By this order we propose to dispose above referred five appeals filed by the appellant Punjab Conware Container Freight Station involving similar question of law and fact. 2. Briefly stated facts relevant for the disposal of the appeals are that M/s Rajpal Enterprises & Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., M/s Glenmark Pharmaceuticals & Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., M/s Cipla Ltd. & Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., M/s Global Influence & Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., & M/s. M J Bipharma and Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. filed separate appeals before the State Commission concerned with similar allegations. As per the allegations in the respective complaints, the above noted complainants had imported goods relating to their business. The cargo was shipped by the respective overseas suppliers to all the complainants who had taken marine insurance policy pertaining to the goods imported from respondent no.2 insurance company. 3. On arrival of their respective cargo, the above noted complainants ( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) had entrusted the imported cargo into the charge, care and custody of the appellant opposite party which was accepted by the appellant as custodian of the custom authorities under section 45 of the Customs Act. While the imported consignments were stored in the appellant’s customs bonded warehouse pending completion of custom authorities, due to out-break of fire, the imported consignments were totally damaged. 4. The above noted complainants ( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) filed insurance claims under the marine insurance policy issued by respondent no.2 insurance company. Respondent no.2 insurance company appointed surveyors and on the basis of survey reports, the insurance claims of respective complainants were settled. The complainants issued subrogation letters in favour of the insurance company. 5. It is further the case of the respective complainants that they lodged monetary claim on the appellant on the ground of loss of marine consignments while in the custody of the appellant. The appellant, however, failed to indemnify the complainants for the loss of goods. This led to the filing of joint complaints by the respective complainants ( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) being CC/11/179, CC/11/180, CC/11/181, CC/11/182 & CC/11/183. 6. The appellant/opposite party on being served with the notice resisted the complaint by filing written statement wherein the pleas on merits were denied. The appellant also took the preliminary objection that the complaint was not maintainable as the complainants do not fall within the definition of consumer as envisaged under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 7. The State Commission, Maharashtra vide impugned orders partly allowed the complaints and directed the appellant to pay to the complainant No.2 M/s Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. the amount they had paid to respective complainants in settlement of their insurance claims. 8. Being aggrieved of the orders of the State Commission the appellant preferred the above-noted appeals. 9. Apart from the other pleas learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the impugned order of the State Commission is without jurisdiction because the State Commission has failed to appreciate that the respondents/complainants are not the consumers as envisaged under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act. Expanding on the argument learned counsel for the appellant has contended that going by the allegations in the complaints it is obvious that the appellant had no privity of contract with respondent No.2 insurance company. So far as the complainants ( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) are concerned, they had admittedly availed of services of the appellant/opposite party in relation to the cargo imported by them for commercial purpose. Therefore, the services of the appellant having been availed for commercial purpose, the complainant No.1 cannot be termed as a consumer and as such he could not have maintained the consumer complaint. It is argued that so far as the insurance company is concerned it has joined the consumer complaint in the capacity of a subrogatee who under law steps into the shoe of the person who has subrogated rights in favour of the insurance company and as such the status of insurance company cannot be better than the complainant No.1. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents/complainants on the contrary has argued in support of the impugned order. It is submitted that from the record it is obvious that the subject imported goods were kept in the custody of the appellant as a bailee till the clearance of the imported cargo by the Custom authorities. Therefore, it cannot be said that the goods in question were kept there for commercial purpose or the services of the appellant were hired or availed for commercial purpose. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the Co-Ordinate Bench of this Commission in the matter of M/s Harsolia Motors vs. M/s National Insurance Co. Ltd. (1)/2005 CPJ (NC) and the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Economic Transport Organization vs. Charan Shipping Mills Pvt. Ltd. &Anr. (2010) 4 SCC 114. 11. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the record. It is not in dispute that the respective complainants ( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) pertaining to the above noted appeals are the companies engaged in commercial activities. It was also not in dispute that the cargoes imported by the aforesaid respondents/complainants were in relation to their commercial activities. It was also not in dispute that the aforesaid cargoes were kept in the warehouse of the appellant pending completion of formalities for release of cargoes by the custom authorities and the said cargoes got destroyed because of breakout of fire in the warehouse of the appellant. From the aforesaid circumstances it is clear that the service of the opposite party/appellant was availed by the complainants ( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) in relation to commercial purpose i.e. keeping the goods in warehouse till the clearance. Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act defines the term “consumer qua a service provider as a person who hires or avails of any services for consideration whether paid or promised to be paid but it does not include a person who avails of services for any commercial purpose. In view of the discuss above, it is clear that complainant/respondent No.1 of the respective appeals had availed of services of the appellant for storing the goods imported by them for their units which obviously was for commercial purpose. Therefore, in our considered opinion the exception to definition of ‘consumer’ carved out in Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act comes into play, in view of which the respondent No.1/complainants cannot be termed as consumer. That being the case, the said respondents could not have maintained the consumer complaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 12. So far as respondent No.2 insurance company is concerned, admittedly insurance company is a subrogatee of the respondent No.1/complainants who had entered into the service contract pertaining to storage of the goods in the warehouse of the appellant. The respondent No.2 being a subrogatee steps into the shoe of the subrogater and therefore he would have only those rights which are available to the subrogater as per law. As already observed that complainant ( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) are not the consumers qua the appellant because they had availed of services of the appellant for commercial purpose, respondent no.2 being the subrogatee also cannot be termed as consumer. As such, could not have maintained the consumer complaints. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the Co-Ordinate Bench of this Commission in the matter of Harsolia Motors (supra). In our considered opinion, the said judgment is of no avail to the respondents because admittedly insurance claims of the respondent No1/complainants have already been settled and the subject complaints have been filed on the allegations of deficiency in service on the part of the appellant in respect of contract between the appellant and respondent No.1/complainants. 14. The respondent also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Economic Transport Organization (supra). The aforesaid judgment is also of no avail to the respondents for the reason that the judgment has been passed in civil appeal No.561/1999. At the relevant time, exception regarding commercial purpose was not there in the definition of consumer qua a person who hires or avails of service for consideration. The exception was incorporated in Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 on 15.03.2003. As the judgment of the supreme court in Economic Transport Organization ( supra) relates to pre amendment period, it is not applicable to the facts of the case because admittedly in the instant cases services of the appellant were hired or availed by the complainant (( respondent no.1 in respective appeals) after the amendment of the definition of term ‘consumer’. 15. In view of the discussion above, it is clear that the Fora below has passed the impugned orders against the appellant ignoring the fact that respondents/complainant No.1 in respective complaints were not even consumers and since the respondents/complainant No.1 were not the consumers as envisaged under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act as such they had no locus standi to maintain the consumer complains. Thus, in our view the Fora below has exceeded its jurisdiction in dealing with the consumer complaint. The impugned orders, therefore, cannot be sustained. 16. In view of the discussion above, we allow the appeals and set aside the impugned orders with the observation that this order will not come in the way of the respondents No.1/complainants to avail of their legal remedy by approaching the appropriate Fora having jurisdiction. | 
