राज्‍य उपभोक्‍ता विवाद प्रतितोष आयोग, उ0प्र0, लखनऊ

विविध वाद सं0-237/2022

सुरक्षित  

यूनियन बैंक आफ इण्डिया बनाम अग्रवाल ट्रेडर्स

01-03-2023 :-

मा0 श्री राजेन्‍द्र सिंह, सदस्‍य द्वारा उद्घोषित

यह विविध प्रार्थना पत्र आवेदक यूनियन बैंक आफ इण्डिया की ओर से दिनांक 16-08-2022 को इस आशय का दिया गया है कि उन्‍हें दिनांक 12-07-2022 को अपील में जो कमी बताई गई थी अर्थात् 1,755/- रू0 की जो धनराशि जमा करनी थी उसकी फोटोकापी ले कर आए थे और यह कथा कि इस मामले को स्‍थगित कर दें जिससे वह इस अपील की कमी को पूरा कर सके।

हमारे द्वारा आवेदक के विद्वान अधिवक्‍ता श्री राजेश चड्ढा को सुना एवं पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया गया। प्रत्‍यर्थी की ओर से कोई उपस्थित नहीं है।

हमने मूल अपील सं0-348/2018 ब्रांच मैनेजर यूनियन बैंक आफ इण्डिया बनाम अग्रवाल ट्रेडर्स की पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया।

दिनांक 23-02-2018 को यह अपील प्रस्‍तुत की गई और प्रस्‍तुत करने के दिनांक को ही इस पर कार्यालय आख्‍या के अनुसार पत्रावली त्रुटिपूर्ण दाखिल की गई है और त्रुटि का निवारण दिनांक 09-03-2018 तक करने की टिप्‍पणी मौजूद है। इसमें डिमाण्‍ड ड्राफ्ट में 1755/- रू0 कम होना बताया गया। दिनांक 09-03-2018 को बार-बार मौका दिया गया किन्‍तु कमी पूरी नहीं की गई। दिनांक 28-03-2018 का आदेश निम्‍नप्रकार है :-

‘’ कार्यालय आख्‍या के अनुसार 1755/- रू० का ड्राफ्ट धारा 15 उपभोक्‍ता संरक्षण अधिनियम के अन्‍तर्गत जमा धनराशि हेतु कम है। अपीलार्थी ने इस सन्‍दर्भ में आदेश दिनांक 14-03-2018 का अनुपालन नहीं किया है। अत: अपीलार्थी निश्चित तिथि तक वांछित धनराशि जमा करें। पुन: समय नहीं प्रदान किया जाएगा। पत्रावली अंगीकरण के बिन्‍दु पर सुनवाई हेतु दिनांक 07-05-2018 को सूचीबद्ध हो। ‘’  

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इस पर भी कमी को पूरा नहीं किया गया। पुन: दिनांक 06-07-2018 को निम्‍न आदेश पारित किया गया :-

‘’ उभयपक्ष अनुपस्थित। पत्रावली के अवलोकन से प्रतीत हो रहा है कि अपीलार्थी ने त्रुटि का निवारण नहीं किया है। अत: अपीलार्थी को निर्देशित किया जाता है कि वह त्रुटि निवारण एक माह में किया जाना सुनिश्चित करे। तत्‍पश्‍चात् पत्रावली आदेश हेतु दिनांक 01-10-2018 को सूचीब‍द्ध हो। ‘’

पुन: दिनांक 01-10-2018 को निम्‍न आदेश पारित किया गया :-

‘’ उभयपक्ष अनुपस्थित। पत्रावली के अवलोकन से प्रतीत हो रहा है कि अपीलार्थी ने त्रुटि का निवारण नहीं किया है। अत: अपीलार्थी को निर्देशित किया जाता है कि वह त्रुटि निवारण एक माह में किया जाना सुनिश्चित करे। पत्रावली आदेश हेतु दिनांक 28-02-2019 को सूचीब‍द्ध हो। ‘’

अन्‍तत: दिनांक 29-02-2019 को मा0 अध्‍यक्ष महोदय द्वारा निम्‍न आदेश पारित किया गया :-

