1.       This appeal has been filed under section 19 of the Act 1986 in challenge to the Order dated 12.06.2019 of the State Commission in complaint no. 481 of 2019.

2.       We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants (the ‘complainants’) and the learned counsel for the respondents (the ‘insurance co.’) and have perused the record.

3.       The case relates to an insurance claim on the death of the insured. The complainants are the widow, minor son and minor daughter of the deceased insured. The dispute relates to the insurance co. not paying the accidental death benefit on the subject policy. Its repudiation was made vide the insurance co.’s letter dated 18.06.2015. Counting from the said date, when the cause of action arose, the complaint was filed with delay of 728 days beyond the two-year limitation period prescribed under section 24A(1) of the Act 1986. The State Commission vide its Order dated 12.06.2019 held that sufficient cause to condone the delay in exercise of power under section 24A(2) of the Act 1986 was not forthcoming and as such dismissed the complaint on limitation.

4.       The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the deceased insured had taken insurance policies from two different companies i.e. HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co. Ltd. and the present insurance co. namely Aviva Life Insurance Company India Ltd. After the death of the insured in Himachal Pradesh the complainants re-located themselves and shifted to Kerala. The complainant no. 1, the widow of the deceased insured, engaged an advocate for the purpose of getting the claims by taking the help of another advocate who was a friend of her deceased husband. As must have been natural, she requested and instructed the advocate she had engaged to file complaints against the two insurance companies concerned i.e. against HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co. Ltd. and the present insurance co. Aviva Life Insurance Company India Ltd.  She was all along made to understand and was under the impression that both complaints had been duly filed by the advocate. The complaint against HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co. Ltd. was filed before the District Commission since the same fell within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Commission. Eventually the same was also allowed by the District Commission. Appeal thereagainst by HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co. Ltd. was dismissed by the State Commission. The present complaint fell within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission. Her advocate however omitted to file the complaint before the State Commission though he did file the other complaint before the District Commission and within the limitation period. Ultimately she was impelled to contact another advocate who then filed the complaint before the State Commission but by then the two year limitation period had expired. The complainant no. 1, the widow of the deceased insured, and the natural guardian of the complainants no. 2 and no. 3, minor son and daughter, had taken steps at the due time with diligence to get the present complaint filed at the earliest and well within the limitation period. Submission is that the omission on the part of her advocate may not be held against her. It has been urged that the truthful facts have been honestly narrated by the complainants and the facts and circumstances constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay under Section 24(A)(2) of the Act 1986. 

5.       Learned counsel for the insurance co. submits that the complaint is heavily barred by limitation and sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. Submission is that the State Commission has taken the correct view in the matter by dismissing the complaint as being barred by limitation.

6.       While dealing with the issue in question here, regarding the limitation period, its breach and the availability or non-availability of sufficient cause to condone the delay in matters where the complaint has been filed after the lapse of limitation period, we must first observe that the law on the point of limitation wherever it is provided has to be respected and complied with and in no case be shelved with apathy or be blissfully ignored. Unless and until there are good valid reasons to condone the delay the statute has to adhered to. Eventually, whether or not sufficient cause to condone delay is there turns out to be a question of fact in each case and we have to see the complete factual matrix and the syllogism of context and circumstances under which the delay is said to have been occasioned and have to find whether or not the same constitutes a sufficient cause to justifiably lean in favour of the complainant who prays that his cause should be adjudicated on merits. 

7.       While coming to the present case what we find is that the State Commission has taken a somewhat strict view of the matter without entirely appreciating the facts and circumstances in the right perspective.

The principal reason why the complaint could not be filed within time has been told to be the unethical inaction or remiss behaviour of the advocate, who, for reasons best known to himself, did not file the complaint even though he was briefed and instructed to do so. We find a conspicuous fact in this matter that there were two individual complaints against two different insurance companies which the complainant had instructed her advocate to file. There is no dispute regarding the fact that in so far as the complaint relating to one company i.e. HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co. Ltd. was concerned the same was duly filed within time and it has been told that it was also allowed by the District Commission and sustained by the State Commission. We fail to understand and in fact there is no earthly reason to comprehend as to why the complainant no. 1 who was actually having claims against two insurance companies would ever choose not to instruct the advocate to file both complaints or would instruct with regard to only one. Certainly this is not a case where the complainant had relinquished either of her claims. She was not only aware of her entitlement and right, she also approached an advocate through an advocate friend of her deceased husband and gave the necessary instructions, signed the ‘vakalatnama’ to get the complaints filed, and was told that the same shall be done. It has been averred that she was under the bonafide impression that the complaints with regard to both the claims had been filed by the advocate. In fact it has also been averred on behalf of the complaint no. 1 that she was at some stage told that it was because of the paucity of certain papers that the present complaint could not be filed. We find it reasonable to believe that in such circumstances the bonafide complainant having trust in her advocate did not find any reason to disbelieve him. It was only at a belated stage when she found that the answers given by the advocate were no more convincing or trustworthy that she approached another advocate and then to her utter dismay and consternation she discovered that the complaint was actually never filed and by that time the limitation period had also expired. 

There is a ring of honest truth in the averments of the complainant no. 1, which the State Commission has failed to appreciate.

The State Commission has taken a view that if this explanation had truth then the complainant no. 1 ought to have moved the Bar Council and sought appropriate action against the deviant advocate. In our considered opinion, though such a course could have been undertaken by some aggrieved person(s) but that is not a very natural way in which an aggrieved person generally behaves or conducts himself against an advocate especially when one other case is also being conducted by that same advocate. If the complainant, who was a widowed lady having two minor children to look after, after the shock of her husband’s demise, did not turn out to be proactively plaintive as to have brought action against the advocate who did not perform his duty diligently we do not think that the absence of such assertive vengeful propensity on the part of the complainant no. 1 ought to be treated as fatal to her cause and should go to disentitle her to seek condonation of delay in filing the complaint.

Another observation made by the State Commission is that the advocate friend of the complainant’s husband who was instrumental in the engagement of the concerned advocate ought to have filed his affidavit in this regard is again something which if could have taken place might have certainly helped the complainant. But if this course was not adopted, we are of the view it ought not to be treated as fatal to her case. Generally a third person would want to avoid filing an affidavit containing allegations of dereliction of duty etc. before judicial or quasi judicial courts or tribunals against a colleague, perhaps the advocate who ultimately filed the complaint did not deem it advisable or prudent to adopt such a course of making allegations on affidavit against an advocate, whatever be the reason this cannot be a ground to out-and-out dismiss the complainants’ narration of the facts and circumstances.

The fact also remains that the complainants’ cause remained unadjudicated on its merits.

In the conspicuous facts and circumstances of the case as are emanating from the record we feel that this is a matter in which it would have been well advised that the State Commission ought to have leaned in favour of the complainants and should have considered that the noticeable facts and circumstances of the case just enough so as to constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay. We feel in the peculiar circumstances and facts of this case that it would result in travesty of justice or at least to certainly something less than justice if we throw out the complainants’ cause at the threshold stage and do not allow adjudication on merits. In the conspicuous and peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the door of justice must be kept ajar and the matter ought to be adjudicated on merits.

8.       Sequel to the discussion above we set aside the impugned Order dated 12.06.2019 of the State Commission and remand the case back to the State Commission with the observation that sufficient cause to condone the delay was very much forthcoming and as such the delay stands condoned. We request the State Commission to decide the substance of the complaint on merit as per the law. The parties are directed to appear before the State Commission on 03.11.2022. 

9.       The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to the parties in the appeal and to their learned counsel. The Registry is also requested to forthwith communicate this Order to the State Commission by the fastest mode available. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.