JUDGMENT

JUSTICE V.K.JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER (ORAL)

          This revision petition is directed against the order of the State Commission dated 27.03.2014, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioners against the order of the District Forum dated 09.05.2011 was dismissed.  The District Forum had, by its order, directed the petitioner no. 2, Superintendent of Post Office to pay a sum of Rs. 27,909/-  to the complainant towards LTC bill alongwith compensation amounting to Rs. 3,000/- and costs of litigation amounting to Rs. 1,500/-.

2.      Since there is a delay in filing the revision petition, I.A. No. 7337/2014 has been filed, seeking the condonation of delay in filing the revision petition.  The application to the extent it is relevant, reads as under:-

“2.       That immediately the counsel for appellant was approached to get issue the certified copy of judgment so that the matter should be proceeded further and the said counsel was also requested vide letter dated 09.06.2014 and through other letters for the certified copy of the judgment.

3.        That it is also necessary to point out here that no communication or copy of judgment was sent by the Commission in view of sub section 10 of section 4 of the U.P. Rules 1987.  The another counsel has been requested to get issued the copy and who applied for the same on 19.09.2014 and keeping in view the aforesaid fact, there is no delay in filing of present revision.

4.        That in the light of law settled on the point of limitation and the commencement of period of limitation, there is no delay in filing the present revision but since the revisionists are law abiding persons and therefore the present application is being moved detailing the facts and reasons.”

3.      A perusal of the reply filed by the complainant to the application would show that the complainant delivered a copy of the order of the State Commission in the office of the petitioner on 21.04.2014.  It is an admitted case that the aforesaid photocopy of the judgment was received by the petitioner no. 2 on 21.04.2014.  The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the period of limitation would not commence either form the date of the order or from the date, on which its photocopy was delivered in the office of the petitioner, but would commence only from the date, on which certified copy of the order was issued by the State Commission to the petitioner.  This, according to the learned counsel, was done on 19.09.2014.

4.      The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Housing Board, Haryana vs. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 92.   In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the order by the District Forum came to be pronounced on 22.10.1992.  It was, however, not signed on that date, as the President had proceeded on leave soon after the pronouncement.  On inquiry, the learned counsel for the appellant board was told by the Stenographer of the Court that the order would be dictated and typed after the return of the President and the copies of the order would be available to the parties only on 30.10.1992.  The copy was in fact made available only on 03.11.1992.  It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the period of limitation for the purpose of filing the appeal would commence on the date on which the copies of the order were ready and were made available i.e. 30.10.1992 and since the appeal before the State Commission had been filed on 30.11.1992, it was well within limitation, 29.11.1992 being a Sunday.  During the course of the judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court, inter-alia, observed and held as under:-

“11.  From the scheme of the Act it becomes apparent that the Consumer Protection  Act 1986  has  been  enacted  with          the object to  provide for better protection of the interest of the consumers, as a measure for economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of          their disputes and matters connected therewith.  It  is with this object in view that Rule 4 (10) has also  been made.  It provides  for communication  of the order of the district Forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the burden  of expenses      that may be incurred for obtaining the certified  copy.  If the rule  itself enjoins a duty for communicating the  order of  the District  Forum duly signed and dated  to the  parties free of charge, there will hardly be an occasion for  the parties  to make an application for obtaining a  certified copy thereof. Thus, Section 15 of the Act cannot  be read  in isolation  but it  has     to  be          read alongwith Rules 4 (10)  and  8 (3)  of  the  Rules  and  a combined reading  of  Section  15 and  the  Rules  reproduced above gives  an impression that the purpose, object and intention of  these statutory  provisions is  to protect the interest of  the parties before the District Forum by making it obligatory on the District Forum to provide a copy of the order duly  signed and dated by the members of the Bench and the period  of limitation  prescribed  with  regard  to the filing of an appeal shall be computed as commencing from the date of          communication of  the order in the manner laid down

in sub-rule (10) of Rule 4.

12.   In the  facts and circumstances stated above. The date of pronouncement of the  order in  the open Court by itself cannot be  the starting  point of  determining the period of limitation under  Section 15  of the  Act. It has also to be shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was duly signed and dated    by the members of the District Forum constituting the  Bench and the same was communicated to the parties free of charge. That  being so,  it has  to be appreciated that mere pronouncement  of an order in the open Court will not be enough but under the scheme of the Rules a copy of the said  order has  also to be communicated to the parties    affected  by  the  said order so  that  the  party adversely affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of knowing  that text, reasons and  contents thereof so  as to  formulate grounds  of attack  before the appellant  or higher forums.   In the absence of such communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order  so as  to challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or the higher Forums.”

5.      The aforesaid decision is clearly inapplicable to the present case since, a duly signed and dated copy of the order of the State Commission was made available to the complainant and a photocopy of the order was duly served by him in the office of petitioner no. 2 on 21.04.2014.  On receiving the photocopy of the duly signed and dated order on 21.04.2014, the petitioner came to know not only the operative part of the order, but also the reasons given by the State Commission in support of the order passed by it.  Nothing thereafter prevented the petitioner from challenging the order passed by the State Commission on 27.03.2014.  Computing from 21.04.2014, the prescribed period of limitation expired some time in July, 2014 and therefore there is a delay of 81 days in filing the revision petition.  The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singam Shetty  Attendrooloo & Ors. vs. State of T. N. & Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 700.  We have carefully examined the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners.  It does not contain any such legal proposition which would be of any help to the petitioners.

6.      The next question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the petitioners have explained the delay of 81 days in filing the revision petition.  On a perusal of application seeking condonation of delay, we find that there is not even a sincere attempt to explain the delay in filing the revision petition.  The only ground taken in this regard is that “in between correspondence was going on between petitioner no. 2 and Higher Authorities”.  No particulars in this regard having been given in the application, we are not at all satisfied with the aforesaid reason.  The petitioners in our view should have given cogent and convincing explanation for the delay which was caused after the period of limitation computed from 21.04.2014 had expired.

7.      The Apex Court in Gurgaon Gramin Bank Vs. Khazani and Another, IV (2012) CPJ 5(SC), interalia observed as under:-

“2.       Number of litigations in our country is on the rise, for small and trivial matters, people and sometimes Central and State Governments and their instrumentalities Banks, nationalized or private, come to courts may be due to ego clash or to save the Officers’ skin.  Judicial system is over-burdened, naturally causes delay in adjudication of disputes.  Mediation centers opened in various parts of our country have, to some extent, eased the burden of the courts but we are still in the tunnel and the light is far away.  On more than one occasion, this court has reminded the Central Government, State Governments and other instrumentalities as well as to the various banking institutions to take earnest efforts to resolve the disputes at their end.  At times, some give and take attitude should be adopted or both will sink.”

8.       Considering the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay and also taking into consideration that the amount involved in this case is a small amount, we are not inclined to condone the delay in filing the revision petition.  The application seeking condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed.  Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed, as barred by limitation.  However, the question of law raised in the revision petition is kept open and dismissal of the revision petition on account of its being barred by limitation shall not come in the way of the petitioner raising the same in some other petition.