‘’ अपीलार्थी की ओर से विद्वान अधिवक्‍ता श्री राजेश चड्ढा उपस्थित आए और त्रुटि निवारण हेतु समय चाहा। त्रुटि निवारण निश्चित तिथि तक अवश्‍य किया जाए। पुन: त्रुटि निवारण हेतु समय नहीं प्रदान किया जाएगा।

पत्रावली आदेश हेतु दिनांक 03-07-2019 को सूचीबद्ध हो। ‘’

इस आदेश में स्‍पष्‍ट लिखा था कि पुन: त्रुटि निवारण हेतु समय नहीं प्रदान किया जाएगा। इसके बाबजूद भी त्रुटि निवारण नहीं किया गया।

पुन: मा0 अध्‍यक्ष महोदय द्वारा दिनांक 03-07-2019 को निम्‍न आदेश पारित किया गया :-

‘’ ‘’ अपीलार्थी की ओर से विद्वान अधिवक्‍ता उपस्थित आए और त्रुटि निवारण हेतु समय चाहा। अपीलार्थी इंगित त्रुटि का निवारण निश्चित तिथि तक अवश्‍यक करें, अन्‍यथा विधि के अनुसार आदेश पारित कर दिया जायेगा।

दिनांक 01-11-2019 अंगीकरण के बिन्‍दु पर सुनवाई हेतु तिथि निश्चित हो। ‘’

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इसके बाबजूद भी त्रुटि का निवारण नहीं किया गया।

बार-बार अवसर देने के बाद भी त्रुटि का निवारण नहीं किया गया। इसके पश्‍चात् दिनांक 11-11-2021, 24-12-2021, 28-01-2022 और दिनांक 30-05-2022 को इस कमी को दूर करने के आदेश पारित किए गए किन्‍तु अपीलार्थी द्वारा इस पर कोई ध्‍यान नहीं दिया गया जिससे यह विश्‍वास होने का पर्याप्‍त कारण उत्‍पन्‍न हुआ कि अपीलार्थी न्‍यायालय को अपनी इच्‍छा से चलाना चाहता है और उसे न्‍यायालय के आदेशों का अनुपालन करने में कोई रूचि नहीं है। अन्‍तत: दिनांक 12-07-2022 को इसी आधार पर अपील निरस्‍त कर दी गई। तब इसके एक महीने पश्‍चात् दिनांक 16-08-2022 को यह विविध वाद प्रस्‍तुत किया गया।

अपीलार्थी/आवेदक यूनियन बैंक आफ इण्डिया है। अत: यह नहीं कहा जा सकता कि वह अत्‍यधिक गरीब व्‍यक्ति है जो इस तुच्‍छ धनराशि की पूर्ति नहीं कर सकता। उपभोक्‍ता आयोग को इस प्रकार समझा जा रहा है कि वह पक्षकारों के निर्देश के अनुसार कार्य करेगा और जितना चाहें वे मामले को लम्बित रख सकते हैं।

अपील के पुनर्स्‍थापन के सम्‍बन्‍ध में निम्‍नलिखित तथ्‍यों को देखा जा सकता     है :-

In the case of Mr. Reju Thomas vs. The National Insurance, WP(C).No. 37468 of 2004(I), judgment dated 04 August 2008, Hon’ble Kerala High Court has said;

“6. Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides the procedure to be complied by the District Forum on admitting a complaint. Sub clause (i) and (ii) of clause (b) of subsection 2 of Section 13 of the Act empowers the District Forum either to dismiss a complaint for default or to pass an exparte order against respondents based on the evidence of the complainant. The Act does not contain a provision empowering the District Forum either to restore a complaint which is dismissed for default or to set aside the exparte order passed under Section 13 (2) (b) of the Act. This omission cannot be ignored. Section 22A of the  Act was inserted by The Consumer Protection Amendment Act (Act 62 of 2002) empowering the National

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Commission to set aside an exparte order. Section 22A provides that where an order is passed by the National Commission exparte against the opposite party or a complainant, the aggrieved party may apply to the National Commission to set aside the said order in the interest of justice. Even when such a power was granted to the National Commission by the Amendment Act, such a power was not given either to the District Forum or the State Forum. It is also important to take note of the fact that Amendment Act 62 of 2002 was introduced subsequent to the decision of the Apex Court in Jyotsana Aravind Kumar Shah v. Bombay Hospital Trust 1999(4) SCC 325 and also the decision in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Srinivasan's case (supra).

