JUSTICE J.M. MALIK The complainant obtained loan for a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- from Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd for purchasing a Max Pick- up vehicle for transport of business. The loan agreement was executed on 24.06.2006. The petitioner waddled out of the commitments and could not repay the loan in time. As per the Schedule and the terms of the Agreement, the petitioner Finance Co. re-possessed the vehicle. The petitioner thereafter sent a notice to the respondent as well as the Guarantor on 16.03.2009 calling upon them to clear the dues within seven days, failing which, the vehicle would be disposed of. In the meantime, the complainant filed a consumer complaint before the District Forum. 2. The District Forum allowed the complaint in part and held as under : aking into consideration of the case of the complainant and documents filed by the parties we allow the case of the complainant in part. The Ops are directed to take steps to realize the outstanding dues with the fine amount at the time of seizure due on the complainant. The Ops are further directed to close up the loan accounts after taking all legal steps by disposing the vehicle in presence of the complainant preferably market value will not less than Rs.2.00 lakhs as admitted by them. Further the Ops are directed to return back the balance amount to the complainant after deducting the pending and fine amount at the time seizure. Accordingly the case is disposed of 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the appeal was preferred before the State Commission by the petitioner herein, with a delay of 144 days. The State Commission dismissed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that when the petitioner was aware of the impugned judgment and order, the plea that copy of the impugned order was not received in time, cannot be the ground for condoning such an inordinate delay. Appeal was dismissed on the ground of delay only. 4. Thereafter, the instant revision petition was filed. There is a delay of 15 daysin filing this revision petition. It is explained that a SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order dated 28.03.2012 was filed, but subsequently this revision petition was filed. Petitioner Advocate Mr. Uday B. Dube was not available in Delhi due to summer vacation during the third week of June, 2012. Consequently, the above said delay occurred. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. He submitted that an opportunity of being heard should have been granted by imposing reasonable costs upon the petitioner. He further argued that the petitioner could not sell the vehicle for the sum of Rs.2.00 lakhs despite frantic efforts made by it. The complainant was requested to sell the vehicle but he did not co-operate. 6. We are unable to concur with him for three reasons. First of all, no ufficient ground was established before the State Commission. There was inordinate delay of 144 days Consequently, when the appeal was dismissed on the ground of arred by time alarm bells should have rung, but the petitioner was not vigilant and there was delay of 15 days in filing the revision petition, before this Commission, which was also not explained, to our satisfaction. 7. In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that t is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras 8. In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed that e hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Appeal Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition 9. In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that t is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ufficient causeis not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ufficient causeis shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. 10. In Sow Kamalabai, W/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal Vs. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare, 2007 (1) Mh. LJ 807, it was held that he expression ufficient causecannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such ufficient causestated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for 11. For all these reasons, the order passed by the State Commission cannot be faulted. The revision petition has to be dismissed on the ground of delay in filing the appeal before the State Commission as also on delay in filing the instant revision petition, before this Commission. 12. Now, we advert to the merits of the case. The order passed by the District Forum does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. It has taken care of the petitioner. The amount which was lent was taken care of. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that nobody is ready to buy the vehicle and though they tried to sell it for Rs.2.00 lakhs, but nobody turned up. They informed the complainant to bring a buyer but he did not co-operate. 13. Instead of coming to the point, the learned counsel for the petitioner tried to stretch things, a bit far. The order passed by the District Forum is as per the consent given by both the parties. The order quoted above clearly goes to show that both the parties had admitted before it that the market value of the vehicle was not less than Rs.2.00 lakhs and the petitioner is also estopped from raising this point again and again. 14. It must be mentioned that the District Forum passed the order on 22.09.2011. The vehicle should have been sold immediately. With the passage of time, its value stands depreciated. The vehicle was in possession of the petitioner. It is surprising to note that the petitioner is unable to sell the vehicle even after about 10 months from the date of the passing of the order of the District Forum. This is wastage of time of this Commission and their own time. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed.