1.      This revision petition under section 21 (B) the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, the “Act’) assails the order dated 31.08.2017 in First Appeal No. 116 of 2015 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi (in short, the ‘State Commission’) emerging from the order dated 02.09.2014 of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum SW, New Delhi (in short, the ‘District Forum’) in Consumer Complaint no. RBT 79 of DF-VII/246/2013/583.  While the District Forum dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner/complainant for want of jurisdiction, the State Commission dismissed the appeal on grounds of limitation, being barred on grounds of delay of 161 days that was not sufficiently explained.

2.      The facts as per the petitioner/complainant are that the respondent/opposite party raised an unreasonably exorbitant bill of Rs 4,13,294.98 for the period 23.09.2012 to 22.10.2012 without proper cause or reason seeking withdrawal/waiver of the same. On contest, the District Forum held that the matter could not be adjudicated for want of jurisdiction on the basis of General Manager Telecom Vs. M Krishnan, 2009 (8) SCC 481. The appeal was dismissed by the State Commission on grounds of limitation being delayed by 161 days which was not sufficiently explained. This order is assailed before us on the grounds that the impugned order took a hyper technical and pedantic approach to conclude that there was no sufficient cause shown. The delay is attributed to actions of the counsel and it is prayed that the interest of the petitioner should not be jeopardized for this reason.

3.     I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and carefully considered the material on the record.

4.      The State Commission’s order records as under:

6.       In para 2 of the application, it is submitted by the appellant/complainant that the certified copy of the impugned order dated 22.08.2014 was obtained on 11.02.2015 i.e. after passing of about 5 months and 11 days. It is pertinent to mention that the Ld. District Forum had dispatched the impugned order dated 22.08.2014 on 02.09.2014 which must have reached the appellant/complainant on or before 10.09.2014. To confirm this position we also requisitioned the file of the District Forum wherein also same position is reflected. The allegation made by the appellant/complainant in para 3 above are not substantiated in any manner. In support of the averments made in para 3 & 4 reproduced above, appellant/complainant has failed to file any proof. If the appellant/complainant had not received the copy of the impugned order it could have made efforts to find out the outcome of the complaint from the District Forum. Further, stand of the appellant/complainant that in the month of November 2014, he was informed by the office of the Ld. District Forum that order has been passed and same will be sent to the appellant/complainant directly is also vague. Even the appellant/complainant is silent on the point at to why the application was moved before the District Forum for procurement of the certified copy of the impugned order so late. There is nothing as to so as to what efforts were made by appellant/complainant to get the certified copy of the impugned order at the earliest.

 7.      Thus we find no merits in the reasoning given by the appellant. The expression “Sufficient Cause” cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as “Sufficient Cause”. It is well settled that “sufficient cause as envisaged under section 5 of the Limitation Act is a question of fact in each case. The following authorities are relevant for the disposal of present appeal.

5.     Relying on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, and in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., vs Kailash Devi and Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, the State Commission held as under:

12.     Thus, gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides is imputable to the appellant. Accordingly, no sufficient cause is shown by appellant/complainant for condoning the long delay of 161 days in filing the present appeal. The application for condonation of delay under these circumstances is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is also dismissed being barred by limitation.

6.      The learned counsel for the petitioner argued on the basis of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnakutty, 1988 (7) SCC 123 for a “liberal construction of the words ‘sufficient cause’ so as to advance substantial justice”. Reliance was also placed on Collector Land Acquisition Vs Mst. Katiji, 1987 (2) SCC 107 and Divisional Manager Plantation Division, Andaman and Nicobar Islands vs Mannu Barrick – (2005) 2 SCC 237 to argue for a pragmatic approach of the rights of the consumer in a benevolent legislation. On merits, it was argued that the petition was covered by the order of this Commission in Reliance Communications Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Beena Menon & Anr., dated 19.11.2014.

7.      The learned counsel for the respondent argued on merits that the petitioner was a corporate entity and not an individual who had been saddled with an unreasonable bill. The respondent argued that the petitioner had filed a consumer complaint before the District Forum, New Delhi which was dismissed on 22.08.2014, whereafter, it was challenged before the State Commission, Delhi by the petitioner along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The said application for condonation of delay was dismissed on 31.08.2017. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner had portrayed as if the petitioner was an individual consumer and had not received the certified copy of the order dated 22.08.2014 for 173 days since the order was pronounced on 22.08.2014. On its part, learned counsel for the respondent relied on judgment in Sanjay Shankar Mamarade vs Maharashtra State Financial in Original Petition no.9 of 1995 decided on 07.01.2002 wherein it was held that when a registered post addressed to the respondent, a company registered under the Companies Act and having been correctly addressed which was not received back, service was taken to be complete. Counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgments of this Commission in Koganti Atchuta Rao and Anr. Vs Koganti Vineeth in RP no. 727 of 2013 decided on 09.04.2013 and in Commissioner, Rajasthan Housing Board and Ors. vs Madan Singh in RP no.2734 of 2010 decided on 28.07.2015 which held as under:

The petitioner, however, has filed not only before the fora below, but also before us the postal receipt whereby the final notice dated 05.10.2001 was sent to the complainant. The said notice as well as the postal receipt bear the correct address of the complainant. Therefore, there is a statutory presumption under section 27 of General Clauses Act and section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act that the said final notice dated 05.10.2001 was duly served upon the complainant in due course.

It was stated that, in view of the above said judgments relied upon, the order dated 22.08.2014 was served to the parties including the complainant.

          In the light of the above, it was argued that the respondents stood served before the lower fora.

8.      The issue of limitation has been considered. It is apparent that the petitioner is a registered corporate entity which had agitated the matter after due notice before the lower fora by engaging counsel. It cannot be said that there was any lack of legal advice or assistance to it during the course of its efforts to contest the issue. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued strongly in favour of condoning the delay of 161 days in the filing of the appeal before the State Commission and relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited above and argued in favour of a liberal construct of the showing of sufficient cause to condone the delay. The Consumer Protection Act is a benevolent legislation intended for the benefit of consumers purchasing goods or availing services. However, the legislative intent is also to provide for expeditious resolution of issues without protracted delays on account of the process of a civil court’s procedure. The provision of section 24A in the Act is, therefore, with the objective to protect the rights of consumers. The objectives of the Act cannot be allowed to be diluted through inordinate delays in the execution of orders to set right grievances in relation to goods and services. Inordinate delay or a prolonged lapse of time between an order and its execution harms both the interest of the consumer as well as the objective of the Act. At the same time, the period of limitation provided is adequate to enable an aggrieved party to exercise the option of appeal and redressal should it be considered. Hence, the provision of limitation in the Act seeks to balance the equities of both parties equally. Any delay which is inordinate and is not justiciable would be deleterious to the cause of justice in a beneficial legislation and should not be encouraged to the detriment of justice. The ascribing of the delay of 161 days, or 5 months and 11 days, due to the inaction of the petitioner of his counsel is not a sufficient cause considering that the petitioner is a corporate entity which has an organizational structure that should pursue its legal interests and remedies. In this view of the matter, the arguments of the petitioner with regard to the condonation of delay cannot be considered.

9.      For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the State Commission does not warrant any interference and is accordingly dismissed. As the petition falls at the threshold of limitation, the same is not considered on merits. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending IAs, if any, stand disposed of with this order.