7. In Jyotsana Aravinda Kumar Shah's case (supra) the power of the State Commission to set aside an exparte order was considered by the Apex Court. It was held that so long as there is no provision in the Act enabling the State Commission to set aside an exparte order, it cannot set aside an exparte order. Their Lordships held:

         “The State Commission, however, fell into  an error in not bearing in mind that the Act under which it is functioning has not provided it with any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte reasoned order. It is also seen from the order of the State Commission that it was influenced by the concluding portion of the judgment of the Bombay High Court to the effect that the respondent (writ petitioner) could approach the appellate authority or make an appropriate application before the State Commission for setting aside the ex parte order, if permissible under the law. Here again, the State Commission failed to appreciate that the observation of the High Court would help the respondent, if permissible under the law. If the law does not permit the respondent to move the application for setting aside the ex parte order, which appears to be the position, the order of the State Commission setting  aside the ex parte order cannot be sustained. As stated earlier, there is no dispute that there is no provision in the Act enabling the State Commission to set aside an ex parte order.”

9. The question considered by the Apex Court in New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Sreenivasan (supra) as is clear

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from paragraph 5 of the judgment was whether in view of dismissal of the first complaint filed by the respondent therein, a second complaint on the same facts and cause of action would lie and whether it ought to have been dismissed as not maintainable. Their Lordships considered the power of Consumer Redressal Forum under Section 13 and held that powers which are available to a civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure are made available to District Forum in respect of matters enumerated in sub section 4 of Section 13 and provisions of Order IX are not made applicable. Their Lordships  then held:

“(10). We have already indicated above that the Code of Civil Procedure has been applied to the proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act only to a limited extent. If the intention of the legislature was to apply the provisions of Order 9 also to the proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, it would have clearly provided in the Act that the provisions of Order 9 will also be applicable to the proceedings before the District Forum or the State Commission or, for that matter, before the National Commission. If the legislature itself did not apply the rule of prohibition contained in Order 9 Rule 9(1), it will be difficult for the courts to extend that provision to the proceedings under the Act.”

After laying down that it would be permissible to file a second complaint, explaining why the earlier complaint could not be  pursued and was dismissed for default, it was held:

“(18). We only intend to invoke the spirit of the principle behind the above dictum in support of our view that every court or judicial body or authority, which has a duty to decide a lis between two parties, inherently possesses the power to dismiss a case in default. Where a case is called up for hearing and the party is not present, the court or the judicial or quasi-judicial body is under no obligation to keep the matter pending before it or to pursue the matter on behalf of the complainant who had instituted the proceedings. That is not the function of the court or, for that matter of a judicial or quasi-judicial body. In the absence of the complainant, therefore, the court will be well within its jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint for non-prosecution. So also, it would

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have the inherent power and jurisdiction to restore the complaint on  good cause being shown for the non- appearance of the complainant.”

It is relying on this paragraph learned counsel appearing for petitioner argued that the Consumer Redressal Forum has the power to restore complaint which was dismissed for non appearance of the complainant. The learned counsel pointed out that taking note of the earlier decision in Jyotsana Aravind Kumar  Shah's case where a contrary view was taken, a subsequent Bench of the Apex Court in Rajeev Hitendra Pathan v. Achyut Kashinath Karekar (2007 (7) SCC 667) has referred the question to a larger Bench and therefore it is to be found that Consumer Redressal Forum has the power to restore a complaint which was dismissed for default. In Rajeev Hitendra Pathan's case (supra) taking note of paragraph 18 of the judgment in New India Assurance case (supra) it was held:

“In the latter case i.e. New India Assurance case reference was not made to the earlier decision in Jyotsana case. Further the effect of the amendment to the Act in 2003 whereby Section 22A was introduced has the effect of conferment of power of restoration on the  National Commission, but not to the State Commission. In view of the divergence of views expressed by coordinate Benches, we refer the matter to a larger Bench to consider the question whether the State Commission has the power to recall the ex parte order. Records be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.”

