1.      This appeal has been filed by the appellant, Sri Rabindra Nath against the order dated 20.01.2017 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, West Bengal, (in short ‘the State Commission’) passed in complaint case No.265 of 2016.

2.      Brief facts of the case are that appellant/complainant is a contractor with the Indian Railways and had a cash credit account with the opposite party/respondent, UCO Bank.  It is the case of the complainant that due to embargo on the payments by the Indian Railways, the payments of the complainant were not released in time by the Railways and therefore, complainant could not repay the loan existing on the complainant.  The opposite party bank then wrote to the Indian Railways that whatever payments are due to the complainant as contractor, the same may be credited to his loan account with the bank.  The complainant has alleged that even after lifting of the embargo, the Railways did not pay anything either to the complainant or to the bank.  Thus, the complainant suffered irreparable loss.  Moreover, the opposite party bank refused to pay a cheque issued by the complainant for Rs.2,34,000/- by endorsing on it “account closed”.  This was not factually correct and the payee filed a complaint under Negotiable Instruments Act, in the competent court where the complainant had to go to jail for not been able to deposit Rs.3,00,000/- as ordered by the court.  Later, the bank has clarified before the court that the account was not closed, rather, its operation was only stopped and the complaint against the appellant was dismissed by the competent court.  However, due to this deficiency and wrong endorsement of the bank, the complainant had to suffer jail term and mental agony for which the complaint was filed before the State Commission. 

3.      The opposite party remained ex-parte before the State Commission.  However, the State Commission vide its order dated 20.01.2017 dismissed the complaint being barred by limitation as well as on merits.

4.      Hence the revision petition.

5.      Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

6.      The learned counsel for the appellant stated that the complaint was not barred by limitation because the competent court dismissed the complaint lodged by the payee of the cheque only on 30.11.2015 and the complaint was filed on 15.06.2016.  Thus, the complaint has been filed within period of two years from the date of cause of action, which only arose when the appellant was discharged from the criminal case.  He could not have filed the complaint before that otherwise on one side he would have been facing a criminal liability and on the other, he would be asking for his civil remedy which would have been against the law. Hence, the order of the State Commission is prima facie wrong so far as it relates to the point of limitation.

7.      Coming to the merits, the learned counsel pointed out that the complainant is a consumer.  The opposite party bank was duty bound to clear the cheque issued by the complainant.  However, the cheque was refused by endorsing a wrong fact. The bank actually endorsed “account closed”, whereas, later on, it has been clarified by the bank officials in the court that only the operation of the account was closed.  Learned counsel drew the attention to the following portion of the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s order dated 30.11.2015:-

“It is a common practice of the banks to usually tick mark the actual remark at the relevant column of a Return Memo for showing the reason for dishonor of a cheque.  But in the given case, a perusal of Exhibit 2 being the Return Memo dated 02.02.2007 reveals that the words “Accounts Closed” have been hand written at serial no.21 and no tick mark has been put there whatsoever.  This Court is compelled to look at the Return Memo being exhibit 2 with great suspicion as the account of the accused appears to be only dormant and DSW being the concerned bank official, has unequivocally stated that the account of the accused is not closed.  Thus, in view of the same, I do not find it cogent to rely on Exhibit 2. In any case, the Accused does not seem to have any liability to be discharged in favour of the complainant.  As such I find that complainant’s case fails miserably on all accounts.”

8.  Based on the above observation of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the learned counsel stated that the appellant has been acquitted and the deficiency on the part of the bank is clearly proved.  The learned counsel thus, submitted that the complaint was well within time and it also deserves acceptance on merits.

9.      I have given a thoughtful consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and have examined the material on record.  Coming to the first point of limitation, it is the settled principle that the limitation is to be counted from the cause of action and in the present case the cause of action actually arose when the cheque was dishonoured by the bank.  It is not material on what grounds the cheque was dishonoured.  As the complainant must have known that his account was not closed, the complainant should have raised this issue with the opposite party bank itself and if he was not satisfied, he should have filed the consumer complaint.  The case filed under the Negotiable Instruments Act was proceeding in a criminal court and it could have bearing on the consumer complaint case only to the effect that the deficiency on the part of the bank could have been established.  So far as limitation is concerned, this decision of the CJM does not benefit the complainant in any way.  Obviously, the complainant was aggrieved when the cheque was dishonoured and he could have filed a complaint within two years from the date of dishonouring of the cheque.  The complaint has been filed beyond that period.  The State Commission has rightly concluded that the complaint was barred by limitation. Thus, I agree with the finding arrived at by the State Commission on the point of limitation.

10.    Once the finding of the State Commission regarding complaint being barred by limitation is confirmed, there is no point in going into the merits or other issues raised in the complaint.  Accordingly, I find that the appeal No.382 of 2017 has no force and is liable to be dismissed. 

11.    Consequently, the First Appeal No.382 of 2017 is dismissed in limine.