APPEARED AT THE TIME OF ARGUMENTS For the Appellant | : | Mr. Pawan Kumar Ray, Advocate | | | |
PRONOUNCED ON: 22nd February 2018 ORDER PER DR. B.C. GUPTA, PRESIDING MEMBER This first appeal has been filed under section 19 read with section 21(a)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, against the impugned order dated 12.08.2016, passed by the Maharashtra State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Mumbai, Circuit Bench Pune (hereinafter referred to as “the State Commission”) according to which, the written version to the consumer complaint no. CC/15/716 submitted on behalf of the appellant/opposite party (OP) was not accepted on the ground that the same had not been filed within the period of 45 days, as stipulated in section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the consumer complaint in question was filed against the appellant, alleging deficiency in service on their part for their failure to handover the possession of the flat in question with all amenities in accordance with the agreement entered between the parties. As stated in the memo of appeal itself, the said complaint was admitted by the State Commission and notice was sent to the appellant/OP for appearance and for filing the written statement on 11.01.2016. The matter was then adjourned to 14.03.2016, on which date, the counsel for the appellant filed vakalatnama and took adjournment to file written statement on 11.07.2016. On that date, the counsel for the appellant sought withdrawal of vakalatnama and the next date of hearing was fixed as 09.08.2016. On 09.08.2016, the case was further adjourned to 15.12.2016 and there was no sitting of the Bench on that date. However, the appellant approached the Bench with his new counsel on 12.08.2016 and moved an application for taking the matter on Board, alongwith his vakalatnama. The said application was allowed, but the written statement was not accepted on the ground that time of 45 days had already elapsed from the date of service of the notice. Being aggrieved by the said order of the State Commission, the appellant has filed the present appeal before this Commission. 3. The present appeal has been filed with a delay of 346 days. The impugned order dated 12.08.2016 was made in the presence of the learned counsel for the appellant, but the present appeal has been filed on 23.08.2017, which is late by 346 days, after deducting the permissible time of 30 days for filing such an appeal. An application for condonation of delay has been filed, in which it has been stated that a copy of the impugned order dated 12.08.2016 was received by the appellant on 14.02.2017. Thereafter, time was spent for arranging the services of a counsel and to get hold of the necessary documents. 4. During hearing before this Commission, the learned counsel for the appellant was asked to provide justification for the condonation of huge delay of 346 days in filing the appeal, but he could not advance any further reasons, apart from those mentioned in the application for condonation of delay. 5. On perusal of the material available on record, we do not find any cogent and convincing explanation, which may justify the condonation of the huge delay of 346 days in filing the present appeal. Even if the version given by the appellant that they received copy of the impugned order dated 12.08.2016 on 14.02.2017 is believed, even then the further delay in filing the appeal is not justifiable on any ground. It is a well-settled legal proposition that the delay cannot be condoned, unless there are very solid and convincing reasons to do so. We are supported in this view by an order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), in which, it was observed as
follows:- “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”. 6. It may further be stated that as per the own version of the appellant, they put in appearance through counsel before the State Commission on 14.03.2016. However, they have not given any reason, as to why the written version could not be filed within the statutory time limit of 45 days, as laid down in section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. From the record before us, it is not made out anywhere that the appellants made any plea before the State Commission for extension of the time limit, based on any valid reason. As stated in the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 04.12.2015 in Civil Appeal No. 10941-10942 of 2013, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (Pvt.) Ltd., no further time can be given for filing the written version, apart from that mentioned in section 13 of the Act. Thereafter, the matter has been referred to a five-Member Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as per the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 1083-1084/2016, Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. Grand Venezia Buyers Association and allied matters on 11.02.2016. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed an order on 10.02.2017, in the meantime, in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. vs. M/s. Mampee Timbers and Hardwares Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. in Civil Appeal No. 2990/2017, directing that written version could be allowed to be filed after the expiry of the period laid down in section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ‘on suitable terms’. In the present case, however, there does not seem to be any justification for condoning the delay in filing the written version on any valid ground or any suitable terms. 7. Based on the discussion above, it is held that there is no merit in this appeal and the same is ordered to be dismissed on grounds of limitation as well as on merits. There shall be no order as to costs. |
