1. The present IA/6495/2020 in RP/989/2020 has been filed for condonation of delay in filing the Revision Petition. Both sides were heard on 31.07.2023 and orders were reserved.

2. Petitioner(s) have stated following grounds/reasons for the delay :

1. The delay of 1033 days can be divided into two distinct periods. The first period spans from 06.07.2018 (the date of receipt of the order on 07.04.2018, marking the end of the 90-day period) to 15.03.2020. It is essential to note that this period occurred before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, as clarified in the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.A. No. 665/2021. The duration of this period amounts to 616 days. The delay within this period can be attributed to specific circumstances. Initially, the Petitioner had instructed their former counsel to initiate the filing of the Revision Petition before the Hon'ble National Commission. However, in compliance with the orders of the State Commission (vide FAIA No. 1120/2013 dated 16.06.2014), the Petitioner undertook repair works and engaged technical experts, namely R.J. Tech Services, to address the pending tasks. This engagement culminated in the successful completion of all repair works, attested by the satisfaction of all flat owners.

2. Despite the completion of these works and the belief that the matter was effectively resolved, a notable development arose. While the impugned order was pronounced on 07.03.2018, the filing of E.A. No. 46/2019 occurred in 2019, a year after the order's pronouncement. The Petitioner's earlier counsel endeavored to persuade the complainant to desist from pursuing E.A. No. 46/2019 in C.C. No. 132 of 2013 before the District Commission, Ranga Reddy. The pending proceedings of this matter were set to resume on 02.02.2022. It is pertinent to highlight that the Respondent Complainant's representatives engaged in negotiations with the Petitioner and their former counsel, leading to the belief that a resolution could be reached. This sense of optimism stemmed from the anticipation that the completion of repair works would lead to a withdrawal of E.A. No. 46/2019. However, the Respondent Complainant's position shifted unexpectedly due to changes in leadership, and their intentions were made evident. In light of these circumstances, the delay of 616 days during the first period was not intentional or wilful. Instead, it resulted from genuine efforts to address pending works, negotiations, and unforeseen developments.

3. The subsequent period covers the remaining 417 days, commencing from 15.03.2020 onwards, when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged and significantly impacted all aspects of human life. Notably, the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in miscellaneous application No.665/2021 in SMW (C) No.3/2020 on 23.09.2021 rendered that "the period from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021 shall stand excluded in computing the period of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits, and termination of proceedings within which a court or tribunal can condone delay." Considering these circumstances, the present Revision Petition was filed on 10.11.2020. The 417-day period falling under the second category is excluded from the period of limitation as per the aforementioned judgment, thereby enabling the condonation of the delay, especially in light of constraints posed by COVID-19 and operational challenges in the office.

4. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble National Commission has demonstrated a liberal approach in condoning delays, as evidenced by the condonation of a delay of 645 days in filing an Appeal (F.A.NO.465/2019 dated 24.05.2019), coupled with the provision of costs to the Respondent / Complainant. This approach emphasizes the consideration of merits and the justness of the case when determining the quantum of delay.

3. Heard counsels of both sides.  Contentions/pleas of the parties, on various issues raised in the RP, Written Arguments, and Oral Arguments advanced during the hearing, are summed up below.

1. The counsel for the petitioner argues that the impugned order was dispatched from the office of the State Commission on 07.04.2018. It is established through precedent that the limitation period for filing a Revision Petition is 90 days, as no specific limitation period is prescribed in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Accordingly, the 90-day period concluded on 06.07.2018. However, the present Revision Petition was filed on 10.11.2020, resulting in a delay of 616 days for the period unaffected by COVID-19, from 06.07.2018 to 15.03.2020. The subsequent period from 16.03.2020 to 10.11.2020, encompassing 417 days, has already been excluded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as highlighted in Miscellaneous Application No. 665/2021 dated 08.03.2021. Therefore, although the total delay in filing the Revision Petition is 1033 days, the deduction of the COVID-19 affected period of 417 days, as approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, necessitates the condonation of the remaining delay of 616 days.

2. That the delay is neither intentional nor wilful. The Petitioners and their counsel made genuine efforts to persuade the complainants to withdraw the execution Application. The Revision Petitioners were led to believe that the matter would be amicably resolved, but the complainants' stance changed due to alterations in the governing body. Subsequently, the Petitioners filed the present Revision Petition seeking the setting aside of the impugned order. In parallel, the merits of the case support the dismissal of the complaint. The delay can be condoned on compensatory grounds, in line with the precedent set by this Hon'ble Commission in cases like Roopal Sagi Vs. TSR Gupta (F.A. No.465/2019), where a delay of 645 days was condoned by awarding compensatory costs of Rs.25,000/- to the Respondent /Complainant. The present case, similarly strong in its merits, warrants the condonation of delay through compensatory costs.

