Complainant/appellant, which is a private limited company, purchased a BMW car manufactured by OPs 1 and 2 worth Rs.80 lakh for the use of its Managing Director from the dealer OP-3.  Appellant filed the complaint with the allegation that although he was told that he was sold a car of 2008 model whereas he was sold a car of 2009 model; that in spite of requests, the respondents refused to replace the same. 

        State Commission held that the petitioner was not a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) as it had purchased the car for a commercial purpose.  State Commission observed as under :

“The Complainants wanted to project that theirs was a company of high standards and of high repute and, therefore, they decided to purchase a BMW car for its Director, the Complainant No. 2, by shelling out an amount more than Rs.80,00,000/-.  Such a company must be held to have purchased this car from the Opponent No. 3 – Dealer for ‘commercial purpose’ only and as such, in terms of explanation appended to Section-2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 the Complainants cannot be permitted to file a consumer complaint.  On this ground also, this complaint is liable to be rejected at the stage of admission itself.”

        View taken by the State Commission is in line with the view taken by this Commission in General Motors India Pvt. Ltd. vs. G.S. Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (F.A. No.723/2006 decided on 7.2.2013) wherein it has been held as under :

“We have heard learned counsel for both parties and have gone through the evidence on record. We note that in his complaint before the State Commission the Respondent-Complainant had clearly stated that the vehicle was purchased for the use of its Managing Director. We agree with Appellants’ contention that this clearly amounts to its purchase for a ‘commercial purpose’ since the Managing Director of a private limited company would obviously not use this vehicle for self-employment to earn his livelihood but for ‘commercial purposes’ as a perk of his office. Counsel for the Respondent-Complainant has sought to challenge this contention by pointing out that since the present case pertains to 1999 and the amendment referred to was made only in 2002, it was not applicable in the instant case. We are unable to agree with this contention as well because the 2002 Amendment to the Act pertains to Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act relating to hiring or availing of services for a consideration and not to Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Act which relates to purchase of goods. In fact, the interpretation of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Act relating inter alia to purchase of goods has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as far back as in 1995 in its judgment in Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute [1995 (3) SCC 583], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has ruled as follows:

“… On this interpretation of the definition clause, persons buying goods either for resale or for use in large scale profit-making activity will not be ‘consumers’ entitled to protection under the Act. It seems to us clear that the intention of Parliament as can be gathered from the definition section is to deny the benefits of the Act to persons purchasing goods either for purpose of resale or for the purpose of being used in profit-making activity engaged on a large scale. It would thus follow that cases of purchase of goods for consumption or use in the manufacture of goods or commodities on a large scale with a view to make profit will all fall outside the scope of the definition. It is obvious that Parliament intended to restrict the benefits of the Act to ordinary consumers purchasing goods either for their own consumption or even for use in some small venture which they may have embarked upon in order to make a living as distinct from large-scale manufacturing or processing activity carried on for profit. In order that exclusion clause should apply it is however necessary that there should be a close nexus between the transaction of purchase of goods and the large-scale activity carried on for earning profit.”

        Since the order passed by the State Commission is in line with the view taken by this Commission, the appeal is dismissed.

        However, Appellant is put at liberty to seek relief from any other Forum along with an application under Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act for condoning the delay for the time spent before the consumer fora, keeping in mind the observations made by the Supreme Court in Laxmi Engineering Works vs. PSG Industrial Institute – (1995) 3 SCC 583.