Hence it cannot be said that Apex Court has held that District Forum has jurisdiction to restore a complaint dismissed for default. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court and submitted that it was held that District Forum has the power to set aside the exparte order. In St. Joseph's Hospital v. Jimmy (2001 (2) KLT 514) the learned Single Judge also held that power to set aside the exparte order under Order IX was not given to the District Forum. True, relying on New India Assurance case it was observed that District Forum has inherent power to restore the complaint dismissed for default. But that was not the question decided in the said case. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal

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Commission in Harish Chandra  v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2008 (2) CPR 249 (NC) also held that Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act does not empower a State Commission to review or recall its own final order or a complaint.

“13. Though reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Thressiamma v. Union of India (1999 (2) KLT 683) what was held therein was only that existence of an alternate remedy is not a bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, if there is violation of the fundamental rights or violation of any Act or Rules or violation of  the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench following the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in M/s Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheswari v. Antarim Zila Parishad (AIR 1969 SC 556) held that if there is violation of the principles of natural justice or violation of any rule or Act, dismissal of writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy is not proper. When under Section 13(2) (c) the District Forum is competent to dismiss a complaint on the failure of complainant to appear, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the complaint was in violation of any rule or Act. When the Act does not empower the District Forum, to restore a complaint to file dismissal of the petition for restoration, whatever be the ground for dismissal, is also not an act in violation of the Act or the Rules. Sub section 3 of Section 13 specifically provides that “no proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in sub section 1 and 2 shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with”. Therefore the order cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice also. Hence fact that writ petition was earlier admitted is also not a ground to quash the order of the District Forum which is legal and regular. In   such circumstances, the writ petition is not maintainable.”

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of   New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs R. Srinivasan on 28 February, 2000Appeal (civil)  11439 of 1996 ;DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/02/2000 has held ;

“The District Forum, by its order dated 19.12.1994, allowed the claim of the respondent for a sum of Rs.

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1,47,141.70 p. together with interest at the rate of 18 per cent from 26.11.1991. This order was challenged by the appellant before the State Commission, Madras, on the ground, inter alia, that a second complaint could not be legally instituted by the respondent as the first complaint, which was dismissed for default, was not restored. The State Commission, however, dismissed the appeal by its judgment dated 12.6.1995. The appellant, thereafter, filed Revision before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, which was dismissed on 27.2.1996.

The only question raised before us by the learned counsel for the appellant is that in view of the dismissal of the first complaint filed by the respondent, a second complaint on the same facts and cause of action would not lie and it ought to have been dismissed as not maintainable. It is contended that the second complaint was filed in respect of the same vehicle and for the same amount and against the same party from which damages were claimed earlier, and once the complaint was dismissed though for default, a second complaint would not lie, specially as the application for restoration was also rejected by the State Commission.

The provisions of Order 9 have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act. Order 9 deals with appearance of parties and consequence of non-appearance. It is provided by Rule 2 of Order 9 that if the plaintiff was found to have not taken any step for service upon the defendant, the suit would be dismissed. Rule 3 contemplates dismissal of suit for non-appearance of the parties. If the suit is dismissed under Rule 3 on account of non-appearance of the parties, it would be open to the court to set aside the order by which the suit was dismissed and to restore the suit to its original file. Rule 4 also enables the plaintiff, whose suit was dismissed under Rule 3, to bring a fresh suit. But where the suit is dismissed under Rule 8 for non-appearance of the plaintiff, though the defendant is present, it will not be possible lor the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action on account of the prohibitions contained in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 of Order 9. But it will be open to the Court to recall the order and restore the suit. It is this Rule which is being relied upon by the counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that the complaint filed by the respondent having been once dismissed

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and the restoration application having also been rejected, it was not open to him to file a fresh complaint on the same cause of action against the appellant.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyotsana Arvind Kumar Shah & ors. Vs. Bombay Hospital Trust on 22 January, 1999, 1999 (1) BLJR 602, JT 1999 (5) SC 228, 1999 II OLR SC 126, (1999) 4 SCC 325 has held:

