| ORDER | STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, U.T., CHANDIGARH First Appeal No. | : | 430 of 2013 | Date of Institution | : | 04.10.2013 | Date of Decision | : | 10/10/2013 | | M/s Berkeley Automobiles Ltd., Dealer Code: 0704, through its Managing Director, Plot No.27 (Plot No.24, as mentioned in documents, in previous address), Industrial Area, Phase-I, Chandigarh. Present appeal through its Legal and Liasioin Officer, Shri Om Parkash Sharma. ……Appellant/Opposite Party No.2 V e r s u sAnamika Uppal, resident of House No.1326, Sector 44-B, Chandigarh. Appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. BEFORE: Argued by: PER JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.), PRESIDENT “In view of above discussion, finding merit in the allegations of the Complainant, we allow the present complaint and pass the following orders:- (a) (b) (c) 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Alongwith the appeal, an application for condonation of delay of 97 days, as per the applicant/ appellant (as per the office report 86 days), in filing the same (appeal), was moved. In the application, it was stated by the applicant/appellant, that certified copy of the order impugned dated, was received by it, on 10.06.2013. It was further stated that, on receipt of the said order, the applicant/appellant, prepared a cheque dated 14.06.2013, in the sum of Rs.11,236/-, towards its equal share of amount of compensation, and handed over the same, to the complainant/respondent, which was accepted by her. It was further stated that the applicant/appellant, also wanted to comply with the remaining directions of the District Forum, in respect of repair of the vehicle, in question, but, in the mean time, it (applicant/Opposite Party No.2), had resigned from the dealership of Opposite Party No.1, on 04.02.2013, which was accepted by it (Opposite Party No.1), on 11.02.2013, and finally the said dealership became non-existent w.e.f. 05.05.2013. It was further stated that after the said resignation, all the equipments/machineries were disposed of, as a result whereof, the repair of the vehicle, in question, of the complainant, could not be carried out. It was further stated that the applicant/appellant, contacted Maruti Suzuki India Limited, in order to get the repair of the vehicle, from some other authorized dealer/workshop, at its (applicant/appellant) cost, but it could not succeed. It was further stated that the applicant/appellant also approached the District Forum, by filing a Miscellaneous Application, for modification of the order, and expressed its inability to repair the vehicle, in question, but it did not entertain the same, on the ground that it had no Jurisdiction, to recall/review/modify, its own order. It was further stated that, on account of the reasons, aforesaid, the delay of 97 days, (as per the office report 86 days), in filing the appeal occurred. It was further stated that the delay, in filing the appeal, was neither intentional, nor deliberate. Accordingly, the prayer, referred to above, was made. 9. We have heard the Counsel for the applicant/appellant, on the application, for condonation of delay, as also, in the main appeal, at the preliminary stage, and have gone through the record of the case, carefully. 10. ,a case decided by a Full Bench of the held as under:- “No doubt the words “sufficient cause” should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. However, when it is found that the applicants were most negligent in defending the case and their non-action and want of bonafides are clearly imputable, the Court would not help such a party. After all “sufficient cause” is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guide-lines can be given and Court has to decide on the facts of each case as to whether, the defendant who has suffered ex-parte decree has been able to satisfactorily show sufficient cause for non- appearance and in examining this aspect, cumulative effect of all the relevant factors is to be seen.” 11. ,it was held as under:- “There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice, but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.” 12. ,the Supreme Court observed as under:- “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition”. 13. it was held as under:- “The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its 14. it was held as under:- “Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around Section 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigation who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay” 15. it was held as under:- “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras” 16. had resigned from the dealership of Opposite Party No.1, which was accepted on 11.02.2013, by it (Opposite Party No.1), and order dated 29.05.2013, on 10.06.2013, the officials of the applicant/appellant just slept over the matter and, ultimately, woke up from the deep slumber on 04.10.2013, when the instant appeal was filed, without furnishing any plausible explanation. It could be said that the officials of the applicant/appellant were not diligent, in pursuing the matter. The prescribed period of limitation, as envisaged by Section 15 of the Act, for filing an appeal is 30 days, from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The applicant/appellant did not act, with due diligence, resulting into delay of 97 days, (as per the office report 86 days), in filing the appeal, which is about three times, beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The cause, set up by the applicant/appellant, in the application, for condonation of delay, could not be said to be plausible. The mere fact that the officials of the applicant/appellant, acted in a leisure mood, without envisaging the consequences, which could ensue, on account of non-filing of an appeal, within the period prescribed, under Section 15 of the Act, does not mean that it could be shown undue indulgence. The delay, in filing the appeal was, thus, intentional, willful and deliberate. Since, no sufficient cause is constituted, from the averments, contained in the application, the delay of 97 days, as per the applicant/appellant (as per the office report 86 days), cannot be condoned. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. The application is, thus, liable to be dismissed. 17. Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361,it was “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.” 18. ,that even if, sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire, whether, in its discretion, it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter, requires the Commission, to take into Ram Lal & Others’ case(supra)is fully applicable to the instant case. This is, therefore, not a fit case, in which this Commission, should exercise its discretion, in favour of the applicant/appellant, in condoning the delay. 19. 20. “The vehicle having registration No.CH04L9993, Engine No.F8DN3723682, Chassis No. MA3EYD81SO 1464409 was presented for inspection by Sh. Satish Uppal. The vehicle in question was inspected and test driven for 13 Kms. The Committee after inspection, test drive and perusal of records is of the opinion:- 1. 2. 3. 4. The above observations may not attribute to manufacturing defects as these can be rectified by replacement of suspension system.” 21. 22. 23. The District Forum, was, thus, right, in holding that the Opposite Parties, were deficient, in rendering service, by not properly repairing the vehicle, and replacing the defective parts thereof, free-of-cost. The findings of the District Forum, in this regard, being correct are affirmed. 24. 25. 26. 27. Pronounced. October 10, 2013 Sd/- [JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.)] PRESIDENT Sd/- (DEV RAJ) MEMBER Rg |
