There is a delay of 334 days in filing this revision petition. The counsel for the petitioner has filed an application for condonation of delay. The delay is explained in para No. 1 and 2 of the said application, which are reproduced as here-under: -2- “ 1. That the petitioner is an illiterate widow lady and residing alone in Bhiwani and she has no knowledge of the impugned order dated 19.10.2011 passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Panchkula, Haryana and even the Advocate who was engaged by the petitioner to represent her before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum had not appeared while passing the impugned order dated 19.10.2011. The Petitioner even had not received any copy of the impugned order dated 19.10.2011 if any sent by the Hon’ble State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Panchkula, Haryana. 2. That since neither the counsel of petitioner nor the petitioner had received the copy of the impugned order dated 19.10.2011, and the petitioner herself only came to know about the impugned order dated 19.10.2011 passed by the State Commission, Panchkula, when the execution proceedings were started by the respondents, then the petitioner immediately engaged a new counsel and the new counsel on 20.11.2012 made an application for taking certified copy of the order dated 19.10.2011.” The affidavits of Advocates mentioned in para No. 1 and 2 did not see the light of the day. Counsel for the petition further submits that the petitioner is a widow and helpless lady and wife of an ex-serviceman. 2. This is well settled that a wrong committed by an agent is the wrong of the litigant itself. This is the duty of the litigant to post herself -3- on the day to day hearings. The C.P. Act is a special Act, which prescribe its own period of limitation. The Commission cannot take excessive liberal view of Section-5 so as to erase the Section itself. Some sufficient cause has to be shown. This case finds support from the following authorities: “(i) In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”. (ii) In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ‘sufficient cause’ is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ‘sufficient cause’ is -4- shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.” (iii) In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held: “The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]” (iv) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held that: “Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay.” -5- 3. Let us now, advert to the merits of this case, the case of the petitioner is very weak. The State Commission has concluded that the petitioner is not the ‘Consumer’ as per Section-2 (1) (d) of the C.P. Act. This is an admitted fact that the husband of the petitioner was the consumer. The husband has since expired but the petitioner did not move any application for transfer of the registered electric connection into her name. It was her duty to do it immediately. No case. Dismissed. |