 “7. We heard learned Counsel on both sides for quite some time. When we asked the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent to point out the provision in the Act which enables the State Commission to set aside the reasoned order passed, though ex parte, he could not lay his hands on any of the provisions in the Act. As a matter of fact, before the State Commission the appellants brought to its notice the two orders, one passed by the Bihar State Commission in Chief Manager, UCO Bank v. Ram Govind Agarwal 1996 (1) CPR 351 and the other passed by the National Commission in Forest Research Institute v. Sunshine Enterprises 1997 (1) CPR 42 holding that the redressal agencies have no power to recall or review their exparte order. The State Commission had distinguished the above said orders on the ground that in those two cases the opponents had not only not appeared but also failed to put in their written statements. In other words, in the case on hand, according to the State Commission, the opponent/respondent having filed the written statements, the failure to consider the same by the State Commission before passing the order would be a valid ground for setting aside the ex parte order. The State Commission, however, fell into an error in not bearing in mind that the Act under which it is functioning has not provided it with any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte reasoned order. It is also seen from the order of the State Commission that it was influenced by the concluding portion of the judgment of the Bombay High Court to the effect that the respondent (writ petitioner) could approach the appellate authority or make an appropriate application before the State Commission for setting aside the ex parte order, if permissible under the law. Here again, the State Commission failed to appreciate that the observation of the High Court would help the respondent, if permissible under the law. If the law does not permit the respondent to move the application for setting aside the ex parte

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order, which appears to be the position, the order of the State Commission setting aside the ex parte order cannot be sustained. As stated earlier, there is no dispute that there is no provision in the Act enabling the State Commission to set aside an ex parte order.

8. The National Commission, as noticed earlier, dismissed the revisions in limine without going into the merits.

9. As it is clear from the above discussion that the order of the State Commission setting aside the ex parte order was one without jurisdiction, we cannot sustain the same. Accordingly, the order dated 10.6.1992 of the State Commission as confirmed by the National Commission is set aside and Miscellaneous Application No. 15 of 1996 stands dismissed. Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 1996 is restored to the file of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra State, Mumbai for disposal in accordance with law. The appeals are allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of   Rajeev Hitendra Pathak & Ors. Vs. Achyut Kashinath Karekar & Anr. on 19 August, 2011 in Civil Appeal no.4307 of 2007; with Civil Appeal no..8155 OF 2001;  M.O.H. Leathers  Versus United Commercial Bank has held:

“2. The main question which arises for consideration is whether the District Consumer Forums and the State Commissions have the power to set aside their own ex parte orders or in other words have the power to recall or review their own orders?

"5. In Jyotsana's case it was observed at para 7 as follows:

"We heard the learned counsel on both sides for quite some time. When we asked the learned counsel appearing for the respondent to point out the provision in the Act which enables the State Commission to set aside the reasoned order passed, though ex parte, he could not lay his hands on any of the provisions in the Act. As a matter of fact, before the State Commission the appellants brought to its notice the two orders, one passed by the Bihar State Commission in Court Master, UCO Bank v. Ram Govind  Agarwal 1996 (1) CPR 351 and the other passed by the National Commission in Director, Forest Research Institute v.

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Sunshine Enterprises 1997 (1) CPR 42 holding that the redressal agencies have no power to recall or review their ex parte order. The State Commission had distinguished the abovesaid orders on the ground that in those two cases the opponents had not only not appeared but also failed to put in their written statements. In other words, in the case on hand, according to the State Commission, the opponent (respondent) having filed the written statements, the failure to consider the same by the State Commission before passing the order would be a valid ground for setting aside the ex parte order. The State Commission, however, fell into an error in not bearing in mind that the Act under which it is functioning has not provided it with any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte reasoned order. It is also seen from the order of the State Commission that it was influenced by the concluding portion of the judgment of the Bombay High Court to the effect that the respondent (writ petitioner) could approach the appellate authority or make an appropriate application before the State Commission for setting aside the ex parte order, if permissible under the law. Here again, the State Commission failed to appreciate that the observation of the High Court would help the respondent, if permissible under the law. If the law does not permit the respondent to move the application for setting aside the ex parte order, which appears to be the position, the order of the State Commission setting aside the ex parte order cannot be  sustained. As stated earlier, there is no dispute that there is no provision in the Act enabling the State Commission to set aside an ex parte order."

