REKHA GUPTA, PRESIDING MEMBER

                Revision Petition no. 1677 of 2016 has been filed has against the judgment dated 30.09.2015 of the Bihar State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Patna, (‘the State Commission’) in First Appeal no. 591 of 2010.

2.     The facts of the case as per the respondent/ complainant are that the respondent had taken an Insurance Policy ‘Gram Santosh’ of Gram Jeevan Bima Policy’ and the first yearly instalment was deposited on 22.09.2004 for which the Post Master Baheri, Post Office issued receipt no. 276 dated 22.09.2004. In the said policy the applicant was made the nominee being the wife. Thereafter due to serious injury in the head of the husband of the applicant - Manoj Kumar, he unfortunately died. After the death of respondent’s husband, the respondent in the capacity of nominee filed her claim before the petitioner no. 4/ opposite party no. 4 along with all the relevant documents so that the respondent may get all the benefits but the aforesaid petitioner no. 3/ OP no. 3 gave Memo No. RPLI 05-06 dated DB 17.08.2005 and informed the respondent that the claim had been rejected by the petitioner no.2 / OP no. 2 and ordered that the amount of Rs.5910/- deposited by her husband may be returned. The ground given was that the proposal was accepted after the death of Manoj Kumar. The respondent again reiterated that the proposal of Santosh Kumar was filed on 15.09.2004 the proposal of the husband of the respondent was accepted after 90 days on 20.12.2004. After rejection of the claim, the respondent visited the petitioner no. 3 and 4 many times but to no avail. It was informed that as per their rules the insurance was only effective from the date of acceptance and not from the date of payment of premium. Hence, petitioner nos. 2 to 4 had rejected the claim of the respondent and ordered return of the instalment amount of Rs.5910/-. It was alleged that in this manner the petitioner had committed deficiency in service. The respondent then had a legal notice dated 01.10.2005 issued through her advocate, which was not replied to by the petitioners. Aggrieved with the conduct of the petitioners the respondent filed the complaint with the prayer that the petitioners be directed to pay Rs.10,000/- of the insurance amount with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of death of deceased along with Rs.50,000/- for mental agony and for legal expenses of Rs.5,000/-.

3.     The petitioners/ opposite parties have also submitted their written statement mentioning therein that the respondent has no cause of action. She was not entitled for the insurance. The proposal made by the husband of the respondent under the provisions of RPLI required a medical examination. The proposer has to appear for the medical examination and the same was fixed for 13.10.2004. The proposal was thereafter accepted on 20.12.2004 but the husband of the respondent meanwhile died on 30.11.2004, and therefore, his claim was rejected because there was no valid contract and the amount of Rs.5910/- which was deposited as the first premium was returned to the respondent.

4.     While allowing the complaint, the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Darbhanga (‘the District Forum’) vide order dated 06.10.2010 observed as under:

“Heard the arguments of the parties and perused the record and it is clear from the annexure I filed by the complainant is proved that her husband had taken the post office insurance policy which was accepted vide annexure IA and sent policy bond. The learned counsel for the opposite party has also submitted that in the present case rule does not apply because the payment was made by cash and bond was issued and the insurance is liable for the risk covers from the date of payment, not only this in case of sending the cheque and draft the risks starts from the date of dispatch. In this manner the forum reached to the conclusion that the claim of the complainant is perfect and she is entitled to get the insurance amount and she is entitled for the correct claim because after issuance the legal notice she has not received any reply and she had filed the case in constrained circumstances, there she is entitled for the mental agony and expenses for filing the claim.

Therefore, on the basis of the aforesaid facts and circumstances the forum hereby directs the opposite party to pay the insurance amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to the complainant within a period of 45 days and to pay interest @ 7% per annum from the  date of the death of the complainant and Rs.5,000/- for mental agony and litigation expenses of Rs.1,000/-. Otherwise the complainant shall be entitled for payment of interest @ 7% per annum till the date of payment on the above said amounts. By the aforesaid order the claim is allowed”.

