainant in June 1996 or thereabout.  It is the OP who has made use of the money which the OP was liable to pay to the complainant for all these years and therefore the OP was bound to pay reasonable compensation by way of interest on the said amount which has been ordered to be paid at the rate of 9% which is the current rate of interest. 

16.     We can find no fault with the impugned order on any score.  We find that there is no merit in this appeal and consequently the same is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs. 5000/-.