6. Subsequently, in New India Assurance case this Court appears to have taken a different view as it is evident from what has been stated in para 18, the same reads as follows:

“We only intend to invoke the spirit of the principle behind the above dictum in support of our view that every court or judicial body or authority, which has a duty to decide a lis between two parties, inherently possesses the power to dismiss a case in default. Where a case is called up for hearing and the party is not present, the court or the judicial or quasi-judicial body is under no obligation to keep the matter pending before it or to pursue the matter on behalf of the complainant who had instituted the proceedings. That is not the function of the court or, for that matter of a judicial or quasi-judicial body. In the absence of the

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complainant, therefore, the court will be well within its jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint for non-prosecution. So also, it would have the inherent power and jurisdiction to restore the complaint on good cause being shown for the non- appearance of the complainant.”

7. In the latter case i.e. New India Assurance case reference was not made to the earlier decision in Jyotsana case. Further the effect of the amendment to the Act in 2003 whereby Section 22A was introduced has the effect of conferment of power of restoration on the National Commission, but not to the State Commission. In view of the divergence of views expressed by coordinate  Benches, we refer the matter to a larger Bench to consider the question whether the State Commission has the power to recall the ex parte order. Records be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

11. We have been called upon to decide whether the State Commission has the power to recall an ex parte order.

12. Shri Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal No.4307 of 2007 submitted that the Consumer Tribunals set up under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are creatures of that Statute and derive their powers only from the express provisions of the Statute. He has drawn our attention to various provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to strengthen his submission. He referred to Section 13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which reads as under:

“13 (4) For the purposes of this Section, the District Forum shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:-

(i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath;

(ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object produced as evidence;

(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;

(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant

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source;

(v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness; and

(vi) any other matter which may be prescribed.”

13. Mr. Bhatnagar has also drawn our attention to Regulation 26(1) of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005, framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 30-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Regulation 26(1) reads as follows:

 “26. Miscellaneous- (1) In all proceedings before the Consumer Forum, endeavour shall be made by the parties and their counsel to avoid the use of provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):

Provided that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be applied which have been referred to in the Act or in the rules made thereunder.”

14. Mr. Bhatnagar submitted that only very few provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings before the District Forums and the State Commissions under Section 18 of the Consumer Protection  Act, which applies Sections 13 and 14 to the State Commission and the National Commission (under Section 22(1) are those under Section 13(4)). He relied on the judgment of this Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das (1994) 4 SCC 225 to strengthen his argument that the consumer tribunals can derive powers only from the express provisions in the Statute. In the said case, the Court observed as under:

“44. A careful reading of the above discloses that there is no power under the Act to grant any interim relief of (sic or) even an ad interim relief. Only a final relief could be granted. If the jurisdiction of the Forum to grant relief is confined to the four clauses mentioned under Section 14, it passes our comprehension as to how an interim injunction could ever be granted disregarding even the balance of convenience.”

15. Mr. Bhatnagar also placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in Gulzari Lal Agarwal v. Accounts Officer (1996) 10 SCC 590. In this case, the Court relied on earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund and observed that the Consumer Forum has no jurisdiction or power to pass any

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interim order pending disposal of the original complaint filed before it.

16. Mr. Bhatnagar relied on Section 17 of the Act which deals with the jurisdiction of the State Commission. Sections 17-A and 17-B were added by the 2002 Amendment of the Act dealing with the “Transfer of Cases” and “Circuit Benches” respectively. The objects and reasons for introducing the said provisions by way of the said amendment were as follows:

“Objects and Reasons- Clause 15 (old) seeks to insert a new Section 17-A to empower the State Commission to transfer a case from one District Forum to another District Forum within the State if required for the ends of justice. It also seeks to insert another new Section 17-B to enable the State Commissions to hold Circuit Benches.”

17. Mr. Bhatnagar also relied on Section 22 of the Act, which deals with the power and procedure of the National Commission. Before the 2002 Amendment, the said provision was as follows:

“22. Power of and procedure applicable to the National Commission- The National Commission shall, in the disposal of any complaints or any proceedings before it, have

a) the powers of a Civil Courts as specified in Sub-Sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13;

b) the power to issue an order to the opposite party directing him to do any one or more of the things referred to in clauses (a) to (i) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 14,  and follow such procedure as may be prescribed by the Central Government.”