3. Furthermore, a series of judgments by the Hon'ble Supreme Court affirm that the discretion to condone delay rests with the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not stipulate that such discretion can be exercised only within certain limits. The length of the delay is not the primary concern; the acceptability of the explanation and the merits of the case determine the criteria for condonation. Past instances demonstrate that even delays of up to 789 days have been condoned, emphasizing that once the delay is condoned, no prejudice shall be caused to either party, allowing the case to be adjudicated on its merits. OP relies on various judgements:-

1. 2015 AIR (SC) 2070 - Central Bank of India Vs. Jagbir Singh

2. 1998 (7) SCC 123 - N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishna Murthy

3. 2015 AIR (HYD) 203 - Maji Somulu Vs. Maji Nagaraju

4. 2009 (9) SCC 94 - State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh

5. 1996 AIR (SC) 2750 - Special Tahsildar Vs. K.V. Ayisumma

6. 1996 AIR (SC) 1623 - State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani

(g) F.A. No.465/2019 - Roopal Sagi Vs. TSR Gupta of the Hon'ble National Commission

4. The counsel for the Respondent/Complainant argues that the Petitioners/OPs initiated this court action after an intentional delay of 1033 days, without providing any coherent explanation or plausible reason. The illogical argument put forward by the OPs to condone this delay, citing the prevailing pandemic as a force majeure situation, is perplexing considering that there was already a substantial time gap of over 2 years between the order's date and the pandemic's onset. That the corona pandemic commenced in 2020. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, through its order dated 10.01.2022 in suo moto Writ Petition (C) no. 03 of 2020, declared the pandemic period as spanning from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for the purpose of calculating limitation periods for filing petitions. This order was subsequently adhered to by this Hon'ble National Commission through 'office order no. 07 of 2022 dated 14.01.2022. It is noteworthy that even prior to the global emergence of the pandemic, the OPs had intentionally delayed filing the present Revision Petition for more than 2 years. Retroactively applying the pandemic period to condone this delay would indeed amount to a grave miscarriage of justice. Thus, this IA for condonation of delay warrants rejection and dismissal with associated costs.

5. That the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, underscored the significance of statutes of limitation for public policy. The court emphasized that the expiration of the limitation period affords the decree-holder the right to regard the decree as binding, and that such statutes exist to ensure both private justice and the curbing of fraud and perjury. The court further accentuated that the discretion to condone delay should be exercised in pursuit of substantial justice and should not undermine the principle that laws of limitation are grounded in public policy. The delay of 1033 days by the OP in filing the instant Revision Petition conspicuously portrays negligence, inaction, and a lack of good faith, rendering it ineligible for condonation.

6. Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court's observation in Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, accentuates the role of statutes of limitation as "statutes of peace" and mechanisms for ensuring private justice, deterring fraud and perjury, and averting oppression. The court also emphasized that delay contradicts equity, and that courts provide assistance to those who are vigilant and proactive in asserting their rights. In this context, the OP’s evident inaction and negligence in approaching this court underscores a deficiency in vigilance, thus warranting that the delay should not be condoned. In Maji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao Versus Reddy Sridevi & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 7696 of 2021, the Supreme Court upheld the principles discussed above, rejecting the condonation of a delay of 1011 days in filing a second appeal.

4. According to the petitioner's assertion, the initial phase of delay spanning from 06.07.2018 to 15.03.2020 corresponds to a total of 616 days (comes to 618 days). The subsequent period, starting from 15.03.2020 and extending to 10.11.2020 (D/o filing RP), encompasses 240 days, although the petitioner contends that it encompasses 417 days [resulting in a cumulative total of approximately 1033 days (616+417)]. However, based on the records maintained by the registry, the overall delay is recorded as 857 days. Excluding period covered under Covid pandemic i.e. from 15.03.2020 to 10.11.2020, we are of the view that total delay, which is to be considered for condonation is from 06.07.2018 to 14.03.2020 i.e. 617 days delay

5. We have carefully gone through the facts & circumstances of the case, grounds/reasons for condonation stated in IA 6495/2020 and rival contentions of the parties. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, after taking note of various authorities/earlier judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, culled out broad principles for considering the condonation of delay applications and also added few more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. These are reproduced below:-

“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle

cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual

xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: -

a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

6. In Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr.  [(2012) 3 SCC 563], Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of condoning the delay on the part of office of the Chief Post master General, observed

• 12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

                   Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.”

7. In Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321], Hon’ble Supreme Court observed,

• 25. Much later, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy this court referred to a large number of previous judgments, and observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Other decisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula to judge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and the exercise is necessarily fact specific; in Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh, the court held:

“16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.”

26. The court also emphasized that each case has to be balanced on the basis of its facts and the surrounding circumstances in which the parties act and behave.”

8. In the light of principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases cited above, we have carefully gone through various reasons for delay/grounds for condonation of delay from 06.07.2018 to 14.03.2020 i.e. 617 days stated in the IA 6495/2020 as well as those raised during the oral hearing, but do not find the same convincing. Thus the IA for condonation of delay warrants rejection

9. For the reasons stated hereinabove, and after giving a thoughtful consideration to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, various pleas raised by the learned Counsel for the Parties, the IA 6495 of 2020 is dismissed.

In view of dismissal of the application for condonation of delay filed vide IA/6495/2020 in RP 989 of 2020, the RP 989 of 2020 is hereby dismissed on grounds of having been filed beyond the limitation period.