1. Heard learned counsels for Petitioner.

2. Challenge is to order dated 01.03.2024 of the State Commission in IA/54/2023 in FA No. 32 of 2023, vide which the said IA for Condonation of Delay was dismissed and consequently the Appeal filed by the Petitioner herein, who was the Appellant before the State Commission, has been dismissed on account of limitation, having been filed after a delay of 213 days.

3. The Petitioner has challenged the orders of the State Commission on following grounds:

(a) The State Commission has failed to appreciate the facts of the case, material available on record, the reasons specified for delay in filing of the appeal and has erroneously passed the Impugned order dated 01.03.2024, which is patently illegal, bad in law and against judicial propriety. Hence, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside.

(b) The District Commission has completely ignored the fact that the FIR was not produced by the Complainant even after Letters dated 12.08.2013 and 19.09.2013, consequently the claim was repudiated vie Repudiation Letter dated 03.12.2013.

(c) The present revision falls within the limited scope under revisional jurisdiction of the Hon’ble National Commission and thereby it is necessary that the impugned order is modified by exonerating the Insurance Company in toto.

(d) The Revisionist craves the leave of the Hon’ble Commission to urge other and further grounds in support of this appeal at the time of arguments.        

4. The main question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the State Commission was justified in declining condonation of delay in filing the Appeal and dismiss it as barred by limitation. We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, other relevant records and contentions of the Petitioner herein. We have also considered the reasons for delay as contained in the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner herein before the State Commission in the light of observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases, especially the following:

1. Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Respresentative and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Anr. (2023) 10 SCC 531 

2. ‘Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81  

3. Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649] 

4. Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321] 

5. Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 

6. Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) 14 SCC 578  

7. H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Nahar Exports Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 680  

8. Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513  

9. State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 

5. In Sheo Raj Singh (Supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the appeal filed against an order of the High Court condoning the delay, observed that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the lengths of delay being immaterial, each case for condonation of delay based on the existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts and that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below. In Basawaraj (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when a case is filed beyond the limitation period, the applicant must demonstrate "sufficient cause," meaning an adequate and enough reason for not approaching the court within the prescribed time. If the party is found to be negligent, lacking bona fides, or not acting diligently, there is no justified ground for condoning the delay. Courts are not justified in condoning such delays by imposing any conditions and must adhere to the established parameters for condonation of delay. Condoning delay without sufficient cause and proper justification would violate statutory provisions and show disregard for legislative intent. In Esha Bhattcharjee (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed a distinction between inordinate delays and delays of short duration or a few days. In cases of inordinate delay, the doctrine of prejudice is invoked, warranting a strict approach, while delays of short duration may not necessitate such a stringent view and instead call for a more lenient interpretation. The Court expressed concern over the growing tendency to perceive delay as a trivial matter and to exhibit a lackadaisical attitude towards it, which needs to be addressed within the confines of legal parameters. In Sridevi Datla (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the precedent set in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, highlighting that a strict standard of proof can sometimes fail to uphold public justice and may result in public harm. The Court emphasized that there is no universal formula to determine whether sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay, and each case must be assessed based on its individual facts and surrounding circumstances. The Court reiterated that no rigid criteria exist to evaluate whether sufficient and good grounds have been presented for condoning delay and emphasized the need for a case-specific approach in such matters. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane (Supra), the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the law of limitation must be applied rigorously as prescribed by statute, even if it causes hardship to a particular party. The court cannot extend the limitation period on equitable grounds. Despite any inconvenience or hardship caused, the court must enforce the statutory provision fully, adhering to the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex," meaning "the law is hard but it is the law." It is established that inconvenience is not a decisive factor in interpreting a statute, and a court cannot disregard a statutory provision to alleviate perceived distress resulting from its application. In Anshul Aggarwal (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when considering applications for condonation of delay in consumer cases, it is crucial to bear in mind the special limitation period set forth in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions. The Court highlighted that entertaining significantly delayed petitions against consumer forum orders would defeat the objective of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes. In H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, and therefore, applications for condonation of delay should be strictly construed in the absence of genuine reasons. The failure of the respondents to demonstrate due diligence in filing appeals and the significant delay in refiling are viewed as indicative of gross negligence and lack of bona fides, especially in the absence of a valid explanation. The court underscored the need to balance the scales of justice for both parties, emphasizing that even in cases of refiling, a liberal approach should not disregard this principle. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra) observed that the law of limitation is rooted in the public policy of concluding litigation by forfeiting the remedy rather than the right itself, emphasizing that rights or remedies not exercised within a specified time should cease to exist; while Section 3 of the Limitation Act should be strictly construed, Section 5 should be interpreted liberally. Despite considering justice-oriented approaches, the court cannot override the limitation law under Section 3. Merits of the case need not be considered in delay condonation, and applications must adhere to statutory provisions to be granted. In Bherulal (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that the notion that merit in a case justifies disregarding a period of delay is preposterous. Regardless of a case's merit, the limitation period can bar its consideration, potentially excluding even strong cases. However, this does not negate the court's jurisdiction to condone delay in appropriate circumstances.

6. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Manjunath Anandappa (Supra), stated that appellate courts generally should not intervene with the discretion exercised by lower courts. This principle is affirmed in U.P. Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros (AIR 1967 SC 249), where it is emphasized that appellate courts should be hesitant to interfere with the exercise of discretion by trial courts. The appellate court should not replace its own discretion for that of the trial judge unless the trial court has acted unreasonably, capriciously, or ignored relevant facts. Additionally, in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (1980) 2 SCC 593, it is highlighted that appellate courts should intervene only when the lower court's order is clearly wrong, not just when it is not right.

7. Primarily, it is the satisfaction of the fora considering the application for condonation of delay about the sufficiency of cause and we cannot substitute our satisfaction unless it is shown that the fora below improperly exercised its discretion to consider the application for delay based on untenable, arbitrary, or perverse grounds and/or its order suffers from any illegality or material irregularity. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments[1] that revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission is extremely limited, it should be exercised only in case as contemplated within the parameters specified in the provision i.e. when State Commission had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction so vested or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.  It is only when such findings are found to be against any provisions of law or against the pleadings or evidence or are found to be wholly perverse, a case for interference may call for at the second appellate (revisional) jurisdiction.

8.  After careful consideration of entire facts and circumstances of the case, orders of the State Commission as well as the reasons for delay contained in the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner herein before the State Commission, we find no illegality or material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the order of the State Commission. We are in the agreement of the findings of the State Commission, hence the same is upheld. Accordingly, RP is dismissed.

9. Pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.