1.       These Revision Petitions have been filed by the Petitioner against the impugned order dated 26.08.2019 of the Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Commission’), in First Appeal (FA) Nos. 269/2019 and 236/2019 respectively.  Vide this order, both the First Appeals have been rejected by the State Commission on account of limitation.  The relevant portion of the order of the State Commission reproduced below:-

“Both these Appeals have been filed against District Forum, Jhunjunu order dated 15.11.2018. Both the Appeals have been filed against the same order therefore, they will be disposed in a single order.

Petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Both the above appeals respectively have been filed after delay of 93 and 100 days.

Appellant has been heard. District Forum order and the Complaint have been examined.

The counsel for Appellant had appeared before the District Forum and the impugned order dated 15.11.2018 was passed in his presence. In Section 5 Limitation Act Appeal, both the Appellants have stated that due to Legislative Assembly elections delay was caused in collection of documents for appeal and on 16.12.2018 copy of Complaint was presented however on examination of the copy it is clear that the Application for the same was filed on 26.02.2019 and the same day the copy was issued. On 15.11.2018 when counsel for appellants was present and orders were passed, delay in making copy of the Complaint was not explained.

 It was stated that the counsel on 07.01.2019 was given a copy at the commission's office however in such a case the Appellant's office in-charge would have been deputed, in such a case they could have possibly taken action therefore there is no basis for condonation of 93 and 100 days' extraordinary delay and Section 5 Appeal of both the Appellants is liable to be rejected and both the appeals are rejected due to delay.”

2.       The Petitioner has contended that:

(a)      State Commission committed grave illegality by dismissing the Appeals filed by the Petitioner on technical grounds of delay of 100 and 93 days, without even addressing the vital fact that the District Commission committed a grave jurisdictional error by allowing the Consumer Complaint of the Respondent against the Petitioner, who were not the consumers and service provider respectively, within the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

(b)     That the Petitioner herein had filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 before the State Commission, mentioning that after the judgment of the District Forum was passed on 15.11.2018, legislative assembly elections were scheduled to be held in the State of Rajasthan in the same month and thus delay was caused on that account as the Petitioner is a Commission under the State Government. It was stated that the application for obtaining the certified copy of the Judgment was submitted on 16.12.2018 and a copy of the same was received on 18.12.2018. Thereafter, the copy was delivered to the office of the Petitioner on 07.01.2019 and subsequently some time was taken for preparation of the factual report by the Petitioner's officials and drafting of the said Appeals resulting into a delay of 100 days and 93 days. However, the  State Commission merely relied on the date of the certified copy annexed with the said Appeal, which was applied on 26.02.2019.

(c)      It is apposite to mention that it is a standard practice of the Petitioner Commission that one certified copy of any judgment, in which the Commission is a party is kept in the office of the Petitioner for decision of future legal action or compliance and the Advocates are directed to obtain another certified copy later, if the decision to file an appeal is taken. In the instant case, the date of the certified copy relied upon by the Hon'ble State Commission was the second certified copy, which was obtained by the Advocate after the decision to file an appeal against the Order of the District Forum was conveyed to the Advocate. 

3.       In the Revision Petitions, the Petitioner has given detailed reasons for delay and has contended that detailed reasons sufficiently explain the reasons for the entire delay period and are liable to be considered as sufficient reasons for condonation of delay as the same were bona fide and beyond the control of the Petitioner herein. That the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the landmark judgment of The Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v K.V. Ayisumma, (1996 (10) SCC 634] has directed the Courts to adopt a pragmatic approach rather than a pedantic approach in dealing with condonation of delay related to the Government as large public interest is involved. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that "It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice, it would result in public mischief by skillful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court would be pragmatic but not pedantic." That the ratio laid down by the said judgment has also been followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in several other cases.Therefore, in light of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the Hon'ble State Commission gravely erred in adopting a technical and strict approach, without averting to the vital fact that such an approach would open the flood gates of litigation against the Petitioner and result into grave miscarriage of justice.

4.       Petitioner has relied upon the following judgments in support of his contention:-

1. Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) SCC 10.

2. G. Ramegowda, Major, etc. Vs Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, SC 1988 AIR 897, 1988 SCR (3) 198.

3.       State (NCT Of Delhi) vs Ahmed Jaan SC SLP (Crl.) No.131 of 2006.

4.       Lala Mata Din vs A. Narayanan SC 1970 AIR 1953, 1970 SCR (2)90.
 

5.       State Of Nagaland vs Lipok Ao & Ors. (2005 (3) SCC 752).

6.       N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (AIR 1998 SC 3222).

5.       We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, Revision Petitions, other relevant records of the cases, contentions of the Petitioner and Case Laws relied upon by the Petitioner.

6.       In order to condone the delay, the Petitioner/Appellant has to satisfy the Forum before whom his Appeal is/was pending that there was sufficient cause for preferring the Appeal after the stipulated limitation period.  The term ‘sufficient cause’ has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer  (2013) 14 SCC 81.  Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case observed as follows:

9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale……..

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

7.       Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, after taking note of various authorities/earlier judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, culled out broad principles for considering the condonation of delay applications and also added few more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario.  Relevant paras of these are reproduced below:-

“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

                                    x x x x

ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

x x x x

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

x x x x

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle

cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual

perception

xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

                                    x x x x

c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

8.       In Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr.  [(2012) 3 SCC 563], Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of condoning the delay on the part of office of the Chief Post Master General, observed :

“12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

       Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.”

9.       In Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321], Hon’ble Supreme Court observed :

"25. Much later, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy this court referred to a large number of previous judgments, and observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Other decisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula to judge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and the exercise is necessarily fact specific; in Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh, the court held:

“16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.”

26. The court also emphasized that each case has to be balanced on the basis of its facts and the surrounding circumstances in which the parties act and behave.”

10.     From the above it is clear that the Appellant i.e. the Petitioner herein had to satisfy the State Commission about the sufficiency of reasons for filing the Appeal with delay, which in the instant cases, they have not been able to do successfully.   Ultimately, it is the satisfaction of the State Commission before whom the Appeals were filed and applications for condonation of delay were heard, we cannot substitute our satisfaction for sufficiency of cause for delay with that of the State Commission’s satisfaction, unless prima facie we find that there is/was any irregularity or illegality in the order of the State Commission in considering such condonation of delay applications.  In the instant cases, we have also carefully considered the reasons for delay/grounds for condonation as stated in the Revision Petitions as well as those adduced during the hearing, but do not find the same convincing. As was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rubi Chandra Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2011) 11 SCC 269], the scope in a Revision Petition is limited. Such powers can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order. In Sunil Kumar Maity Vs. State Bank of India & Ors. [AIR (2022) SC 577] held that “the revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the said Act is extremely limited. It should be exercised only in case as contemplated within the parameters specified in the said provision, namely when it appears to the National Commission that the State Commission had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.”

11.     We find no illegality or material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the order(s) dated 26.08.2019 of the State Commission, hence the same is upheld.  Accordingly, both the Revision Petitions are dismissed.     

12.     The pending IAs in the case, if any, also stand disposed off.