ORDER Taken up through video conferencing. 1. This revision has been filed under section 21(b) of the Act 1986 in challenge to the Order dated 19.02.2013 of the State Commission in appeal no. 1092 of 2011 arising out of the Order dated 14.12.2009 of the District Commission in complaint no. 17 of 2003. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the two sides. Perused the material on record, including inter alia the Order dated 14.12.2009 of the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 19.02.2013 of the State Commission and the petition. 3. The matter relates to allotment of a low income group (L.I.G.) flat by the development authority (the respondent herein) to the complainant (the petitioner herein). Essentially, two issues were inherent in the dispute, one, whether the development authority could revise / enhance the initial tentative cost, and, two, the date from which the instalments had to be paid by the complainant to the development authority for the balance consideration amount. The District Commission vide its Order dated 14.12.2009 allowed the complaint and ordered the development authority to execute sale-deed of the subject flat in favour of the complainant on his paying a lumpsum amount of Rs. 75,851/-. The development authority appealed before the State Commission. The State Commission decided the two issues inherent in the matter in favour of the development authority. In respect of the first issue it held that the development authority was within its rights to revise / enhance the initial tentative cost, as it had the power to do so. In respect of the second issue it held that the development authority had correctly fixed the instalments from 1976 (and not from 1979 as contended by the complainant), as the requisite construction and development works had been completed by 1976. The complainant preferred revision before this Commission. 4. The Orders of the District Commission and of the State Commission are a matter of record, no useful purpose will be served by reproducing them here all over again. It suffices to observe that a perusal of the District Commission’s Order shows that, of the two issues germane in the dispute, it has not examined the first issue regarding final costing at all, it has also not examined the evidence in respect of the date from which the instalments for the balance consideration amount were due (whether from 1999 as contended by the development authority or from 1996 as contended by the complainant). Making a nebulous and somewhat incoherent discussion, it has ordered that on payment of a lumpsum amount the subject flat be registered in favour of the complainant. On the other hand, the State Commission has appraised the facts and evidence in a precise and coherent manner and answered both the issues innate in the matter. 5. We may observe that the development authority herein is a government authority, it works ( / is required and expected to work) as per the prescribed administrative, financial and technical rules laid-down by the government, its accounts are subject to audit, its officials are accountable. Needless to elaborate that cost of land and construction of house is subsidized for the low income group (L.I.G.) and as such the same gets substantially extenuated. Benefit of allotment under the L.I.G. category for a flat has been provided to the complainant. 6. It is normal to have an initial tentative cost and a revised final cost in the functioning of a government development authority. Some escalation in cost at times occurs. If there is no patent ‘deficiency’ or ‘negligence’ or ‘unfairness’ or ‘deceptiveness’ visible in fixing such enhanced final cost (like, for example, not adhering to its administrative, financial and technical rules, indulging in manifest managerial or administrative inefficiency as may have occasioned unjustified and unreasonable time or cost overruns, or where the decision in question may be arraigned for being discriminative and partisan in not making the revised cost universally applicable to all similarly placed persons, etc.), the development authority cannot be baldly accused of ‘deficiency’ or ‘negligence’ or ‘unfairness’ or ‘deceptiveness’. However, nothing along these lines has been even contended, far less being proved, by the complainant. As such we do not see any reason to disagree with the State Commission in its findings, in the present case, that there was no ‘deficiency’ on the part of the development authority in revising the cost and making it universally applicable to all similarly situate persons. We but hasten to add that our observation in this regard is in respect of the present case alone in the specific facts and circumstances of the same, it must not be misconstrued or misused by any development authority(ies) as a finding of this Commission to condone unjustified and unreasonable time or cost overruns as may be patently ‘deficient’ or ‘negligent’ or ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’. 7. The State Commission has decided this question in favour of the development authority by holding that the development authority has the power to calculate the revised final cost at an amount higher than the initial tentative cost. We but qualify the State Commission’s Order by making it explicit that any such power or condition of allotment is per se subject to scrutiny and in case the facts and evidence point towards clear ‘deficiency’ or ‘negligence’ or ‘unfairness’ or ‘deceptiveness’, the development authority(ies) cannot take the cover behind the shield of such power or condition. Such power or condition cannot either vindicate or condone manifest proved instances of ‘deficiency’ or ‘negligence’ or ‘unfairness’ or ‘deceptiveness’ (like, for example, as already illustrated before, not adhering to its administrative, financial and technical rules, indulging in manifest managerial inefficiency as may occasion unjustified and unreasonable time or cost overruns, not making the revised cost universally applicable to all similarly placed persons, etc.). 8. The question of the applicable date of fixing instalments has been correctly appraised by the State Commission. Considering the facts and evidence apropos the status of construction and development works, the State Commission has held that the development authority was right in asking for instalments from 1996. It is also clear that this date has been made applicable universally by the development authority in respect of all similarly situate persons in the L.I.G. category. 9. As already stated above, the District Commission has not even attempted to examine the two issues inherent in the matter while making its appraisal and has passed a nebulous and somewhat incoherent Order. As such we find it difficult to be persuaded with the submission of the learned counsel for the complainant that the Order of the District Commission be sustained, it being difficult to agree to an ill-appraised imprecise and somewhat half-baked incoherent Order. We find no good reason to disagree with the State Commission in dismissing the complaint. We have made observations in respect of the State Commission’s appraisal in paras 6 and 7 above. However this does not affect the State Commission’s decision to dismiss the complaint in the present case, in its specific facts and evidence. 10. The petition is dismissed. Resultantly, the complaint remains dismissed. However the State Commission’s Order is qualified with the observations as contained in paras 6 and 7 above. 11. The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to their learned counsel as well as to the State Commission and the District Commission within three days. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately. | 