5.     Aggrieved by the order of the District Forum, the petitioner/ opposite party filed an appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission while upholding the order of the District Forum and dismissing the appeal observed as under:

“Taking into consideration the facts of the present case in its entirety and the finding of the District Forum as also on consideration of the notification dated 15.03.1995 clause 16 which is related to payment of First premium, it has been mentioned therein, that the risk is not covered until the policy is accepted by the Post Master General or its authorised authority and in spite of deposits of first premium amount, no claim is payable until the proposal is accepted by the Department. But the paragraph 18 of the said notification, which explains in respect of beginning of coverage of risk, it has been mentioned therein that ‘the risk of life of the proposer begins from the date of the policy is accepted or the First premium amount is paid in total, whichever is later. So in view of the above-mentioned clause 18 of the said notification dated 15.03.2015 filed on behalf of the appellant post office, we are of the opinion that since it is admitted fact that the deceased Manoj Kumar had paid full first premium amount in cash to the appellant post office on 22.09.2004 and died on 30.11.2004 at Patna Medical College, Patna due to head injury in accident, the First Premium amount paid to the proposer before death, is treated to be the last as the policy was accepted after the death makes no sense. As such the policy is valid as per the clause 18 laid down under ‘beginning of the risk’ in the said notification dated 15.03.1995 Gazette Part 1, Government of India, Postal Department. Moreover, in absence of any time period limited for accepting of the policy of a proposer by the appellant post office, which cannot be indefinite, we find that there was delay on part of the appellant in accepting the proposal, which amounts to deficiency in service and as such the complainant/ respondent as nominee in the said policy of the deceased Manoj Kumar is entitled to get the insurance claim under the policy.

In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not find any error or infirmity in the order passed by the District Forum, which stands confirmed. The appeal fails to succeed.

In result the order of the District Forum is upheld and the appeal stands dismissed”.

6.     Hence, the present revision petition.

7.     The revision petition has been filed with an application for condonation of delay. As per the report of the petitioner there is a delay of 82 days but as per the report of the Registry, there is a delay of 134 days. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also gone through the application for condonation of delay. The reasons given in the application for condonation of delay are as under:

“2.    It is submitted that the copy of the impugned order dated 30.09.2015 was made available to the petitioner only on 03.12.2015 along with the opinion of Central Government Counsel Advocate Sudhir Kumar Tiwary. The revision petition was to be filed within 90 days from the date of available of order impugned, hence, the time for filing the petitioner was up to 03.03.2016.

3.     It is submitted that thereafter the petitioner contacted the Government Counsel to prepare the appeal to be filed before this Hon’ble Court which took little time and hence, the present appeal is being filed now which is delayed by 82 days as the petitioner has to obtain permission from the Department and also to get appointed the Counsel from the penal of the Government, it took time and thus could not be filed within the statutory period”.

8.     It is seen from the application that absolutely no reasons have been given to explain the day to day delay of 134 days. Learned counsel for the petitioner also could not give any reasons except for ‘administrative delay’. Hence, the petitioner has failed to give sufficient cause to condone the delay of 134 days. We also agree with the State Commission that the there was a grave deficiency on the part of the petitioner in so far as their rules have failed to prescribe any time limit to accept the policy of the proposer. Admittedly, in the instant case, we find that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner to accept the proposal. The proposal/ premium was taken on 22.09.2004 and as per the petitioner, the proposal was only accepted on 20.12.2004, this tantamounts to deficiency in service. We would also urge that the petitioner should set a time limit for acceptance of the insurance proposals as per the guidelines of IRDA.

9.     Hence, we find the petitioner has failed to give detailed day to day reason to condone the delay of 134 days and as such the petitioner has failed to give ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay. This view is further supported by the following judgment:

InAnshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”.

In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed that “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Appeal Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition”.

In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.  The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5.  If ‘sufficient cause’ is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone.  If ‘sufficient cause’ is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

In Sow Kamalabai, W/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal Vs. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare, 2007 (1) Mh. LJ 807, it was held that “the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act.  There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation.  I do not find any such ‘sufficient cause’ stated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for”.

In Balwant Singh Vs.  Jagdish Singh & Ors., (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held:   

“The party should show that besides acting bonafide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]”.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held;

“After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under;

“It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.”

          The Court further observed;

“It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs”.

10.    Accordingly, we find that there is no ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay of 134 days in filing the present revision petition. The application for condonation of delay is without any merit as well as having no legal basis and is not maintainable. Consequently, the present revision petition is dismissed being barred by limitation as also on merit.