1.   This revision petition has been filed under section 58(1)(b) of The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 in challenge to the impugned Order dated 16.08.2023 passed by the State Commission in First Appeal No. 1349 of 2023 arising out of the Order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the District Commission in Complaint
No. 533 of 2018.

2.   It appears that the District Commission had passed its Order on 21.04.2023 whereby the complaint was allowed. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the appeal was filed before the State Commission but the same too did not find any favour and was dismissed. The present petition has been filed against the concurrent finding / orders passed by the two fora below.                                                

3.   It appears that the present petition has been filed with reported delay of 154 days (admitted delay of 100 days as per the condonation delay application). As the delay is neither insignificant nor small, the learned counsel for the petitioner has been heard first on the application seeking condonation of delay in order to decide whether the same deserves to be condoned or not.

4.   Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the entire record including inter alia the Order dated 21.04.2023 passed by the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 16.08.2023 passed by the State Commission, the application seeking condonation of delay and the memo of petition.

5.       Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has reiterated the grounds as taken in the application seeking condonation of delay and has not added anything to it.  Submission is that initially the delay was occasioned because the impugned Order was tagged in a different file of the authority and the same could be retrieved as late as in the month of December when the records were checked. Further delay was contributed in obtaining permissions and approvals and eventually the matter was marked to the counsel only after winter vacations in January 2024. When the record was inspected it was discovered that it was not complete as the same had not been supplied by the counsel. Thereafter, the petitioner’s counsel before the District Commission took some time in arranging relevant documents and eventually informed that the District Commission’s files have been disposed of. Submission is that it was the slipshod dealing of the matter by the then counsel which contributed to the delay. Additionally some time also got consumed in getting the translation of the documents done which are in vernacular languages. It has been submitted that as the delay in filing the present petition is neither intentional nor deliberate the same should be condoned and the petitioner has a good case on merits and if opportunity of hearing on merits would not be provided, it will cause adverse prejudice to the rights of the petitioner.   

6.   It may be observed that normally in matters like this we resort to a stance which leans favourably towards the defaulting petitioner who fails to file the petition / appeal within the limitation period. It is ordinarily preferred not to adopt a pedantic approach but to proceed with a pragmatic view and to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation. But while saying so Commission should not be understood to mean or to imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided by the Act can either be blissfully ignored or be soft paddled at will.  Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment of the law of limitation. The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with.  In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period.  It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the given Fora looking into the matter that there were actually justifiable reasons which go to explain as to why the petition /appeal was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Forum cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which even this Commission exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously. The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioner / appellant who seeks judicial indulgence in this regard. While undertaking the exercise of such evaluation the Bench also keeps in perspective the practical side of the working of institutions which are not personal entities and tries to adopt a pragmatic approach making due allowance in that regard but that must not also be misconstrued to imply that in the name of being an institution any party can claim to have such long rope which may render the law regarding the period of limitation nugatory as if it signifies nothing.

7.   When this Bench proceeds to evaluate the sufficiency of the cause and validity of reasons proffered on behalf of the defaulting petitioner in order to see whether the same may be made the basis to condone the delay involved in the matter, it is found that it is difficult to call them adequate grounds. The impugned Order was passed on 16.08.2023 and as per the stamp affixed on the certified copy the same was provided on 01.09.2023 to the petitioner. As per the delay condonation application this fact has not been disputed that the certified copy of the impugned Order was very well issued on 01.09.2023. The petition has been filed on 16.04.2024. Thus, if we reckon the period of limitation form the date of issuance of the certified copy on 01.09.2023, the limitation period had expired on 29.11.2023 but the present petition was not filed within the prescribed period of 90 days which was sufficient enough to do the needful. Instead of that the instant revision petition was filed on 16.04.2024 with a delay of not days or weeks but of months. The plea of misplacement of the impugned Order is difficult to accept at its face value. To such sort of an unsubstantiated plea, it is difficult to provide the status of being called sufficient cause enough to absolve in delay. The other pleas relating to the time taken for permissions and approvals are almost banal and hackneyed ones and do not go very far to impress. It is true that while adjudging the validity of reasons or sufficiency of cause the Bench does not adopt a pedantic approach and prefers to keep in perspective the pragmatic side of working of an institution or department as it may be and makes due allowance on that count, nevertheless, while saying so it does not go to imply that in the name of being a public-sector department such a long leash should be expected or may be granted which may resultantly reduce the statutory law on the point of limitation to complete insignificance as if it is nugatory. That may not be a commendable or advisable approach to deal with such matters. The petitioner-department is highly evolved organized and well-structured authority having no dearth of wherewithal. Much more alacrity and dispatch of movement is expected in the course of its business and functioning. It appears that the explanations or the pleas which have been put-forward reflect a kind of indifference and casual attitude towards the law of limitation and the things appear to have been taken for granted. Managerial insufficiency and internal administrative slackness or the want of due diligence on the part of its officials or their negligence are difficult to be provided the name of ‘sufficient cause’ or ‘valid reasons’ enough to earn condonation of delay. So far as the time taken in translation work is concerned, it goes without saying that in the National Commission, the matters come from all nooks and corners of the nation having different vernacular languages and the translation of the documents is a routine exercise in almost all matters which came before us, but that does not imply that the petitions should not be filed within the prescribed period of time stipulated in the law. The insinuations made against the erstwhile counsel are also difficult to comment upon at his back who is not here to defend himself. Be that as it may, the delay involved in the matter is sufficiently drawn out and it would need far more convincing, credible and genuine explanations than what have been offered to bridge up the hiatus which separates the date of impugned Order and the date when the petition has been filed. The delay involved in the matter cannot be ignored.      

      In the present case, the Bench feels constrained to observe that it does not see even a semblance of good explanation which may constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay. The onus was on the petitioner to show the factual basis from which may emanate such grounds but the same remains undischarged. The application for condonation of delay being without much worth or substance is unworthy of acceptance. Sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming.

8.   The application being sans merit must therefore meet its legal nemesis and as such the same stands dismissed.

9.   As the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, the revision petition too concomitantly stands dismissed.

10. The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to the parties in the petition and to learned counsel for the petitioner as well as to the fora below within three days. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission within three days.