18. After the 2002 Amendment, Section 22 of the Act now reads as follows:

“22. Power and procedure applicable to the National Commission-(1) The provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder for the disposal of complaints by the District Forum shall, with such modifications as may be considered necessary by the Commission, be applicable to the disposal of disputes by the National Commission.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Sub-Section (1), the National Commission shall have the power to review any order made by it, when there is an error apparent on the face of record.”

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19. The 2002 Amendment also introduced Section 22A which reads as follows:

“22A. Power to set aside ex parteorders.-Where an order is passed by the National Commission ex parte against the opposite party or a complainant, as the case may be, the aggrieved party may apply to the Commission to set aside the said order in the interest of justice.”

20. Mr. Bhatnagar contended that Section 22(2) was introduced in 2002 to give the National Commission the power to review its own order. This power could not have been used  by the Commission before the amendment. After amendment, now the Commission has specific power to set aside an ex parte order. This power has only been given to the National Commission and not extended to the District Forums or the State Commissions. If the legislature intended to give this power to the State Commissions and District Forums then it would have extended the same to those forums also.

21. Mr. Bhatnagar has also drawn our attention to the objects and reasons for carrying out the amendment which reads as follows:

“Objects and Reasons-Clause 21 (old) seeks to substitute Section 22 so that the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder for the disposal of complaints by the District Forum, shall, with such modifications as may be considered necessary by the Commission, be applicable to the disposal of disputes by the National Commission. It also seeks to empower the National Commission to review any order made by it when there is an error apparent on the face of record. These provisions will make the powers and procedures in respect of the National Commission more explicit. It also seeks to insert new Sections 22-A, 22-B and 22-C and 22-D. New Section 22-A empowers the National Commission to set aside ex parte orders against the opposite party or complainant in the interest of justice........"

22. Mr. Bhatnagar submitted that the limited applicability of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to the Tribunals under the Act is under Section 13(4) of the Act. There is no power of

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review or recall under the said provision. Even under Section 13(4)(vi), no Rule has been framed in terms of Section 30(1) by the Central Government which provides power to review or recall of orders.

23. Learned senior counsel for the appellants also relied on M/s Eureka Estates (P) Ltd. v. A.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and Others AIR 2005 AP 118 in which the Court observed that the District Forums and the State Commissions are entitled to exercise only such powers which are specifically vested in them under the Act and the Rules.

24. Mr. Bhatnagar submitted that it is evident from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act that the purpose of the Act is to provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes. It is for this reason that all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have not been extended to the Consumer Forums.

25. Mr. Bhatnagar further submitted that the salutary object of speedy and simple redressal under the Act is to be found inter alia in Sections 13(2) and (3) of the Act which provide for the procedure to be adopted by the forum in deciding the complaints admitted by it. The said provisions read as follows:

13. (2) The District Forum shall, if the complaints admitted by it under Section 12 relates to goods in respect of which the procedure specified in Sub- Section (1) cannot be followed, or if the complaint relates to any services,-

(a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum;

(b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the complaint, referred to him under clause (a) denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the District Forum, the District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute,-

(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and the opposite party, where the opposite party denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or

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(ii) ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant where the opposite party omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the Forum.

(c) where the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing before the District Forum, the District Forum may either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits. (3) No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in Sub-Sections (1) and (2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with.

26. Mr. Bhatnagar also relied on Section 12(3) of the Act which reads as follows:

“12(3) On receipt of a complaint made under Sub-Section (1), the District Forum may, by order, allow the complaint to be proceeded with or rejected:

Provided that a complaint shall not be rejected under this Sub-Section unless an opportunity of being heard has been given to the complainant: Provided further that the admissibility of the complaint shall ordinarily be decided within twenty- one days from the date on which the complaint was received.”

27. Mr. Bhatnagar tried to explain the legislative intent behind introducing Section 22-A. According to him, only the National Commission has been given power to set aside ex parte orders and the same power has not been extended to the District Forums or the State Commissions because against the orders of the District Forums and the State Commissions,  appeal or revision can be filed before the State Commission and the National Commission respectively. But in the case of the orders of the National Commission, prior to the amendment, the parties were compelled to approach this Court even against the orders by which the cases were dismissed in default. It became extremely expensive and time consuming. In this view of the matter, it became imperative to give this power to the National Commission.

