HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT MANDAL, PRESIDENT

1. This appeal has been filed under section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 against the order dated 29/03/2023 passed by the Learned Addl. District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Rajarhat (New Town) ( in short, ‘the Addl. District Commission’) in connection with consumer case No. CC/88/2023.

2. Along with the appeal an application for condonation of delay has been filed by the appellants. The office has submitted a report that this appeal has been filed after a delay of 256 days.

3. Heard the Learned Advocate appearing for the parties at length and in full and carefully perused the application for condonation of delay.

4. Having heard the Learned Advocate appearing for the appellants and on perusal of the record it appears to me that the impugned order was passed on 29/03/2023. It also appears to me that the appellants applied for obtaining a certified copy of the impugned order dated 29/03/2023 on 04/05/2023. It is also found that the certified copy of the order was ready for delivery on 09/06/2023 and on that date it was delivered to the appellants.

5. It is also found that the instant appeal has been filed by the appellants on 29/02/2024.

6. From the above, it is clear to me that there was a delay for applying certified copy and filing the instant appeal and the appellants were reluctant to file the present appeal.  The appellants never showed any urgency to file the same within time. The reason given for the delay in filing of the appeal is that the appellants could not collect the certified copy of the orders due to general medical issues as stated in paragraph No. 1(d) of the application for condonation of delay. Record goes to show that the application for condonation of delay is not supported by any medical paper to prove that the appellants due to general medical issues could not collect the certified copy of the order in time. So, it may be concluded that the appellants have failed to prove that they were ill and they could not collect the certified copy of the order in time.

7. Another reason given for the delay in filing of the appeal is that the appellants got engaged in their employment and also had to travel outside West Bengal for the same and was unable to contact their newly engaged Advocate.

8. Record goes to show that the appellants have not produced any paper to prove that they were engaged in their employment and had to travel outside West Bengal. So, this reason as stated by the appellants is not believable and acceptable.

9. Another reason given for delay in filing of the appeal is that the newly engaged Advocate was engaged to file the appeal and papers were handed over to the newly engaged Advocate but the newly engaged Advocate was unable to prepare the same. Record goes to show that the appellants have not stated the name of the Advocate who was newly engaged to prepare the memo of appeal and to file the same before this Commission. In the result, non mentioning of the name of the newly engaged Advocate, an adverse presumption may be drawn against the appellants.

10. Under these facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the cause shown for delay in filing the appeal is not sufficient. As such, it cannot be accepted.

11. I think that the appellant / opposite party No. 4 has filed the instant appeal along with the application for condonation of delay only to get rid from the execution case. So, the cause shown by the appellant is not sufficient, believable and acceptable.

12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Lal and Ors.  – Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has observed as under :-

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of R.B. Ramlingam vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC), has stated that a court has to apply the basic test while dealing with the matters relating to condonation of delay, whether the Petitioner has  acted with reasonable diligence or not. The court has held as under :

“We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal / petition.”

14. In another case reported in (2011) 14 SCC 578 (Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority ),  the Hon’ble Apex has held that the special nature of the Act has to be kept in mind while dealing with the special period of limitation prescribed therein.

15. The Hon’ble court has further held as under :

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora.”

16. In view of the above decisions and under this facts and circumstances, I find no sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay of about 256 days. The present appeal is nothing but an attempt to abuse the process of law.

17. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed.

18. The appeal is, thus, dismissed being barred by limitation without being admitted.

19. The appeal is, thus, disposed of accordingly.