28. According to the counsel for the appellants, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., this Court did not notice the earlier decision in Jyotsana's case. He submitted that the Tribunals constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 exercise only such powers as are expressly conferred by the provisions of the said Act and Rules framed thereunder.

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Since no power of review and recall was conferred on the District Forums and the State Commissions, they can exercise no such power.

29. The counter affidavit was filed by the respondents stating that the Commission was justified in setting aside the ex parte  order and restoring the respondents' complaint. The counter affidavit also states that the respondents cannot be deprived of their right without contest on the basis of trivial technicalities.

30. The respondents relied upon the judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. in which this Court held that the Consumer Courts have inherent powers to restore the complaints dismissed for default. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that due to old age, respondent no.1 lost track of the case and therefore, the State Commission was justified in setting aside the ex parte order in order to ensure that justice is done to the parties.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8155 OF 2001

31. In Civil Appeal No.8155 of 2001, the National Commission passed an ex parte order and in the appeal against the order, this Court gave liberty to the appellants to approach the Commission for setting aside the ex parte order.

Thereafter, an application was filed by the complainants for review of the order. The Commission vide order dated 12.7.2001 (relied on the judgment of Jyotsana's case)  dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has filed this appeal.

32. Mr. M.S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No.8155 of 2001 submitted that the National Commission has implied and inherent power to recall the order dated 30.5.1996 passed in Original Petition No.110 of 1993.

33. Mr. Ganesh also submitted that the notice of hearing sent by the National Commission was never served on the counsel for the appellants yet the National Commission proceeded to an ex parte decision on the appellants' complaint and dismissed it on the ground of limitation.

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34. According to Mr. Ganesh, the decision in Jyotsana's case is manifestly per incuriam. It does not even refer to the doctrine of implied powers and was not aware of its applicability. The later decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. is expressly mindful of the doctrine. He submitted that an external aid to the interpretation of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 also reinforces the above construction of the Act.

35. We have carefully scrutinized the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. We have also carefully analyzed the submissions and the cases cited by the learned counsel for the parties.

36. On careful analysis of the provisions of the Act, it is abundantly clear that the Tribunals are creatures of the Statute and derive their power from the express provisions of the Statute. The District Forums and the State Commissions have not been given any power to set aside ex parte orders and power of review and the powers which have not been expressly given by the Statute cannot be exercised.

37. The legislature chose to give the National Commission power to review its ex parte orders. Before amendment, against dismissal of any case by the Commission, the consumer had to rush to this Court. The amendment in Section 22 and introduction of Section 22-A were done for the convenience of the consumers. We have carefully ascertained the legislative intention and interpreted the law accordingly.

38. In our considered opinion, the decision in Jyotsana's case laid down the correct law and the view taken in the later decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. is untenable and cannot be sustained.

39. In view of the legal position, in Civil Appeal No.4307 of 2007, the findings of the National Commission are set aside as far as it has held that the State Commission can review its own orders. After the amendment in Section 22 and introduction of Section 22A in the Act in the year 2002 by which the power of review or recall has vested with the National Commission only. However, we agree with the findings of the National Commission holding that

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the Complaint No.473 of 1999 be restored to its original number for hearing in accordance with law.”

मा0 सर्वोच्‍च न्‍यायालय एवं मा0 राष्‍ट्रीय आयोग के उपरोक्‍त न्‍यायिक दृष्‍टान्‍तों के आधार पर वर्तमान विविध प्रार्थना पत्र आधारहीन है और निरस्‍त होने योग्‍य है। तद्नुसार यह विविध प्रार्थना पत्र निरस्‍त किया जाता है।

वैयक्तिक सहायक से अपेक्षा की जाती है कि वह इस निर्णय को आयोग की वेबसाइट पर नियमानुसार यथाशीघ्र अपलोड कर दें।

                    (विकास सक्‍सेना)                (राजेन्‍द्र सिंह)

                       सदस्‍य                          सदस्‍य                    

निर्णय आज खुले न्‍यायालय में हस्‍ताक्षरित, दिनांकित होकर उद्घोषित किया गया।

                    (विकास सक्‍सेना)                (राजेन्‍द्र सिंह)

                 सदस्‍य                          सदस्‍य                     

प्रमोद कुमार,

वैयक्तिक सहायक ग्रेड-1.  

कोर्ट नं0-2.